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ABSTRACT 
 
Individuals, communities, non-government organizations and governments are in constant pursuit 
of intelligent responses to the complex socio-environmental challenges they encounter. The 
capacity to respond effectively to these contemporary challenges is deeply dependent on the 
presence of effective governance processes.  Governance scholarship has typically been limited to 
individual elements such as frameworks (hierarchical or market or network), tools (e.g., 
regulation) or actors (e.g., government). The goal of this thesis is to characterize and explain 
transformations in water governance in order to offer insight into how more effective governance 
processes can be created. Transformations in governance speak to the dynamic nature of 
governing, and highlight the consistent push and pull between, and amongst, the various 
components at play.   Components include actors, formal and informal structures, and the social, 
economic and environmental contexts in which governance is embedded.  Critically each of these 
components also exists and has influence at multiple levels, adding to the complex and dynamic 
nature of governance.   This research argues that the core elements (frameworks, tools, actors) 
should be examined individually, as well as collectively, and within context of the various 
components in order to obtain a holistic perspective on governance process. This holistic 
perspective is necessary if we are to garner a true understanding of how governance is ultimately 
designed, contested and transformed. 
The research focuses on a large-scale water governance case in southern Ontario that is 
governed by its own provincial legislation – the first of its kind in Canada. The research examines 
governance frameworks as situated within the broader architecture, tools, and actor dynamics in 
the Lake Simcoe watershed and how they evolved over a 30-year period. Interviews, archival 
research, surveys and social network analyses were utilized in a mixed methods approach. The 
first governance element examined in this thesis is the architecture of the entire system over the 
30 year time period.  Rather than conduct a narrow analysis of an individual governance 
framework in a select period of time, the research takes a high level perspective to identify the 
transitions between governance frameworks, and the social, economic, and environmental 
tensions and drivers that initiated change.  Particular value is offered by the use of social network 
analysis to visually identify the structure and statistically evaluate the governance framework at 
multiple phases in the research period. The second element of governance, tools, is then assessed.  
Specifically, the utility of a watershed boundary for water governance is examined.  The thesis 
argues that the watershed boundary has value, but should be applied in limited and focus ways, 
and greater attention should be given to governance processes that transcend the watershed 
boundary. The final element examined is actors.  Early in the thesis, focus is given to the role of 
government, but in the final section particular attention is given to the role of non-government 
actors.  The research describes how the role and activities of non-government actors has advanced 
beyond late 20th century approaches, where recent trends display more innovative and 
entrepreneurial characteristics.  
The research offers nine important insights for theory and practice in water governance. (1) 
Governance processes have the potential to be flexible, adaptive and responsive. (2) A reduced 
presence of government does not always hold back processes of governance. (3) Existing tools 
can be re-imagined for new processes. (4) Non-government actors have agency (5) Give attention 
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to individual knowledge and capacity through a distributed governance approach (6) Give 
attention to time and the building of scientific knowledge (7) Give attention to need for 
effectively facilitated processes (8) Give attention to emerging opportunity (9) Permits space for 
creative destruction. Collectively, the findings from this research further develop scholarship on 
the individual elements of governance, as well as speak to the transformations in water 
governance as a whole. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
As individuals and communities, organizations and governments, we are in constant pursuit of 
intelligent responses to the complex socio-environmental challenges we encounter (Folke, et al. 
2005). Our capacity to respond is deeply dependent on the decision-making processes that are 
engaged (Reed and Bruyneel 2010). The selection of which actors will be involved, which styles 
of dialogue and debate, collaboration or conflict resolution are utilized and how, or if, consensus 
will be formed collectively construct the possible outcomes and therefore success or failure of the 
response.  
Governance can be defined as “the structures and processes by which people in societies 
make decisions and share power” (Young 1992, 160).Governance theory has a basis in policy 
studies and administrative sciences. Governance scholars typically have focused on the actions of 
governments, government-driven policy change, and how governments choose to engage with the 
public and private sectors (Klijn and Teisman 2000; Kooiman 1993; Poulsen 2009). Government, 
in this discussion, is not limited to federal or national governments, but instead refers to 
government agencies across various scales (regional, state/provincial, and federal) and most 
generally, governments in the western world. Changes in social, economic and environmental 
realities, such as severe weather events (droughts, flooding), economic downturns and increasing 
gaps between rich and poor, have influenced government actions and processes, and in turn 
shifted the focus of governance theory (Armitage, et al. 2012). As governments increasingly 
provided or permitted a broader role for markets to offer social services, scholarship in turn begun 
to investigate the resulting restructuring of roles and relationships between government and the 
private sector (e.g.,  Agrawal and Lemos 2007). When a focus on market mechanisms showed 
weakness in dealing with complexities of governing across a broad range of social and 
environmental issues, a second major shift in governance practice took place. Through this 
second shift, the governance literature moved towards examining how networks amongst a 
variety of actors beyond government were influencing and undertaking governance (Gibbs 2008; 
Holley, et al. 2012).  
Yet with each of these governance systems (hierarchy, market, network), scholarly study 
has typically been limited to an element of the system, rather than taking a holistic perspective 
(e.g.,  Bakker 2003; Crona, et al. 2011; Kooiman 1993). Exceptions to this pattern include Holley 
et al. (2012) and Moss and Newig (2010) who consider the interactions amongst multiple 
governance systems, and governance across scale. There is now greater acknowledgement within 
governance scholarship  for the need to examine governance from a holistic perspective, i.e., the 
dynamic and interacting nature of multiple governance systems within, and across scale and time, 
in order to obtain a more accurate understanding of governance in practice and to inform theory 
(Newig and Kvarda 2012). Lowndes and Skelcher (1998, 331) have noted that a more nuanced 
view of the complexity of governance in practice is necessary, because failure to do so would 
result in a “crude periodization” of governance. This phrasing can be understood to refer to how 
practices of governance have been lumped into large phases, or periods of governance systems, 
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i.e., hierarchy or markets. Theirs is an effort to avoid the position that single governance systems 
exist in tidy, isolated and compartmentalized formats where there are only hierarchies, or only 
markets or networks.  
Transformations in governance speak to the dynamic nature of governing, and highlight the 
consistent push and pull between, and amongst, the various components at play.   Components 
include actors, formal and informal structures, and the social, economic and environmental 
contexts in which governance is embedded.  Critically each of these components also exists and 
has influence at multiple levels, adding to the complex and dynamic nature of governance.   This 
research argues that the core elements (frameworks as situated in a broader architecture, tools, 
actors) should be examined individually, as well as collectively, and within context of the various 
components in order to obtain a holistic perspective on governance process. This holistic 
perspective is necessary if we are to garner a true understanding of how governance is ultimately 
designed, contested and transformed. This dissertation argues that there are three elements that 
should be examined in order to construct a holistic perspective on governance. These include (1) 
governance architectures, (2) tools, and (3) actor dynamics. Examining governance architectures 
goes beyond identification of an individual framework and provides insight on what types of 
governance systems are in place, and potentially how they interact and change over time. Given 
that governance is largely a social process (Bogason and Musso 2006; Kanie, et al. 2012) and is 
therefore subject to changes in contexts, influences and externally imposed events, it is unlikely 
that changes in governance over time will follow a common or linear path. Tools are related to 
the actualization of governance and include elements such as participation, idea generation, and 
implementation. These elements define governance in practice. Actor dynamics provide critical 
insights into the relationships and interactions among those engaged in governance. There has 
been a long focus on the actions of government, but with the acknowledgement of market and 
network governance systems, it is clear that non-government actors are engaged in some capacity. 
With such shifts underway, it is necessary to give value and attention to the diverse array of 
actors engaged in governance (Compas 2012; Fagan and Sircar 2010).  
These three elements draw out important research questions regarding governance. What 
types of transformations are taking place within governance architectures? What types of tools 
are available to permit greater flexibility and adaptiveness in response to constantly shifting 
governance contexts? Who is engaged in governance and how? Together, the examination of 
governance relative to these three elements has the potential to offer a comprehensive, holistic 
perspective on the complex dynamics regarding current governance practice, and can deeply 
inform governance theory.  
Water governance is a particularly useful setting within which to examine these governance 
elements. In its third World Water Assessment Report, the United Nations stated that the earth is 
on the brink of a global water crisis, and that avoiding this crisis rests largely on achieving 
effective governance processes (United Nations World Water Assessment Programme 2009). 
While governance challenges that exist in the realm of water resources hold their own unique 
characteristics (i.e., trans-boundary, non-stationary) several also mirror those faced in other 
public policy arenas. These challenges include divided and fragmented authority among 
governing bodies, questions relating to the appropriate mechanisms for governance, and the form 
and extent of engagement and leadership for different governance actors (Moss and Newig 2010).  
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This research provides an examination of governance in a large-scale watershed case in 
southern Ontario, Canada over a 30 year period. The research applies a case study method and 
includes multiple forms of governance systems over time. The long period of assessment is useful 
for highlighting the influence of social, economic and environmental influences on governance 
and resulting changes in architecture, tools and actor dynamics. The geographic area in Ontario 
under examination is a complex system where economics, social and environmental challenges 
and needs are often in conflict, suggesting that a defined set of tools may not always be 
appropriate for a case that requires flexible and adaptive responses to emerging and shifting 
challenges. The case study includes a dynamic range of actors who have changed over time in 
influence and engagement, and have demonstrated that government is not a sole decision maker. 
Finally, the case study location includes multiple levels of contrasting jurisdictional authority and 
responsibilities, adding further complexity to governance architectures, processes and actor 
dynamics.  
1.1.1 Research Objectives 
The purpose of this doctoral research is to characterize and explain transformations in water 
governance. The research explores a water governance case over a 30 year period of time to 
evaluate how and why the water governance system was transformed. Building on this evidence, 
the research explores the broader issues of governance change and inter-related dynamics of actor 
relationships, tools and architectures. Within the broader purpose stated above, there are four 
specific study objectives:  
• To evaluate changes in governance architecture over time; 
• To identify and assess governance tools; 
• To examine the changing role of NGOs in governance  
• To offer insight and theoretical contributions on how more effective governance processes 
can be created 
The holistic perspective on governance is an important step towards deciphering and 
understanding the true complexities and interconnected relationships that exist within social and 
environmental interactions. Collectively, the architecture, tools and actor dynamics of a 
governance system generate an interactive space through which policy, actions and environmental 
changes reverberate. An examination that is too narrowly focused has the potential to miss the in-
direct effects of such reverberations in a system, and therefore misinterpret how and why changes 
are taking place.  
This dissertation has been prepared in the academic journal manuscript style. Therefore, it 
contains this introductory chapter, which is followed by three standalone articles intended for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals, and then a final conclusion chapter that ties the findings of 
the individual manuscripts together in response to the research framework presented here. This 
chapter articulates the research objectives and presents the overall research methodology and data 
analysis. Additionally, it provides grounding for the context of the research and case study 
description. It should be noted that while the research methodology outlined in this chapter is 
relevant to the whole research project, there is variability in the focus, aim and objectives, and 
methodologies within the three chapters that present the results. The Conclusion (Chapter Five) 
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therefore ties the findings of the individual manuscripts back to the main research objectives to 
offer a cohesive response to the research purpose.  
1.2 Governance Theory 
 
1.2.1 Governance Architectures 
Governance as a concept suggests that society utilizes a number of structures and processes to 
identify challenges, create solutions, and successfully implement responses to overcome common 
social problems (Borrás and Radaelli 2011). More precisely it can be understood as “the 
structures and processes by which people in societies make decisions and share power” (Young 
1992) . Yet given that governance practice deals with complex social arrangements, it is 
necessary to examine the depth and complexity of the multitude of structures and processes at 
play. Investigations of governance practice must examine the full range of elements involved in 
order to decipher, describe and gain knowledge of the true construction and interactions of 
governance. Social-organizational features of governance include particular classes of designated 
agents, their roles and relations of power/authority, and procedures for making collective 
decisions. Normative-cognitive features include the definition of problems, the goals or priorities 
relating to the problems and the conceptualization of sources of the problems, the causal linkages, 
and strategies and methods to solve problems or deal with issues (Burns and Stöhr 2011). 
Therefore it is necessary to examine both the social organization and normative-cognitive features 
of governance.  
The concept of architecture provides a useful analytical framework for governance. 
Gunningham (2009a) asserts that the metaphor of architecture enables investigators to distance 
themselves from the details, and permits an evaluation of the underlying foundation of the 
governance system, while also acknowledging the individual parts that form the whole. In 
addition to providing a holistic perspective, the governance architecture construct also permits 
comparative analysis among governance systems. Biermann, et al. (2009) suggest that by 
applying the construct of architecture, the synergy and conflict between governance systems can 
be identified, compared and assessed. Approaching governance through an architectural lens also 
provides for a multi-level and temporal assessment. Clarke (2004; in Kuhlmann and Allsop 2008, 
174 ) calls for a more “‘conjunctural analysis’ in order to explore the ‘unsettled formations’ of 
governance”. These references suggest that the transitions between governance systems over 
time, and the push and pull effects of governance between levels, can impact the architecture of a 
governance system in a particular space and time.  
Biermann, et al. (2009) have identified the analytical problem of governance architectures 
as one of five major future challenges in the emerging field of earth system governance research. 
This same priority applies to regional and local governance systems, where whole system 
research and analysis is only beginning to emerge. Burns and Stöhr (2011), Gunningham (2009a) 
and Biermann, et al. (2009), are scholars applying governance architecture as an analytical 
framework. Each offers particular insight as to how to apply this approach. Biermann, et al. 
(2009, 18) recognize the frequently serendipitous nature of governance architecture when they 
state, “we assume neither an a priori existing state of universal order nor a universal trend 
towards order… architectures are likely to result from incremental processes of 
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institutionalization… In other words, the concept of architecture does not assume the existence of 
an “architect.” This speaks to the need to identify each of the contributing factors, but to assess 
the system as a whole that is responding to a confluence of events. Burns and Stöhr (2011, 180) 
add that descriptions of governance architectures must also examine the “key drives of how 
governance systems are established, maintained or changed through power, knowledge, and 
contestation/conflict processes” in order to draw out the relationship between and amongst 
governance elements. They identify four drivers for shifts in governance including 1) dominant 
power and a shift in the agent’s cognitive-normative framework, 2) power shifts, 3) a new 
governance order is established through multi-agent negotiation, 4) governance shift through 
diffusion and emulation (organic transformation) (Burns and Stöhr 2011).  
This point is echoed by Gunningham (2009a) who states that the relationship between 
elements and actors “enables the development of a more sophisticated and nuanced account of 
how and why environmental architectures have shifted in particular directions, [and] the 
consequences of those shifts.” These statements suggest that in many ways, the most critical 
aspects of governance systems are the informal cultures, institutions and dynamics between 
elements that operate within a given space. Therefore investigations must focus on these possibly 
less tangible, but highly influential, elements in order to triangulate the data and form the most 
accurate construction of the system.  
By understanding the architecture of governance, it may then also be possible to shift it 
towards a more favorable future design. Kanie et al. (2012), in discussion of governance 
architecture for sustainable development, recognize that changing social, economic, 
environmental and political contexts require parallel shifts in governance architecture and pose 
the question – “what alternative architecture would make sense, and how can we get there?” Their 
commentary liberates future governance from current constraints (i.e., how or if a selected 
process or set of tools can achieve a desired outcome) by acknowledging the actor agency role in 
governance, and the potential to create a communally constructed future. Young (2008) states that 
there is a need to seek a change in governance architecture if actors are going to be able to 
respond to the large scale and complex social and environmental challenges present today. As in 
so many cases many institutions are charged with responding to environmental challenges that 
did not exist when they were initially created (Newell, et al. 2012).  
1.2.2 Tools for Governance 
The notion that the watershed provides an ideal boundary has been common for some time. The 
use of watershed boundaries was noted in the third century China (Molle 2009). Drainage areas 
were mapped in Spain and France in the mid-1800s (Blomquist and Schlager 2005; Molle 2009). 
Several rationales for the appropriateness of watershed boundaries have been advanced. First is 
the apparent naturalness of the boundary (Commission of the European Communities 2007; 
Parkes, et al. 2010; Saravanan, et al. 2009; Warner, et al. 2008; White 1957). Watersheds are 
defined by hydrological processes. Thus, they are “distinct, easily mapped and stable” (Barrow 
1998) and “define basic, ecologically and geomorphologically relevant management units” 
(Montgomery, et al. 1995). These properties, it has been suggested, make them a tangible and 
manageable unit for water governance (Kenny 1999).  
With the acceptance of the boundary as natural, it is often asserted that watersheds are the 
most appropriate scale for defining the jurisdiction of water-related organizations. From this 
 6 
perspective, considerations such as social, political, economic and environmental functions 
relevant to water governance should be organized and integrated at this scale (Huitema, et al. 
2009; Leach 2006; Schmidt and Morrison 2012). This perspective is evident in the European 
Union, where watersheds (or catchments) are a defining feature of governance under the Water 
Directorate Framework (Commission of the European Communities 2007). The appeal of the 
watershed boundary as an organizing principle is the assumption that organizing activities around 
this spatial unit will permit systematic integration of issues, participation of relevant stakeholders, 
and more effective resource management (Montgomery, et al. 1995; Schmidt and Morrison 2012; 
Woolley and McGinnis 1999). Veal (2010) outlines several additional purported strengths of the 
use of the watershed boundary. These include the capacity for the state of the ecosystem to be 
reflected in the state of the water flowing through the system; the ability for water systems to 
demonstrate the cumulative effect of environmental stresses; the role that watersheds can play as 
bridging tools for agencies; and finally, the fact that human communities can relate to their 
landscapes, making it an appropriate boundary for engagement.  
 A growing body of literature is arguing that watershed boundaries are useful in limited 
applications and that the utility of the watershed boundaries relates primarily to whether it is 
being used for water management or governance purposes (Cohen and Davidson 2011). It is 
therefore important to make the distinction clear between governance and management. 
Management is defined as “the operational, on-the-ground activity to regulate a resource and 
conditions of its use” (Nowlan and Bakker 2007, 5); designing allocation plans, flooding, and 
day-to-day water quality testing are examples of water management activities. Governance can be 
defined as “the structures and processes by which people in societies make decisions and share 
power” (Young 1992, 160). This paper is concerned with the use of boundaries for water 
governance, and consequently the use of watershed boundaries for water governance. Most 
recently Cohen and Davidson (2011)  have synthesized five distinct challenges that exist 
including boundary selection, accountability, public participation, problemsheds and policysheds.  
 
1.2.3 Non-Government Governance Actors  
Advancements in scholarly governance literature illustrate the dynamic and complex nature of 
governing. These advancements include empirical research on the changing role of the state in the 
last quarter century. This has been an important contemporary concern for policy makers, 
scholars and the public (Gouldson 2009; Hysing 2009). There is increasing recognition among 
governance scholars that non-government governance actors are exerting influence over 
governance systems and contributing in novel ways to governance process (Newell, et al. 2012). 
The roles of non-government actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are 
particularly pertinent to water governance as these groups are very active within water 
governance processes. NGO actors have long played an important role in the governance process 
through advocacy, protests, awareness campaigns and citizen movements (Pross 1986). Classical 
governance arrangements, whereby the state exerts hierarchical control and dominance in 
governing society (Treib, et al. 2007), have proved unsuitable and unresponsive to current social, 
cultural and environmental complexities (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). As a result, NGO actors 
have become more involved in governance beyond the role of advocacy and stakeholders. NGO 
actors are generating opportunities for, and sometimes directing, governance processes (Auer 
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2000a; Bugdahn 2008; Dombrowski 2010). In this way they are exerting greater agency and 
authority (Benecke 2011). 
Some scholars suggest non-government actors are not simply being invited to participate in 
governance activities by government (Edelenbos, et al. 2010; Gouldson 2009; Gunningham 
2009b). Instead, they are actively pursuing their own governance agendas (Crow 2008; Gouldson 
2009) and thus are becoming important actors in shaping environmental solutions (Auer 2000a; 
Wapner 1995). These authors suggest that non-government actors are creating their own distinct 
roles in governance processes that go well beyond simply being subjects for consultation. As a 
result, they are further altering the governance frameworks in which they operate. While Legler 
(2012) states that unless non-government actors are able to obtain authority, their efforts to 
govern are meaningless, other authors contend that contributions by non-government actors are 
creating a more resilient and democratic environment by revitalizing the governance process 
(Kapaciauskaite 2011; Kim 2009). That non-government actors are modifying governance 
process and influencing policy and cultural norms in their own unique ways highlight a need to 
further assess how this is impacting governance architecture as a whole.  
1.3 Historical Governance in the Lake Simcoe Watershed 
Lake Simcoe is a one hour drive north of Toronto, Canada’s largest metropolitan area. The Lake 
Simcoe watershed (Figure 1) has a total land and water surface area of 3,303 sq. km., of which 
the lake itself occupies approximately 22% or 722 sq. km. It contains significant natural, urban 
and agricultural systems and is a source of drinking water for five municipalities. It is southern 
Ontario’s largest inland lake, excluding the Great Lakes (Government of Ontario 2009). The 
watershed provides significant economic value to the region and the province, bringing in an 
estimated $200 million dollars annually through recreational activities (Government of Ontario 
2009). Primary recreational activities include fishing, boating and cottaging (Ontario Ministry of 
Environment, et al. 2009). 
Water quality problems in Lake Simcoe have been documented since the 1970s and 
instigated the collaboration of three provincial ministries and the watershed’s Lake Simcoe 
Region Conservation Authority (LSRCA). Beginning in the early 1970’s the Ontario Ministry of 
the Environment (MOE) conducted water quality studies on the lake and found that the lake was 
being impacted by human activity (LSCRC 1979). During this same time the Ontario Ministry of 
Natural Resources (MNR) was conducting fishery studies and established that the cold water fish 
were in significant decline (LSCRC 1979). Also at this time the communities across the 
watershed were vocalizing concern over visible signs of water quality degradation along the 
shoreline (LSCRC 1979). These events and committees were important because they initiated the 
collaboration amongst these government agencies, and serve as the founding point for multi-actor 
governance in the watershed. 
Joint recognition of these efforts led to the Keswick Conference in 1975, and a resolution 
calling for a coordinated program for pollution control for the basin (LSCRC 1979). In response 
to the resolution, the provincial government established the Lake Simcoe-Couchiching Basin 
Report Committee (LSCRC), to conduct research, and report on the status of the problem and 
suggest management solutions (LSCRC 1979). The resulting report, the Lake Simcoe 
Couchiching Basin Environmental Study, outlined that the primary environmental concern in the 
basin was high levels of phosphorus which promoted algae blooms and shoreline weed growth, 
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leading to decreased levels of dissolved oxygen (required to support aquatic life). Levels of 
dissolved oxygen were below recommended levels, and further led to the decline of cold water 
fish (lake whitefish and lake trout) (LSCRC 1979). The collaborative effort put forth for this 
report and further studies led to the creation of the Lake Simcoe Environmental Management 
Strategy (LSEMS), a partnership of the government ministries and conservation authority whose 
aim was to conduct further monitoring and management of the Lake Simcoe watershed (LSEMS 
1995). In 1986, the LSEMS partnership made a submission to the Ontario Provincial Cabinet for 
political and financial support of further efforts. Cabinet approved the submission, and the 
program was formally announced on July 27 1990 (LSEMS 1995).  
Figure 1 The Lake Simcoe Watershed 
 
 
The LSEMS completed three phases (1990-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2007) of monitoring 
and management, and achieved phosphorus reductions in each stage. However, over this same 
period, environmental challenges in the basin continued to grow and become more complex. 
Changes in population and land-use provide effective illustrations of this change. In 1979 
population in the basin was estimated at 190,000 (LSCRC 1979), by 1995 it reached 271,410 
(LSEMS 1995), and by 2003 it was 382,887 (LSEMS 2003). The change in land use mirrors the 
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population growth. Agricultural land cover in 1985 was 65% and dropped to 45% by 1995 
(LSEMS 1995), and further still to 40% in 2003 (LSEMS 2003). During this same time urban 
land cover grew from 65 km2 in 1985 to 87km2 in 1995 (LSEMS 1995), and was 285km2 by 2003 
(LSEMS 2003). Additionally, invasive species had been introduced to the lake (such as zebra 
mussels), the cold water fisheries were no longer naturally reproducing, high levels of e. Coli 
were resulting in regular beach closures and intense flooding events were demonstrating the 
effects of climate change within the watershed (LSSAC2008).  
Towards the end of the LSEMS Phase 3, the capacity of the collaborative program to 
effectively address the rising complexity of environmental challenges was lessening and new civil 
society groups were emerging and seeking opportunities to engage in governance activities. In 
2005, attention to issues regarding water quality in Lake Simcoe became prominent among the 
public and ratepayers associations in the watershed. An umbrella organization called Rescue Lake 
Simcoe Coalition (RLSC) was formed in 2003 to bring together multiple small community 
groups working to advocate for improvement in the management of the Lake. A second 
organization, Ladies of the Lake (LofL), was also created in 2005 and focused on innovative 
public engagement strategies to raise awareness. The Coalition later joined forces with 
Environmental Defense (ED) (a Canadian national environmental advocacy organization) and 
Ontario Nature (ON) (a provincial scientific and environmental advocacy organization) to form 
Campaign Lake Simcoe (CLS). Due largely to the combined efforts of the RLSC, Ladies of the 
Lake, the Campaign and the LSEMS program, in 2007 the Ontario provincial government 
announced its intent to introduce the Lake Simcoe Protection Act (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23) which 
came into effect on June 2, 2009. The Act is the first in Canada to provide legislation to protect a 
specific watershed. The Act was implemented through the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan (LSPP) 
(Government of Ontario 2009). The plan outlines the environmental management approach and 
policies for the watershed, and identifies responsible authorities for each action. The LSPP marks 
an important advancement in environmental policy for the province by clearly defining and 
incorporating the precautionary principle, adaptive management, sustainable development and 
shared responsibility. It also provides regulations that harmonize multiple levels of governing 
within the watershed boundary. 
The watershed is a large scale, long term complex system under stress. The governance 
challenges in the watershed present significant hurdles to efficient and harmonious decision 
making processes. The system is challenged by its geography, economic significance, 
environmental stressors, and jurisdictional fragmentation. A recent environmental report 
summarized eight categories of stressors that affect the ecological health of Lake Simcoe and its 
watershed: nutrients, primarily phosphorus; contaminants including pharmaceuticals and other 
organics, metals and sediments; pathogens, primarily bacteria; introduced species; climate change 
and other physical stressors; land use change; water extraction; and other human pressures such 
as fishing and boating (LSSCA 2008). The watershed has 14 municipal sewage treatment plants 
discharging to the lake, and it is a source of drinking water for five municipalities. Hence, the 
watershed is under immense stress from human impact which threatens its capacity to continue to 
provide social, environmental and economic value. Finally, the watershed presents a typical 
example of jurisdictional fragmentation. There are 23 different municipal governments within the 
watershed – each with its own municipal land use plans, as well as five provincial pieces of 
legislation that direct land use planning. Additionally, Ontario’s environmental management 
strategy includes Conservation Authorities, arms-length government agencies that have legislated 
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responsibility for environmental management within the watersheds of southern Ontario. 
Therefore in addition to municipal and provincial planning, the Lake Simcoe Region 
Conservation Authority (LSRCA) also creates and implements environmental management plans 
for the watershed. An immensely complicated regulatory planning landscape exists in this region.  
Despite these challenges, the governance system has been able to achieve a number of 
important accomplishments. First among these is the durability of a largely self-directed 
governance system for almost 30 years. This collaboration evolved through four major planning 
phases, with larger contextual issues directly impacting the structure and process of the system in 
each phase, demonstrating critical responsiveness to change. Second, is the achievement of 
significant environmental improvements in the watershed’s ecosystem, marked by the 25 tonne 
reduction of phosphorus over a 15 year period. Third, actions by governance actors resulted in the 
landmark Lake Simcoe Protection Act, (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23) which was the first piece of 
provincial legislation in Canada to provide comprehensive integrated protection and planning for 
an individual watershed. In summary, the governance system in Lake Simcoe provides an 
example of a large scale governance system whose architecture has changed dramatically over 
time. It has experienced both stress as well as success, and has proved durable over a long period 
of time while being situated within a complex and intricate multi-level governing environment.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Introduction  
In order to explore the transformations in water governance, this research involved a long term 
analysis of a water governance system. The Lake Simcoe governance system has experienced 
disruptions, alterations and changes in the nature, form and direction of governance. Additionally, 
variations in actor engagement and leadership, as well as distinct shifts in tools and processes 
permit an opportunity to examine how and why changes in a governance system took place.  
In order to access both the individual shifts in the elements of governance, and to apply a 
holistic perspective on the governance system, several research methods were used in 
combination. Research methods included interviews, document collections, a survey and a 
historical document review (meeting minute notes). A mixed methodology permitted a multi-
level analysis of the governance system, ranging from the individual experience, to the 
organizational and regional levels. Additionally, a mixed methodology permitted both qualitative 
and quantitative assessments of the systems to be integrated for more comprehensive insights. 
The qualitative research involved key informant interviews with governance actors from a variety 
of sectors, including both those who have been involved over several years, and those engaged 
more recently. Actor interviews provided insights into the development, negotiations and 
evolution of the system and spoke to its relevance and strengths, as well as its weaknesses and 
ability to address the challenges in the watershed. Organizational perspectives were obtained 
from reports and media releases. Document reviews were critical for identifying baseline 
characteristics of the governing context. A regional perspective was obtained through formal 
legislation and policy documentation. The quantitative research involved an in-depth survey of 
governance actors focusing on their engagement in governance, their relationships with other 
governance actors and their perspectives on how the system has changed over time. Other 
 11 
quantitative data were collected from historical meeting minutes. The quantitative data were used 
to create Social Network Analysis maps of the governance system, thereby permitting a structural 
perspective. The value and rationale for using Social Network Analysis (SNA) is described in 
greater detail below (Section 1.4.2).  
It is important to note that while the research project as a whole incorporated several 
research methods, not all research methods were utilized for each of the standalone manuscript 
papers. Chapter Two utilizes the historical meeting minutes and survey data to evaluate the 
structural elements of the governance system. This analysis is supported by qualitative data from 
the document collection and interviews that gives perspective and context to the structural 
changes taking place. Chapter Three draws on the formal legislation and policy documentation to 
shed light on the formal governance shifts at a regional watershed scale to identify and to evaluate 
the specific tools and processes that were engaged most recently in the governance system. 
Chapter Four engages primarily with the interviews and firsthand accounts of actor engagement 
in the governance system, but is also supported by qualitative data from the survey and 
documentation to corroborate actor experiences. Thus, while each research methodology plays a 
primary role in one of the manuscripts, it is most important that they are considered as a 
collective within Chapter Five, where their combination illuminates the changes in the 
governance architecture. Table 1 indicates the primary and secondary data sources for each of the 
papers. 
Table 1 Primary and Supporting Research Methods 
Chapter Primary Methods Supporting Methods 
Two Social Network Analysis 
based on data from the 
historical meeting 
minutes and survey data 
Interviews, document 
collections 
Three Document collections Interviews 
Four Interviews Survey, document collections 
 
Collectively, the research seeks to address the whole system of governance. The 
combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods was critical to this study as their 
synthesis provides a deep and rich understanding of the case, as well as visual and statistical 
evidence of structure, processes and actors within the system. This combination permitted 
effective triangulation of the data, and accounted for the biases and weakness in each of the 
methods used.  
This research examines governance in a watershed context over a 30-year period. Three 
criteria were used to select the case study location including; the presence of a long term 
governance system, quantitative data regarding the governance system throughout time and that 
the consequences of the governance system’s actions carry significant impact on an economic, 
social, or environmental system. The governance system in Lake Simcoe as described in the 
previous section met each of these criteria. Accordingly, the case provides a valuable instance of 
a large scale governance system under stress that has been responsive to externalities and resulted 
in dramatic shifts in governance approaches over a long period of time. Governance in the Lake 
 12 
Simcoe watershed occurred in five distinct phases: 1986-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-2000, 2001-
2007, and 2008-2010. The phases are defined by formalized partnerships or legislation. Phases 
one through four were defined by a formal Memorandum of Understanding for the LSEMS 
program. The last phase is defined by actor’s participation in formal committees established by 
the Lake Simcoe Protection Act. 
Case study methods are useful for examining why a set of decisions or processes was 
undertaken and how they were implemented (Yin 2009, 17). They are also appropriate for 
research where surveys or experiments would not obtain the desired information, because of the 
complexity of the context (Bloor and Wood 2006, 25). Baxter and Jack (2008) note that case 
studies are also valuable as they enable the research to consider the phenomenon through a 
variety of data sources, enabling multiple facets of the phenomenon to be explored.  
The boundaries of the case were bounded in both time and space (Creswell 2003). 
Geographically, the study focuses on activities having impact within a watershed (Lake Simcoe 
watershed as noted in section 1.3). The time span of the research covers approximately a 30 year 
period, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing until the end of the research period in 2007. 
For clarity, in Chapter 2, phases of the whole governance system over a 30 year time are 
compared. In Chapter 3, the focus is on the multi-level and integrated governance system 
currently in place within the watershed. Finally, Chapter 4 also assesses change in the governance 
system over time, but with a focus on the changing role of ENGO actors.  This chapter examines 
the last 10 years of the governance system.  The focus on the last 10 years is intended to privilege 
the time period when ENGO’s were deeply engaged in governance in a way that had 
demonstrated impact on the decision making processes and outcomes. 
1.4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The data collection took place over a year, and each data collection effort was informed by 
the preceding effort.  Document collection was the initial step, which permitted a timeline of 
events to be developed, as well as highlighted major activities and key actors.  Following this was 
the historical meeting minutes and further document collection from the LSRCA.  Attendance 
records derived from the meeting minutes served as data for the historical social network 
analysis.  The next step was interviews with key informants; document collection continued 
during this stage as resources were provided by key informants.  Based on connections made with 
key informants at the Ontario Ministry of Environment, access was provided to attendance data 
for the consultation processes for the LSPA and LSPP.  This data was added to the historical 
social network analysis.  The final data collection was the survey.  The sample for the survey was 
based on key actors identified in the document collections, key informants, and actors identified 
by key informants.   Figure 2 highlights the two analytical perspectives on the governance case 
permitted by the diversity of data collected.  This historical analysis was strengthened by several 
overlaps in time periods for the data.  Data was also collected that represented various levels in 
the governance case including the individual level (interviews and surveys), the organizational 
level (media releases, organizational mandates and history of activity) and finally at the regional 
level (legislation, policy and management documents).    
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Figure 2 Triangulated Analysis 
 
1.4.2.1 Quantitative Data for Social Network Analysis  
Social network analysis (SNA) provides a structural analysis of a network (Crona and Bodin 
2006; Schiffer 2008). SNA involves quantitative delineation and analysis of the network to 
identify the structure of interactions between actors and the network properties (Adam and Kriesi 
2007). Comparing and contrasting the network structures and statistics between phases of the 
network provides evidence of network change. A SNA also helps to tease out power, influence, 
and connectivity among network actors (Prell, et al. 2009).  
 This research draws on two separate data sets for the SNA. Data from the historical 
network cover the five phases of the governance system, while the second set of data 
encompasses the latter half of the fourth phases and the entire fifth phase. The first set of data is 
entirely drawn from formal meeting interactions, while the second data set is based on survey 
data from governance actors based on communication patterns. The combination of these two 
data sets provides for a more holistic perspective on the most recent phases of the network.  
1.4.2.1.1 Historical Meeting Minutes  
Data for the historical network was obtained from the Lake Simcoe Region Conservation 
Authority (LSRCA), an arm’s length provincial government agency responsible for 
environmental management of the Lake Simcoe watershed. During the first four phases of 
governance in the watershed, the LSRCA maintained administrative responsibility for the 
program. The data were collected from the records of meeting minutes and comprises the 
attendance of the actors at these meetings. The data were obtained from hard copies stored in the 
library at the LSRCA and were entered into an excel spreadsheet.  
Meeting attendance from all meetings was recorded and included. As noted, the last phase 
of the network is drawn from the formal committees established under the Lake Simcoe 
 14 
Protection Act. Actual meeting attendance data was not available for the first two committees, the 
Lake Simcoe Science Committee and the Lake Simcoe Stakeholder Committee. However, names 
of committee members were made available. As a result, it was assumed that all members 
attended all meetings for these committees. This assumption is supported by the fact that the 
committees were formally appointed by the provincial government and members had a mandate 
to participate. Additionally, actors who participated and were interviewed noted an extremely 
high level of participation from all members. Finally, video conferencing was made available for 
physically absent actors to participate. For the second set of committees created by the Lake 
Simcoe Protection Act, meeting attendance was made available, but was only recorded until the 
time of research data processing, which included two meetings.  
Data processing involved several steps. First, for the initial four governance phases, any 
actor who was completely absent from all sets of meetings was removed, leaving only actors who 
actually attended a meeting. Therefore, only actors who were physically present at meetings and 
had face-to-face interactions with other actors are included in the network. Second, all attendance 
from all committees for the entire five phases were merged into one table. Meeting attendances 
for individuals who were involved in multiple committees were condensed into one line item. 
Next, individual networks were isolated based on identified phases (1986 – 1989, 1990- 1994, 
1995 – 2000, 2001 – 2007, 2008- 2010). Next the attendance of individuals from the same agency 
was collapsed into one actor, and the data was converted to binary values (to remove weighting 
from multiple actors). This data was then imported into UCINET, a software for social network 
analysis. Further processing produced weighted values that represented how many meetings the 
same people attended, indicating a high level of face-to-face interaction.  
1.4.2.1.2 Survey 
Survey Gizmo, an online survey tool was used in this research. The survey was conducted after 
the initial phase of research, which focused on key informant interviews. Conducting the survey 
post-interview enabled better response rates to the survey because a relationship between 
researcher and the respondents had already been established (Bodin, et al. 2006; Borras and 
Zolner 2007). The survey sample was generated through both a purposive and snowball method.  
The survey sample included all key informants who had previously been interviewed, additional 
key actors identified in the document collection, as well as actors who had been identified as a 
key actor by at least two other actors in the network and for whom contact information was 
available. Survey respondents were able to save the survey and complete the information over 
time. The survey also included an option to be included in a cash prize draw. The survey was 
circulated to 78 people, and completed by 43, for a response rate of 52%. Of those who 
responded, 21 had also been interviewed. The survey instrument is included in Appendix A. 
The survey served to collect two sets of information. The first set related to their 
engagement and perspectives on governance in the watershed. These closed questions asked 
respondents to rate their response regarding the presence of good governance principles in the 
watershed, the roles of other actors in the watershed, if they shared resources (human, financial or 
data) with other actors in the watershed, why they became involved in Lake Simcoe governance 
activities, and general character identification questions. Data analysis involved tabulations of 
responses for each of the questions. 
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The second set of questions related more specifically to the actor’s relationship with other 
actors in the governance system for the purpose of building a data set for social network analysis 
(SNA). This time period was identified based on the data from the historical analysis that 
demonstrated a significant expansion in size and increase in diversity of actors in the network. 
The survey provided a list of individual actors listed in alphabetical order, and also provided 
space for the respondent to provide up to five additional names. The list of names was based on 
highly active actors in the historical network data set, as well as any additional key actors that had 
been identified in the interviews. These data were downloaded from the Survey Gizmo website 
and imported into Excel. Primary processing activities included creating a symmetric matrix. 
Data were then imported into UCINET.  
The data were analyzed using tools from UCINET, while visual depictions of the network 
were created in NETdraw. Statistical tools include density, and degree, closeness and 
betweenness centrality and homophily E-I index. The analysis of this data is described in more 
depth in the following sections. 
1.4.2.2 Qualitative Data 
A key weakness of SNA is its inability to discern motivations behind actions. This reflects the 
fact that SNA neither addresses individual behaviors, attitudes and beliefs (Rowley 1997), nor 
provides answers to such questions as: 
• How and why are networks formed and institutionalized? 
• How and why do they function over time? 
• How and why are they governed by hierarchical networks? 
• How do they contribute to effective policy? (Torfing 2007) 
Given the limitations of SNA, a qualitative approach to networks – largely understood as a 
policy network, or network governance approach – has been used to analyze actors, network 
characteristics and processes (Bogason and Zolner 2007; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Nyholm and 
Haveri 2009; O'Toole 1997; van Bueren, et al. 2003). Network analyses that focus on social 
processes require holistic and humanistic approaches (Coviello 2005). A qualitative analysis 
permits researchers to explore the complex interactions among actors to uncover institutional 
rules governing the network, beliefs and motivations as well as longitudinal patterns in the 
network (Provan and Kenis 2008; Torfing 2007). Multiple qualitative research methods such as 
document analysis, interviews, focus groups, and observation permit the creation of network 
narratives that can address the kinds of questions posed in this research (Berg 2007; Borras and 
Zolner 2007; Human and Provan 2000).  
Since networks encompass both qualitative and quantitative dimensions, Coviello (2005) 
argues that network research methods should accommodate both “hard” (quantitative, structural 
analysis) and “soft” (qualitative network analysis) data. Accordingly, this research supplemented 
the social network analysis with qualitative research to further triangulate the data and to 
contribute insight to network structure. Qualitative data was derived from key informant 
interviews, document analysis, and meeting attendance. 
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1.4.2.2.1 Interviews 
Purposive sampling (Bradshaw and Stratford 2005, 72) was used to identify participants for 
interviews. The actors were selected through a multi-stage process. First, a review of news 
releases, reports, studies from actors and organizations in the watershed was completed. Based on 
these documents, a timeline of major events was developed and this provided insight to the 
relationships and interactions amongst actors in the watershed. From this, a list of key actors was 
derived and formed the first set of interviewees. To be considered for an interview, actors must 
have been directly engaged in formal governance in the Lake Simcoe watershed.  
The interview list was expanded based on the snowball technique of referrals from initial 
interviews and key informants (Bradshaw and Stratford 2005, 72; Hennink, et al. 2011, 100). 
This was conducted until saturation (no new names were provided) was reached (Hennink, et al. 
2011, 105). Interview requests were sent to 59 actors, with 34 actors accepting. The interviews 
used semi-structured questions and were based on an interview guide that used a pyramid 
approach, wherein questioning moved from basic opening questions to more complex exploratory 
questions toward the end (Dunn 2005, 82; Hennink, et al. 2011, 113). The core questions asked 
actors to comment on the governance process in the Lake Simcoe watershed. The interviews 
questions evolved over time because an inductive approach was applied. Data from initial 
interviews were used in future interviews to probe more deeply into the issues (Hennink, et al. 
2011, 42). The interviews were conducted with 17 people representing Provincial government 
agencies, four people employed by the Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority, one land 
developer, five municipal government staff people, and seven representatives of NGO’s. 
Interviews typically lasted about an hour, with a few running closer to 45 minutes, or as long as 
90 minutes.  
It is important to note a number of qualifiers on the interview data. First, interviewees 
participated in governance activities in the watershed at different points of time and were not 
engaged in all aspects of the governing process. Therefore insights generated from interview data 
are not widely comparable across time. Second, because of the snowball technique used to 
identify key informants, interview questions that were generated as a result of later discussions 
were not asked of earlier key informants. Third, because of the scale of the watershed and scope 
of governing, often key informants would be engaged in different aspects of the governance 
process. Consequently, not all interview data can be compared based on experience in the 
process. It is the cumulative insight from multiple research methods that is valuable to this 
research given the long term time scale. 
The approach to data analysis was grounded in the principles presented by Liamputtang and 
Ezzy (2005) and supported by Hennink et al.(2011, 206) and Yin (2011, 95) who stated that 
“theory building occurs in an ongoing dialogue between pre-existing theory and new insights 
generated as a consequence of empirical observation” (Liamputtong and Ezzy 2005, 266). 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and then coded using Nvivo 8 software. Interview data were 
validated with each participant. Copies of the interview transcript were emailed to key informants 
who were permitted to clarify statements, or to identify text with which they were not 
comfortable.  
A coding casebook, which is a tool used for the purpose of setting standards for qualitative 
data analysis, was built using both an inductive and deductive approach. In the first round of 
coding, new nodes were developed as free nodes, and the code book was built successively as 
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additional interviews were completed. Once the entire set of interviews was coded, a second 
round of coding was conducted to ensure that all nodes were consistently applied across the data. 
Then, data for each node was reviewed and considered in light of the other nodes that were 
developed (Berg 2009, 362). After this review, the nodes were converted to tree nodes and 
restructured into a relational hierarchy in the process of categorizing to derive meaningful 
categories (Hennink, et al. 2011, 245). Next, each tree node was reviewed and analyzed for 
insight and understanding regarding the node theme, through the process of conceptualizing, in 
order to find relationships and meaning between and among categories and codes (Berg 2009, 
356; Hennink, et al. 2011, 245). Additionally, data analysis was conducted on nodes by way of 
text and compound queries to identify concepts, and to explore patterns, themes and meanings in 
the data. In order to draw out contrasting or supporting positions amongst actors, separate 
analyses were conducted and contrasted based on the characteristics of the respondent. During the 
entire data collection and analysis, constant ‘memoing’ of emergent ideas and code development 
was employed. Therefore, quality of coding was established through: verbatim transcription, 
codebook, memoing and coding saturation (Hennink, et al. 2011, 230).  
1.4.2.2.2 Documents 
Document collection focused on news releases, reports, studies, legislation and regulations from 
the governance actors in the watershed. Based on these documents, a timeline of major events 
was developed. Of particular value was the historical record collection of the LSEMS program 
maintained by the LSRCA. Documents were reviewed to obtain information regarding 
governance efforts, scientific and technical data regarding the state of the lake, and formal 
evidence of governance actor collaboration and engagement.  
1.5 Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation follows the academic journal manuscript style. It includes this introductory 
chapter, followed by three stand-alone manuscripts that will be submitted to peer review journals 
for publication following successful defense, and closes with a concluding chapter.  
• Chapter Two presents the manuscript entitled: Shifting Architectures of a Water 
Governance System Over 30 Years. This manuscript is based in governance scholarship that 
describes governance transitions, primarily the hierarchy to market to network narrative. 
The empirical research in this study confirms emerging research literature that argues 
against a linear transition between these types of governance systems, and instead suggests 
that governance in a multi-level, embedded system that includes several iterations and 
structures, each having influence on the other. The empirical data are used to construct 
several social network analysis maps of the governance system in the case study over time, 
and highlights the various changes that take place.  
• Chapter Three presents the manuscript entitled: Transcending the Watershed Boundary. 
This manuscript is based in water governance scholarship that focuses on the use of a 
watershed boundary for water governance. The manuscript argues that a watershed 
boundary is not appropriate, nor useful for all water governance applications, and that 
instead, several mechanisms that are adaptive, flexible and process-based can prove useful 
in place of a dependence on a watershed boundary. Indeed, the manuscript argues that a 
move towards these new mechanisms is necessary for successful water governance. The 
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data for the manuscript are based on a document review of introduced legislation, 
regulations and policy in the watershed under examination.  
• Chapter Four presents the manuscript entitled: Environmental Non-governmental 
Organizations in Water Governance: Mechanisms, Relationships and Roles. This 
manuscript examines the specific actions of a set of non-government actors, and their 
contributions to the changes in water governance in the watershed. Specifically, the articles 
describes how the role and activities of non-government actors has advanced beyond late 
20th century approaches to recent trends which display more innovative and entrepreneurial 
characteristics. The manuscript also examines the embedded nature of non-government 
actors within a formal network of government actors to find a more collaborative and 
supportive governance environment. Data for this manuscript was drawn from first and 
secondary research sources concerning the actions of the NGO’s as well as a survey taken 
amongst both government and non-government actors in the watershed.  
• Chapter Five brings together the major research findings from each of the preceding three 
chapters to identify how more effective governance processes can be created. This chapter 
also identifies further areas of study.  
The manuscripts do not follow a linear order. Instead each manuscript focuses on one of the 
core research objectives.  Collectively, the dissertation highlights governance transformations 
within the case study watershed.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Shifting Architectures of a Water Governance System Over 30 Years 
2.1 Introduction 
Governance as a concept suggests that society utilizes a number of structures and processes to 
identify challenges, create solutions, and successfully implement responses to overcome common 
social problems (Borrás and Radaelli 2011). More precisely it can be understood as “the 
structures and processes by which people in societies make decisions and share power” (Young 
1992) . Given that governance practice deals with complex social arrangements, it is necessary to 
examine the depth and complexity of the multitude of structures and processes at play. 
Investigations of governance practice must examine the full range of elements involved in order 
to decipher, describe and gain knowledge of the true construction and interactions of governance.  
The concept of architecture provides a useful analytical framework for governance. Gunningham 
(2009a) asserts that the metaphor of architecture enables investigators to distance themselves 
from the details, and permits an evaluation of the underlying foundation of the governance 
system, while also acknowledging the individual parts that form the whole. In addition to 
providing a holistic perspective, the governance architecture concept also permits comparative 
analysis among governance systems. Biermann, et al. (2009) suggest that by applying the 
construct of architecture, the synergy and conflict between governance systems can be identified, 
compared and assessed. Approaching governance through an architecture lens also provides for a 
multi-level and temporal assessment. Clarke (2004; in Kuhlmann and Allsop 2008, 174 ) calls for 
a more “‘conjunctural analysis’ in order to explore the ‘unsettled formations’ of governance”. 
These references suggest that the transitions between governance systems over time, and the push 
and pull effects of governance between levels, can impact the architecture of a governance system 
in a particular space and time.  
Biermann, et al. (2009, 18) recognize the frequently serendipitous nature of governance 
architecture when they state, “we assume neither an a priori existing state of universal order nor a 
universal trend towards order… architectures are likely to result from incremental processes of 
institutionalization… In other words, the concept of architecture does not assume the existence of 
an “architect.” This speaks to the need to identify each of the contributing factors, but to assess 
the system as a whole that is responding to a confluence of events. Burns and Stöhr (2011, 180) 
add that descriptions of governance architectures must also examine the “key drives of how 
governance systems are established, maintained or changed through power, knowledge, and 
contestation/conflict processes” in order to draw out the relationship between and amongst 
governance elements. They identify four drivers for shifts in governance including 1) dominant 
power and a shift in the agent’s cognitive-normative framework, 2) power shifts, 3) a new 
governance order is established through multi-agent negotiation, 4) governance shift through 
diffusion and emulation (organic transformation) (Burns and Stöhr 2011).  
This point is echoed by Gunningham (2009a) who states that the relationship between 
elements and actors “enables the development of a more sophisticated and nuanced account of 
how and why environmental architectures have shifted in particular directions, [and] the 
consequences of those shifts.” These statements suggest that in many ways, the most critical 
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aspects of governance systems are the informal cultures, institutions and dynamics between 
elements that operate within a given space.  
By understanding the architecture of governance, it may then also be possible to shift it 
towards a more favorable future design. Kanie et al. (2012), in discussion of governance 
architecture for sustainable development, recognize that changing social, economic, 
environmental and political contexts require parallel shifts in governance architecture and pose 
the question “what alternative architecture would make sense, and how can we get there?” Their 
commentary liberates future governance from current constraints (i.e., how or if a selected 
process or set of tools can achieve a desired outcome) by acknowledging the actor agency role in 
governance, and the potential to create a communally constructed future. Young (2008) states that 
there is a need to seek a change in governance architecture if actors are going to be able to 
respond to the large scale and complex social and environmental challenges present today. As in 
so many cases many institutions are charged with responding to environmental challenges that 
did not exist when they were initially created (Newell, et al. 2012). 
Two important themes characterize contemporary governance literature pertaining to shifts 
in governance architectures. First, the popular narrative that suggests that governance systems 
transition in a linear fashion from hierarchy to market to networks is being challenged (Bell and 
Hindmoor 2009; Hill and Lynn 2005). Second, and related to recent writing on the first theme, a 
more nuanced perspective on the role of governments is emerging. Where once it was widely 
accepted that the state is in decline, (e.g.,  Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1994), governance researchers 
increasingly are arguing that in many contexts the state is actually taking on new and more active 
roles (Hysing 2009). Thus, contemporary research on governance in a host of settings is 
providing new insights on the complex ways in which governance actually takes place. In that 
context, governance researchers are calling for a better understanding of the roles of governments 
relative to non-government actors, and the ways in which new ways of governing through 
markets and networks interact with traditional hierarchical modes of governance. Howlett, et 
al.(2009, 390) suggest that “careful multi-dimensional analysis is required to see exactly how 
governance in a sector is actually occurring and to understand in which of many possible 
directions it is moving.” 
This paper uses the example of water governance to provide insights into the ways in which 
governance is being transformed in the western world. The objective of this research is to 
examine architectural shifts in water governance over time. The paper begins with a review of the 
governance literature to provide a foundation for the conceptual understanding of governance, 
and to establish current understanding in the literature regarding shifts in governance 
architectures. A case study of water governance in a large and complex system, the Lake Simcoe 
watershed, located in the Province of Ontario, Canada, provides an empirical foundation for the 
research. Following an overview of the case and a review of the methodology, results from a 
Social Network Analysis, supplemented with data from key informant interviews and document 
analyses, provide an empirical basis for evaluating the shifts in governance architecture that took 
place, and continues to take place, in the Lake Simcoe watershed. 
2.2 The Governance Narrative and its Critics 
Significant attention has been given to how governance systems change over time, and 
specifically the transition from government to governance.  The definition of “governance” as 
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distinct from “government” permitted the “hierarchy to market to governance” narrative to 
emerge. Within this narrative it is suggested that recognition of the shortcomings of hierarchical 
government has led to a growing role for governance by markets, and then governance by 
networks. Where hierarchical governing is characterized by unilateral decision making and 
heavy-handed implementation of laws, taxes and regulations, markets are intended to allocate 
resources through price mechanisms. Conversely, networks are understood to exist as a third 
governing mode whereby actors operate in a cooperative capacity for decision making with 
autonomy from the state (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Goodwin and Grix 2011; Weber, et al. 2011). 
In networked governance, actors from all sectors engage with each other to govern collectively. 
Hence, the focus is on the collective decision making power of the network as a whole, as 
opposed to a focus on the power of elected politicians or the private sector (Brugue and Valles 
2005).  
As Termeer (2009, 300) states, “these narratives have not only become very popular in 
analyzing complex interactions around policy making, but also in thinking up and proposing 
alternative strategies for policy making, such as network management, interactive governance, 
collaboration, deliberative policy making, inclusive management or partnerships among other 
things.” Bell and Hindmoor (2009) suggest that the notion that governing was transitioning from 
one distinct mode to another became the primary focus of the political sciences and public 
administration governance literature during the mid to late 1990’s. Early proponents of the 
“governance narrative” include Kooiman ( 1993), Rhodes (1994) and Stoker (1998). Their focus 
was on the changes taking place in the UK governing system during 1990’s that included the 
shifts between governance systems from a Westminster model towards a New Public 
Management model. This led Stoker (1998, 18) to state that “governance is about a change in the 
long-standing balance between state and society.” In parallel, Rhodes (1997) suggested that 
governance was ultimately a ‘new’ way to govern society, and highlighted market and network 
approaches as something separate from hierarchical governing, where one could be selected over 
the other to optimize governing.  
Numerous authors are now arguing that the linear and isolated nature of the governance 
narrative is an overly simplistic perspective on a highly sophisticated system of interactions (Grix 
and Phillpots 2011; Howlett, et al. 2009; Hysing 2009). Others have noted that empirical 
evidence to support the claim is largely absent (Hill and Lynn 2005; Howlett, et al. 2009). As 
such, the governance narrative rests on several assumptions. First, the narrative focuses primarily 
on emerging models of governing, and the roles and activities of ‘new’ governance actors. In 
these models, there has been an increase in participation by non-government actors, and in some 
cases, these actors have created self-governing opportunities outside of formal regulatory 
controls. As a result, proponents of the narrative have assumed that the role of the state has 
declined during this same time, due to the emergence of other actors and governance 
mechanisms. Rhode’s (1994) thesis of the “hollowed state” brought much attention to this idea. 
He suggested that in the United Kingdom, government’s role as a sovereign authority has been 
undermined, and that government’s role in regulatory controls has been constrained by new 
governance approaches. From this perspective, governing is a zero sum game, where increased 
participation by new players must consequently result in a decline in the influence of other actors, 
namely the government.  
In contrast to this perspective, others argue that a decline in involvement by governments in 
governance does not necessarily equal a decline in their importance or power (Newman and Paasi 
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1998; Norman and Bakker 2009). Indeed, recent research demonstrates that this is not an accurate 
depiction of what is taking place. Around the world, societies continue to expect governments to 
providing steering functions (Metze 2011; Waters Robichau 2011). In addition, governments are 
likely to have a continuing and important role in governance in many policy fields because of the 
state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and on the unique power of governments to 
create and enforce legislation and regulations (Grix and Phillpots 2011; Gunningham 2009b; 
Peters and Pierre 2000).  
Two important activities have created the opportunity for a positive sum game. The first is 
the rise of citizen participation. Kim (2009, 874) suggests that positive sum governance is 
possible as a result of “mutual empowerment of state and society” where society has been 
empowered through its engagement in governance processes. Blakeley (2010) suggests this is a 
result of the “professionalization” of citizen participation. Citizens are no longer simply consulted 
for their ideas; instead, they are called upon for their expertise. That citizens are participating 
alongside government, and that they are recognized as having their own level of expertise, 
suggests that governance is in fact a positive-sum game where there are mutually beneficial gains 
for all actors involved (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Blakeley 2010).  
Second, the narrative ignores the potential for governance to exist at multiple levels, which 
could, for example, permit a market or network to be embedded within a hierarchical system. 
Recent research has found multiple forms of governance interacting within the same arena. In 
their study of watershed governance in the Netherlands, Kunindersma and Boonstra (2010) found 
regional partnerships existing along-side state policy, with each reacting and interacting with the 
other. Similarly, Metze (2011) found a synergy between a network coalition of non-government 
actors and the state’s dairy policy institutions. Similar examples exist in a host of settings, leading 
authors such as Tenbensel (2011) and Swyndedouw (2005) to argue that new institutional forms 
of governing are complementing traditional hierarchical governance rather than replacing it. 
Therefore there is potential for positive-sum games within governance. 
If the changes occurring in contemporary environmental governance are not captured 
satisfactorily through the governance narrative, then how should they be understood? Bell and 
Hindmoor (2009) argue that governments are learning how to govern better, not less. Hysing 
(2009, 314), in his study of forest certification schemes in Sweden, states that the role of the state 
is “transforming from a role based on constitutional powers towards a role as facilitator and co-
operative power.” This argument complements Hill and Lynn (2005, 189) who suggest that 
constitutional authority is the “structure within which relational and networked forms are enabled 
to flourish.” Their argument echo’s that made by Kim (2009) and Chhotray and Stoker (2009) 
who point out that by facilitating the existence of a diversity of governance mechanisms, 
governments continue to maintain hierarchical control. Thus governments are creating new forms 
of hierarchical controls, and, in essence, are drawing from a wider range of governing tools 
(Howlett, et al. 2009; Tenbensel, et al. 2011). This suggests that governments are becoming more 
conscious of, and adapting more effectively to, their socio-economic-environmental contexts 
(Jessop 1998). In summary, the role of the state has changed around the world during the past few 
decades – but the state has by no means been “hollowed out”. Instead, governments appear to be 
reinforcing control, but through a wider range of mechanisms than previously utilized.  
This research examines the case of a long-term water governance system in order to 
determine what, if any, changes to the governance architecture have taken place. It then evaluates 
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whether these changes fit with the widely held governance narrative or signal that a broader set of 
changes are taking place that are more accurate of the complex and diverse range of governance 
contexts that exist.  
2.3 Lake Simcoe  
Located in Ontario, Canada, the Lake Simcoe watershed governance system is an instance of a 
large scale, complex system under stress. The governance challenges in the watershed present 
significant hurdles to efficient and harmonious decision making processes. The system is 
challenged by its geography, economic value, environmental stressors, and jurisdictional 
fragmentation. The watershed has a total land and water surface area of 3,303 sq. km., of which 
the lake itself occupies approximately 22% or 722 sq. km (Ontario Ministry of Environment, et 
al. 2009) (Figure 3). Lake Simcoe is southern Ontario’s largest inland lake, excluding the Great 
Lakes (Ontario Ministry of Environment, et al. 2009). Serious water quality problems in Lake 
Simcoe have been documented since the 1970s. Key problems include an overloading of 
phosphorus, invasive species, climate change, land use change, and water-related recreational 
water activities, such as boating and fishing (LSSAC 2008). Water management efforts were able 
to achieve significant environmental improvements in the watershed’s ecosystem, marked by an 
annual 17 metric tonne reduction in phosphorus entering the lake between 1990 and 2001 (Wood 
2008). Nonetheless, progress has widely been considered insufficient. Therefore, in 2008 the 
Lake Simcoe Protection Act, (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23) was passed. This statute is the first piece of 
provincial legislation in Canada to provide comprehensive integrated protection and planning for 
an individual watershed. As such, it is an important instance of a governance system in transition.  
In Ontario, several agencies have formal roles in environmental management and 
governance. Within the provincial government, key agencies include the Ministry of Natural 
Resources (MNR), the Ministry of Environment (MOE), the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Rural Affairs (OMAFRA), and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH). At the 
federal level, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans are responsible for fisheries within inland 
waters. At the local level, municipal governments have important responsibilities for land use 
planning through the Official Plan process. Lastly, the Conservation Authorities exist in southern 
Ontario to manage water resources on a watershed basis as mandated by provincial legislation 
(Johns and Rasmussen 2008).  Each Conservation Authority “consists of representatives of the 
provincial government, and of each municipality within the watershed…They may make 
regulations restricting and regulating the use of water in or from surface water bodies within their 
jurisdiction” (Johns and Rasmussen 2008). 
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Figure 3 The Lake Simcoe Watershed 
 
Additionally, Conservation Authorities are critical actors at the local level. Conservation 
Authorities are arms-length agencies that have legislated responsibility for environmental 
management within the watersheds of southern Ontario. Therefore in addition to federal, 
municipal and provincial planning, the Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority (LSRCA) 
also creates and implements environmental management plans for the watershed.  
Environmental governance in the Lake Simcoe watershed occurred in five distinct phases: 
1986-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-2000, 2001-2007, and 2008-2010. These phases are defined by 
formal Memorandums of Agreement (in the case of the first four phases), and by the creation of a 
statute (in the case of the fifth and most recent phase). Prior to 1975, governance in the Lake 
Simcoe watershed was dominated by government agencies acting more-or-less independently of 
each other. In 1975, a closed network of actors became organized and involved in governance in 
the watershed. This original network has since evolved through five major phases. Initially this 
involved actors participating in the Lake Simcoe Environmental Management Strategy (LSEMS), 
and later was directed by the Lake Simcoe Protection Act, (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23). Changes in the 
network were in response to a host of social, economic and environmental circumstances. In each 
phase of the network core members are defined by either Memorandums of Agreement that 
governed and financially supported the network (1986-2007) or through formal legislation that 
identified a lead government agency responsible for the implementation of the LSPA (2008-
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present). Core network members formed the basis of the network, but would invite other actors to 
participate when deemed appropriate or necessary. Often this took place in the form of focused 
outreach for a specific purpose, and for a limited period of time.  
The Lake Simcoe watershed is ideally suited to provide the kind of careful, multi-
dimensional analyses needed to reveal the changing nature of contemporary environmental 
governance. The overall case study represents an instance of a long term governance system, 
where significant shifts in governance approaches have taken place. The consequences of 
governance actions in the watershed can have significant impact on the economic, social, and 
environmental system, signifying the relevancy of the case’s social-environmental challenges.  
2.4 Methodology  
A mixed methodology combining both quantitative and qualitative perspectives was used to 
obtain a holistic and comprehensive perspective on the case study system. This methodology 
provides first-hand accounts of governance characteristics, challenges and context, along with 
visual and statistical interpretations of a governance system that may not be evident in formal 
documentation and actors recollections (Coviello 2005). The research draws primarily on Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) to analyze the governance networks in each of the five phases described 
above. Each phase includes data from both the SNA, as well the document collection and is 
complimented by interview data from key informant interviews where appropriate.  
2.4.1 Data Collection and Analysis  
Data collection took place over a year, and each data collection effort was informed by the 
preceding effort.  The document collection was the initial step, which permitted a timeline of 
events to be developed, as well as highlighted major activities and key actors.  Following this was 
the historical meeting minutes and further document collection from the LSRCA.  Attendance 
records derived from the meeting minutes served as data for the historical social network 
analysis.  The next step was interviews with key informants; document collection continued 
during this stage as resources were provided by key informants.  Based on connections made with 
key informants at the Ontario Ministry of Environment, access was provided to attendance data 
for the consultation processes for the LSPA and LSPP.  This data were added to the historical 
social network analysis.   
This research utilized both qualitative and quantitative data. In the following sections, these 
data sets are described. The combination of both qualitative and quantitative data drawn from 
multiple sources responds to Howlett, et al’s. (2009) call for a multi-dimensional analysis of 
governance change. Not only do these data provide a multi-level perspective – from the 
individual to the organizational level – but also they provide both a formal and informal 
perspective by drawing on both formal documentation and personal interpretations. In addition, 
the data permit an analysis of the structural change in a governance system overtime by 
contrasting separate phases of the same system. This combination of analyses signals the changes 
that are occurring, and provides insight into why changes are taking place.  
2.4.1.1 Social Network Analysis  
There has been a recent surge in the application of social network analysis (SNA) in 
environmental governance, particularly in the context of natural resource management (Bodin and 
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Crona 2009; Hahn, et al. 2006; Prell, et al. 2009; Raadgever, et al. 2008; van der Brugge and van 
Raak 2007). Social network analysis involves a quantitative delineation and analysis of a network 
to identify the structure of interactions between actors and network properties (Adam and Kriesi 
2007). SNA has resonated within the environmental governance field due to its ability to measure 
quantitatively the influence of specific actors within a network. Analysts have suggested that 
SNA has the potential to uncover the distribution of power within the network, which, in turn, 
may account for the flow of resources and information through the network (Adam and Kriesi 
2007; Bodin, et al. 2006). Recent research has used SNA to identify actors for participatory 
processes, to understand an ongoing collaborative resource governance process, and to explain 
why environmental governance initiatives have stalled (Crona, et al. 2011). SNA is also an 
extremely useful tool for comparing and contrasting the phases of the networks over time, and for 
providing evidence of network stability and/or change.  
The data set for the SNA in this study was derived from records of meeting minutes and is 
based on meeting attendance. In SNA, density, centrality, diversity and homophily are key 
variables that can be used to study the structure of the network (Borgatti, et al. 2013). Density 
refers to the number of ties that exist in a network – the more ties, the more closely linked each 
actor is with other actors in the network (Bodin, et al. 2006). A perfect density, where all actors 
are connected to all other actors, is represented by 1.0. Centrality relates to an actor’s position in a 
network relative to the position of other actors, and is more succinctly defined through three types 
of centrality: degree, closeness and betweenness (Bodin, et al. 2006).  
Degree centrality is measured by the number of direct ties one actor has to another (Bodin, 
et al. 2006) with 1.0 reflecting a tie to all other actors in the network. Closeness centrality is 
measured by the actor’s ability to access all other actors in the network, with a score of 100 
reflecting access to all other actors in the network. Finally, betweenness centrality is measured by 
the control one actor can have over another actor because the first actor is the only one 
connecting the second actor to the rest of the network (Rowley 1997). The betweenness score, 
relative to the other actors, indicates the greatest capacity for control.  
Homophily is a measured by the E-I Index (external-internal ties). Given a partition of a 
network into a number of mutually exclusive groups the E-I index is the number of ties external 
to the groups minus the number of ties that are internal to the group divided by the total number 
of ties. In this study, the partitions in the network are defined by sector. The sectors include 
municipal, provincial and federal government, conservation authorities, ENGOs, agriculture, 
naturalist groups, sports recreationalists, elected officials, development sector, aggregate sector, 
First Nations, university researchers and consultants. Federal, provincial and local government 
agencies were not amalgamated into one “government” because each level of government had 
significantly different roles. However, agencies at one level were grouped together (e.g., all the 
provincial government agencies were labeled “Provincial Government”) in order to draw out the 
sectoral differences. The homophily value can range from +1.0 to -1.0 and can be seen as a 
measure of the extent to which the members of a group choose to interact with themselves. Thus a 
value of -1.0 shows homophily and a value of +1.0 shows heterophily. In this study, the 
homophily measure refers to how frequently actors attended meetings with actors from their same 
sector.  
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2.4.1.2 Qualitative Data  
Network analyses that focus on social processes require holistic and humanistic approaches 
(Coviello 2005). A qualitative analysis permits researchers to explore the complex interactions 
among actors to uncover institutional rules governing the network, beliefs and motivations as well 
as longitudinal patterns in the network (Provan and Kenis 2008; Torfing 2007). Qualitative 
research methods such as document analysis and key informant interviews can permit the creation 
of network narratives that can address the kinds of questions posed in this research (Berg 2007; 
Borras and Zolner 2007; Human and Provan 2000). These narratives add richness and depth to 
findings generated through SNA. 
Purposive sampling was used to identify participants for interviews. To be considered for an 
interview, actors had to have been directly engaged in formal governance in the Lake Simcoe 
watershed. Next, the interview list was expanded based on the snowball technique of referrals 
from initial interviews and key informants (Bradshaw and Stratford 2005, 72; Hennink, et al. 
2011). This was conducted until saturation was reached (Hennink, et al. 2011). Interview requests 
were sent to 59 actors, with 34 accepting. The interviews used semi-structured questions and were 
based on an interview guide organized around a pyramid approach, wherein questions moved 
from basic to more complex exploratory questions towards the end (Dunn 2005, 82). The core 
questions asked actors to comment on the governance process in the Lake Simcoe watershed from 
the late 1970’s. The interviews questions evolved over time because an inductive approach was 
applied. Data from initial interviews were used in future interviews to probe more deeply into the 
issues (Hennink, et al. 2011, 42). The 34 interviews were divided as follows: 17 with people 
representing provincial government agencies; four with people employed by the Lake Simcoe 
Region Conservation Authority; one with a land developer; five with municipal government staff 
people; and seven with representatives of NGO’s. Interviews typically lasted about an hour, with 
a few as brief as 45 minutes or as long as 90 minutes.  
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and then validated with the key informants. Once 
transcripts were approved, they were coded and analyzed using Nvivo 8 software. Analysis 
focused on the formal governance processes, as well as key triggers for change, socio-political-
environmental context, relationships between organizations, and characteristics of actors involved 
as well as emerging themes. The coding casebook was built using both an inductive and 
deductive approach. During the entire data collection and analysis phase, constant ‘memoing’ of 
emergent ideas and code development was employed. Therefore, quality of coding was 
established through verbatim transcription, codebook, memoing and coding saturation (Hennink, 
et al. 2011).  
It is important to note a number of qualifiers on the interview data. First, interviewees 
participated in governance activities in the watershed at different points of time and were not 
engaged in all aspects of the governing process. Therefore insights generated from interview data 
are not widely comparable across time. Second, because of the snowball technique used to 
identify key informants, interview questions that were generated as a result of later discussions 
were not asked of earlier key informants. Third, because of the scale of the watershed and scope 
of governing, often key informants would be engaged in different aspects of the governance 
process. Consequently, not all interview data can be compared based on experience in the 
process. It is the cumulative insight from multiple research methods that is valuable to this 
research given the long term time scale.  
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2.5 Results  
Results in this section are presented based on the five phases of governance identified in Section 
2.3. For each phase, the data are used to provide an overview of key aspects of the governance 
system that relate to the scope, size, diversity of the network, the connections amongst actors, and 
the identification of actors who are central in the network.  
In reviewing the findings from the SNA, it is important to consider both the visual 
depictions of the relationships among actors, as well as the network statistics. The network 
diagrams presented below cannot be used on their own to explore the relationships and 
characteristics of the network. Rather, these diagrams present the actors by sector; this permits a 
focus on the sectoral interactions. In the diagrams the thicker lines denote higher levels of 
interaction between the actors connected by those lines during the phase. It is important to note 
that the location of actors in the figures is relative based on the data for each phase, and the 
relationships between actors. The location in and of itself does not hold special significance, with 
the exception of those located most centrally; this positioning indicates a high level of connection 
to most other actors in the network. The actual centrality of an actor in the network is defined by 
the network statistics. Statistics for each phase are summarized in Table 2, and will be discussed 
in the results for each phase. 
Table 2 Statistical Analysis of Five Governance Phases 
Variable Phases of Governance 
1986-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000 2001-2007 2008-2010 
Size of Network 
(i.e. number of 
actors (by 
sector)) 
7 24 18 88 35 
Number of Ties 36 242 166 2608 686 
Network 
Diversity 
4 10 6 13 12 
Density 0.85 0.43 0.54 0.34 0.58 
Degree Centrality 1.0  
MOE, 
MNR, 
LSRCA 
1.0  
LSRCA 
1.0  
LSRCA 
1.0  
LSRCA 
1.0  
MOE 
Closeness 
Centrality 
100  
MOE , 
MNR, 
LSRCA 
100  
LSRCA 
100  
LSRCA, 
MOE, MNR, 
OMAFRA 
100  
LSRCA 
100  
MOE 
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 88  
MOE 
 94  
MOE,MNR 
89  
LSRCA 
77  
MMAH 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
6.667 
MOE, 
MNR, 
LSRCA 
63.50  
LSRCA 
24.8  
LSRCA 
21  
LSRCA 
97  
MOE 
12  
MOE, MNR 
E-I Index 0.4706 0.2819 0.4211 0.1298 0.7068 
 
2.5.1 1986-1989 
In Phase One (1986-1989) the governance system was driven and organized by government 
actors who formed a closed, voluntary, collaborative network to collect and share data. Three 
provincial agencies (MNR, MOE, OMAFRA) and the LSRCA initiated the network, and secured 
formal support and financial resources for the network from the provincial Cabinet (LSEMSC 
1985). They also provided expert science and report contributions, in addition to fulfilling 
traditional hierarchical roles as regulators (LSEMSSC 1985). The network was formed due to the 
need to scope a problem which had been independently observed by each of the partner 
organizations. Each agency had separate, but related, regulatory responsibilities regarding the 
problem. In this sense, governance in the watershed during this phase occurred through a 
voluntary network of government agencies focused on scientific and technical information 
gathering for regulatory problem solving. Efforts of the network during this time focused on 
scoping the extent of the problem, and achieving some initial reductions (LSEMSSC 1985). 
Between 1985 and 1990 a 15 tonne/year reduction was achieved in the phosphorus entering the 
watershed largely through surface water runoff (LSEMS 1992). This was primarily a result of 
adopting the policy that no increases in total point source loadings from municipal or industrial 
waste water facilities would be permitted (LSEMS 1992). Triggers for change from this phrase 
included financial constraints and a need for deeper commitment to the governance process.  
During this period, the network was quite small with only seven actors involved (Figure 4). 
The actors located on the right side of the network had stronger ties with each other than with the 
actor located on the left (i.e., OMAFRA). OMAFRA’s role during this phase related primarily to 
information sharing. More frequent interactions between the LSRCA and two provincial 
government ministries, MOE and MNR, are visible. Also important to note is the presence of a 
consultant who participated in governance efforts during this time, and federal government 
agencies. Neither the consultant nor staff from federal agencies was formally included in the 
Cabinet submission for governance during this time, or in the agreement between the MOE, 
OMAFRA, MNR and the LSRCA. The consultant was engaged to provide scientific analysis and 
research to the network, while the federal agency was included due to their regulatory role 
regarding fisheries.  
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During this first phase, the network exhibits a high degree of density (0.85) due to its small 
size (7 actors) and the frequent interactions among these actors (Table 2). In other words, the 
network was closed and insular. Given the small size of the network and the high level of density, 
it is logical that the MOE, MNR and LSRCA each have the same value in the centrality measures 
(degree – 1.0, closeness 100, betweeness 6.667): they are the core actors and interact only with 
each other. Given that there are only 7 actors in this network, and 4 different sectors represented, 
the E-Index shows a medium to high level of heterophily amongst actors (0.4706) but is less 
instructive because of the small network size.  
Figure 4 Social Network Analysis - Phase 1986-1989 
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2.5.2 1990-1994  
In Phase Two (1990-1994) the MOU for the LSEMS program continued to include the MNR, 
MOE, OMAFRA and the LSRCA. Administration of the voluntary network shifted to the 
LSRCA, which took the lead in organizing and implementing governance activities. During this 
phase, participation by government actors was reduced as a result of a provincial austerity 
program (LSEMS 1993). While the agencies continued to meet as part of the network, their in-
kind contributions of monitoring and financial support to the network were reduced. 
Consequently, mid-phase, the provincial network agencies retreated to fulfill traditional 
hierarchical roles as regulators, thereby reducing their contributions to expert science, monitoring 
and reporting. The LSRCA attempted to fill the gaps of the network’s needs in these areas. 
 The scope of efforts of the network changed in two ways during this phase. First, there was 
an effort to engage the public in the issues through traditional public consultation exercises 
(LSRCA 1992). Second, environmental management strategies moved beyond regulatory control 
to include agricultural stewardship and landowner improvement programs facilitated by the 
OMAFRA and the LSRCA. Thus, during this phase the scope and level of inclusion of actors 
broadened to include non-government actors through consultation and individual stewardship 
programs. Triggers for change from this phase were motivated by continued government budget 
cuts which forced a reassessment of fiscal support for the program.  
Figure 5 demonstrates that the network grew in this phase to include more actors, and a 
greater diversity of actors. However, there remains a higher level of interaction amongst the 
LSRCA and the provincial government agencies, as demonstrated by the thicker lines between 
these agencies. This indicates that regular meetings continued to be conducted by the core 
agencies. In this phase several clusters are also evident, such as the provincial/university clusters 
to the left, the municipal/environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) cluster to the 
bottom and the second larger municipal cluster to the right. These clusters reveal evidence of 
outreach during this phase.  
In this phase, the network grew in size (24 actors), increased in diversity (10 types of 
actors) and had a lower density (0.43) value as compared with the last phase (Table 1). This 
indicates that while more actors were involved in the network, they interacted in smaller isolated 
groups, as opposed to in large forums. Key informant interviews explained this pattern: 
specialized groups were being formed, but they only provide input to the core network members, 
rather than participating in dialogue across the groups. This is confirmed by the lower E-I index 
score (0.2819). The LSRCA became the highly centralized actor in the network (degree centrality 
1.0, closeness centrality 100, and betweeness centrality 63.5). These statistics accord with 
observations from interview subjects, who explained how the LSRCA took on the role of formal 
network manager.  
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Figure 5 Social Network Analysis - Phase 1990-1994 
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2.5.3 1995-2000 
In Phase Three (1995-2000) the LSRCA continued to lead the network which remained a 
voluntary collaboration among the four core agencies (MNR, MOE, OMAFRA, LSRCA). 
LSEMS meeting minutes indicated that the participation of provincial government agencies in the 
network declined further as a result of deepened budgetary cuts to provincial environmental 
agencies. In 1995 a new provincial governing party was elected.  Two major actions of this new 
government had significant impact on water resources management in the province.  First, 
dramatic spending cuts led to reduced revenue transfers to municipalities and CA (de Loë and 
Kreutzwiser 2005; Prudham 2004).  Second, the government instituted a  radical shift in 
municipal and provincial responsibilities for water resources (de Loë and Kreutzwiser 2005; 
Prudham 2004). The capacity of LSEMS to conduct scientific monitoring and management 
activities was consequently reduced, as confirmed by two staff from the LSRCA and a staff 
person from the MOE. As a result, the LSRCA focused more on finding opportunities to 
financially sustain LSEMS. With increased growth pressures affecting the watershed, two new 
types of actors were introduced to the network. In Ontario, municipalities take two main forms: 
lower-tier municipalities (Towns, Cities) and upper-tier municipalities (Regions and Counties). 
Two regional municipalities (Durham and York) and Simcoe County joined the network as 
formal partners. At the same time, outreach and consultation with several lower tier 
municipalities took place. The upper-tier municipal governments were invited to join to the 
network for two main reasons. First, they played significant roles in planning and managing 
growth and development in the watershed, activities that directly affected the health of the 
watershed. Second, they were able to make financial contributions to support the LSEMS 
program, and to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of the provincial agencies.  
In this phase there were three main triggers for change from the previous phase. First, 
network members recognized a need to reformulate the governance approach to obtain greater 
commitment to the governance process, as expressed by the CAO of the LSRCA. Second, since 
considerable data and monitoring had been completed in previous years, the problems of the 
watershed were now relatively well understood. The focus of the network thus shifted from data 
collection to comprehensive planning for the watershed (LSEMS1995). Third, in light of the 
reduced funding provided by the provincial agencies, there was a need to formulate a plan for 
sustainable long term financial support of the network governance system (Ministry of 
Agriculture, et al. 1999).  
During Phase 3, the network’s size was slightly reduced (Figure 6). This reflects the budget 
cuts at the provincial government level, which in turn led to a weaker capacity on the part of 
LSEMS to engage stakeholders. Ties between the LSRCA and provincial government agencies 
remained strong, but one of the upper-tier municipal governments joined this closely-knit group. 
In this phase the LSRCA and the MOE continue to play central roles in the network. Figure 6 
shows a few clusters of actors with weak ties to the core network actors. This includes a group of 
municipal governments, an ENGO, and three consultants. New but weak ties between the core 
actors and these other actors indicate that the core network members were reaching out to a larger 
group of actors. Meeting data indicated that consultants were utilized for assistance with 
particular water quality monitoring and assessment report as demonstrated by their inclusion in he 
network.  
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Figure 6 Social Network Analysis - Phase 1995 - 2000 
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2.5.4 2001-2007 
Phase Four (2001-2007) of the network was marked by extensive change. The Memorandum of 
Understanding was expanded from the original signatories (MNR, MOE, OMAFRA and the 
LSRCA) to include MMAH, three upper-tier municipal governments, and seven lower tier 
municipal governments. The LSRCA continued to lead the network, but this phase marked the 
return of the original provincial government actors participating in full capacity. Additionally, the 
inclusion of MMAH and the municipal governments in the watershed marks an important change 
in government support for the program. Where previously the provincial ministries most closely 
linked to the environment were the core financial partners of LSEMS, now MMAH and 
municipal governments became core financial partners. Key informants noted that this change 
was due in part to the fact that MMAH was responsible for growth and development in the 
province. The Lake Simcoe watershed had been identified as a high growth potential area by the 
provincial government under the Places to Grow Act, 2005 (S.O. 2005, c. 13). Therefore the role 
of government in this phase was decreasing in one respect (environmental) and increasing in 
another (growth and development). Nonetheless, what remained consistent during this phase was 
the participation of government agencies as regulators in both respects. Two senior government 
staff clearly indicated that the regulatory role of the government never changed, and that during 
this phase, their exertion of power through planning processes was quite significant. The 
inclusion of municipal government actors as formal partners in the MOU also supports this shift 
in focus, as in Ontario they are responsible for local level growth planning and development.  
During this phase, more than two thirds of the network’s funding came from the provincial 
and municipal governments; the balance was provided by the LSRCA. Interview subjects 
reported that increased funding resulting from the growth in network membership permitted an 
expansion of activities, in particular an increased focus on community outreach and interaction 
activities. The CAO of the LSRCA noted, “We took a look at governance models for the future, 
we did a lot of community engagement work, workshops, gaining insights from the community in 
regards to what directions they wanted us to go and we provided recommendations to the 
government of the day.” Outreach efforts were not limited to watershed residents. Instead, they 
also focused on elected officials at the municipal, provincial and federal level. However, more 
significant than increased outreach were the actions of local ENGOs during this phase. Every 
single participant interviewed commented that during this phase the most significant change to 
LSEMS was a result of efforts by ENGO groups. ENGOs called for direct participation in the 
closed network, and were successful. Due to their actions, a new stakeholder committee was 
established for LSEMS, meaning that for the first time non-government actors were formally and 
directly included in the network (LSRCA 2006).  
At the mid-point of this phase, several triggers shifted the governance system. The 
LSRCA’s capacity to lead the governance process decreased as the complexity of the scope and 
scale of the network increased. The LSRCA did not have authority to implement new regulations, 
and their programming was limited to voluntary control measures. Three interview subjects 
suggested that the capacity to reduce phosphorus loadings through voluntary measures had been 
reached, and that additional tools would be required to achieve further reductions. In addition, 
physical signs of the watershed’s degradation were becoming evident at the shoreline and in near 
shore areas, which motivated shoreline residents to take actions such as create the Rescue Lake 
Simcoe Coalition and the Ladies of the Lake organization. In turn, several ENGOs demanded 
even greater roles in decision making.  
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Figure 7 Social Network Analysis - Phase 2001-2007 
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(Lake Simcoe Working Group n.d.). Externally, ENGOs advocated for formal legislated 
protection for the resource and conducted specific activities such as the Lake Simcoe Summit 
(Campaign Lake Simcoe 2007b) and the Citizens Action Plan (Ladies of the Lake and Windfall 
Ecology Centre 2006). In response to the actions of ENGO actors and the work of LSEMS, the 
provincial government introduced the Lake Simcoe Protection Act (R.S.O. 2008, c.23) 
(Government of Ontario 2007). The announcement came shortly after the LSEMS working group 
completed its proposal for a new governance model for the watershed (LSEMSSC 2007). 
Importantly, creation of the LSPA was consistent with the re-emergence of government actors in 
roles beyond simply being a regulator. The provincial government became a key actor again 
through its support for, and facilitation of, the proposal to generate a new governance model for 
the Lake Simcoe Environmental Management Strategy (LSEMS). These efforts indicated that 
government was reasserting its role in governance as a funder, producer of scientific information, 
facilitator of stakeholder processes and regulator. The commitment of several government 
agencies, including those engaged in the network, to collaborate on development of an inter-
governmental action plan for Lake Simcoe demonstrated that the watershed had become a 
provincial level priority concern, significant enough to warrant dedicated resources.  
The SNA figure for this phase highlights the clustering of several groups engaged in the 
internal working group process. Figure 7 shows a clear clustering pattern of four distinct groups: 
the elected officials, the municipal governments with some additional conservation authorities, 
the stakeholder groups, comprised of several different ENGO’s and sector organizations, with the 
remaining core cluster still structured by the three key provincial agencies and the LSRCA. 
Figure 7 also shows that the LSRCA and provincial agencies continue to play central roles in the 
network. However, while the network grew significantly since the previous phase, network actors 
did not formally engage in cross-sectoral dialogue beyond that taking place within the different 
stakeholder clusters.  
Growth of this network (88 actors) also resulted in an increase in diversity (13 types of ac-
tors) due to the high number of new actors engaged in the network. In turn, this led to a decrease 
in density (0.34) and the E-I index (0.1298) as shown in Table 2. The low E-I index is visually 
demonstrated in Figure 7 which demonstrates dense clusters of actors from similar sectors indi-
cating they are only interacting amongst themselves and the most central actors. During this 
phase, even with the emergence of a wide variety of actors, the LSRCA continued to be the most 
central actor (degree centrality 1.0 – Table 2). However, rather than the Ministry of Agriculture 
being the third most prominent government agency, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Hous-
ing emerged as an important player (closeness 77 Table 2) 
2.5.5 2008 - 2010  
The final phase of the network (2008-2010) began with the formalized hierarchical governance 
system established by the LSPA and implemented through the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan 
(henceforth referred to as the Plan) (Government of Ontario 2009). The MOE was designated the 
lead agency for implementing the Act and Plan and therefore became the core network actor. 
Consequently, during this time, the LSEMS program disbanded, with efforts of each of the 
individual actors being refocused on the Act and Plan.  
Activities during this phase indicate that while governance became top-down, with the 
government assuming its traditional formalized hierarchical control position, the role the 
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government played changed considerably. It must be remembered that the Act was a direct 
response to public advocacy from ENGOs, which called for legislative protection of the Lake 
Simcoe watershed. The formulation and implementation of the Act was, and continues to be at 
the time of writing, a highly participatory process. To illustrate, interview subjects emphasized 
that the government consulted extensively during each period of the Act and Plan’s development. 
ENGO actors commented that during the consultation and committee processes, the government 
was highly responsive to their concerns and suggestions. Also, in response to comments from 
ENGO actors, the LSPA established a permanent citizen and science advisory committee that has 
direct oversight regarding the Plan’s implementation. Both of these committees can submit 
concerns or suggestions regarding the Plan’s evolution directly to government staff.  
Importantly, despite this high level of stakeholder interaction, environmental governance 
during this phase is hierarchical because the LSPA and Plan ultimately were designed and 
directed by the provincial government. Formal hierarchical control also expanded beyond existing 
regulatory mechanisms. Where previously environmental decision making in the watershed took 
place primarily through provincial regulations and municipal planning instruments, the LSPA 
introduced one comprehensive piece of legislation focused on integrating previous controls and 
expanding provincial and municipal authority. This introduced a new approach for the provincial 
government. Specifically, the LSPA was the first piece of provincial legislation designed 
specifically to regulate planning and management in a watershed. Furthermore, the LSPA did not 
create a new watershed authority to implement the plan. Instead, it provided mechanisms to 
integrate efforts of existing actors and controls, and to give them expanded authority. The Plan 
also established the foundations for a more collaborative approach to governance through 
engaging the LSRCA, municipalities, provincial agencies and a non-governmental stewardship 
network in plan implementation activities (Government of Ontario 2009). 
The changes in the form of the network that took place during this phase are evident in 
Figure 8, which shows three distinct clusters. These reflect two distinct sub-phases of the 
network. In 2009, science and stakeholder committees were created to contribute to the 
development of the Plan. The interactions of actors in these committees resulted in two of the 
clusters. Once the Plan was finalized, the permanent citizen committee (formally called the 
Coordinating Committee), and the Science Committee were established. The Science Committee 
membership remained largely the same, but the Stakeholder Committee introduced a few new 
actors, as demonstrated by the weaker network lines connecting the lower cluster to the cluster on 
the right in Figure 8. The permanent committees only met twice during 2009-2010. The MOE, 
and the LSRCA continue to play central roles, while university researchers served as a bridge 
between the science and stakeholder committees because they held positions on both committees.  
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Figure 8 Social Network Analysis - Phase 2008-2010 
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
2.6.1 Governance Change 
Howlett, et al. (2009) called for multi-dimensional analyses of governance change. This research 
provided a multi-year (over a 30 year period), multi-scale analysis of a governance system. It 
evaluated the governance system from a statistical, social and formal documentation perspective 
in order to assess the changes in the governance architecture. Key findings are noted in Table 3 
below.  
Table 3 Key Governance Findings 
Theoretical Discussion Findings in Lake Simcoe 
Government is in decline - A strong trend towards increasing hierarchical control 
over time 
Role of government is changing - Within the context of an increase of hierarchical control 
was an increase in facilitating multi-actor governance  
Hierarchy to market to network 
narrative 
- This case demonstrated a complete reverse pattern, 
moving from network to hierarchy and did not include a 
role for markets 
- Current arrangement has a collaborative governance 
system nested within a hierarchical one 
Role of non-government actors is 
changing 
- Non-government actors played a significant role in 
influencing the direction of governance in the watershed 
- Obtained a legislated role in the implementation of 
water governance  
  
Recent scholarship in the governance field rejects the notion that governments in the West are in 
decline (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Hysing 2009). This research offers empirical evidence that 
demonstrates that the reality, at least in the context of water governance, is more nuanced. As 
evident in phases Two and Three, there was indeed a retreat of the government from participation 
in water governance in the Lake Simcoe region. The evidence indicates that this was a direct 
result of economic circumstances in the province, rather than a strategic decision on the part of 
the provincial government to move away from involvement in governance in the region. This 
finding is further supported by the fact that there was a re-emergence of the provincial 
government as a dominant actor in phases Four and Five despite the fact that governance during 
these periods still occurred through a network form. Importantly, the “retreat” of the government 
that did take place during phases Two and Three did not involve a reduction in the legal and 
constitutional responsibility or authority of governments. Instead, it was a shift from activities 
such as conducting expert science, monitoring and planning, to a more limited focus of regulatory 
control. During these phases, the government retained authority and control. Ultimately the role 
of government in the governance system at the end of this research period (2010) was very strong 
and hierarchical, as demonstrated by the introduction of legislation, regulatory controls and a top-
down plan implementation process.  
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Despite the clear return to a hierarchical style of governing, the research also demonstrates 
that the roles governments play can change, but not in simplistic “advance” and “retreat” forms. 
As others have noted, governments can shift from strictly using command and control approach 
to relying on alternative governing mechanisms such as interactive governance, collaboration, 
deliberative policy making, inclusive management or partnerships (Howlett, et al. 2009; Hysing 
2009; Tenbensel, et al. 2011; Termeer 2009). This phenomenon is apparent in Lake Simcoe. 
Attention to the public and scientific community’s engagement in the Act and Plan provides a 
pertinent example. The development of the Act proceeded through traditional, although more 
expansive, consultative processes, i.e., public comment periods that permitted written 
submissions as well as community workshops. However, the creation of two public committees 
(Science and Stakeholder) that directly and frequently advised the government on the formulation 
of the Plan, were widely considered by government staff interviewed for this study to have 
provided significant contributions to the development of the Plan.  
Additionally, two new permanent committees (Science and Coordinating Committees) were 
established by the Act, to oversee the implementation process, and to advise and make 
recommendations on the adaptation of the Plan. As a steering mechanism, these committees 
represent a strategic effort on the part of government to more effectively engage and broker 
professional relationships with non-government actors. This reinforces the argument that 
governance does not have to be a zero-sum game, there is room for multiple actors, engaging in 
multiple types of activities (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Blakeley 2010). In this case, governance of 
the watershed changed as a result of several social, economic and environmental factors. In 
phases Two and Three government participation declined. In phases Four and Five, government 
slowly increased their level of participation; Phase Five concluded with the provincial 
government introducing strongly directive legislation.  
In considering how governance changes over time, the contemporary governance literature 
indicates that the hierarchy to market to network narrative is too simplistic to capture the complex 
changes taking place within government-society relationships (Grix and Phillpots 2011; Howlett, 
et al. 2009; Hysing 2009). The hierarchy to market narrative fails to recognize the power of the 
government to organize and manage society as defined by its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, and on the power of governments to create and enforce legislation and regulations (Grix 
and Phillpots 2011; Gunningham 2009b; Peters and Pierre 2000). Additionally, it runs counter to 
the considerable evidence that demonstrates that societies continue to expect governments to 
provide steering functions (Metze 2011; Waters Robichau 2011). This research certainly supports 
this viewpoint: the LSPA was the direct outcome of intense lobbying by non-government actors 
for a strong regulatory framework.  
In this research, the governance system began as a voluntary collaborative agreement 
between government agencies. It was initiated in order to support the existing programs within 
the government agencies where staff identified an opportunity for collaboration and cooperation 
in building a research capacity around the phosphorus loading issue taking place in the watershed. 
This indicates that it was driven by the opportunity to support mutually beneficial program 
objectives within the respective agencies, as opposed to being a provincially driven policy 
program. In later phases the LSEMS program moved from being led by provincial government 
actors, to being an arm’s length agency that was voluntary and networked in its approach. The 
size and scope of the network waxed and waned in accordance with the economic climate of the 
province, until the fourth and fifth phases when the public and non-governmental organization 
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became more vocal and requested opportunities to participate in the governance process beyond 
consultation.  
Greater inclusion of the public and a broader set of government agencies from multiple 
levels led to more diversity and engagement in the governance process. However, just as the 
LSEMS program arrived at a new model of governance for the watershed through an organic 
model of collaboration, governance of the watershed shifted again, this time to a hierarchical 
model under the direction of the provincial government. In this respect, the governance system in 
this watershed began with a network, which evolved through several phases, before concluding 
with a formal hierarchical system. This reinforces the fact that governance transitions can be non-
linear and do not accord with the hierarchical to market to network narrative. Also, as is apparent 
in this case, the choice is not between governing through hierarchies or governing through 
networks. Instead, both forms can exist simultaneously.  
This research found that the role of government is indeed changing and becoming more 
inclusive of alternative mechanisms of governing, and that governance does not transition in a 
clearly delineated linear fashion. The non-linear transition of governance highlighted two 
important findings. First, that governance changes as a result of the economic, social and 
environmental context in which it is embedded. Second, because governance systems are 
embedded within one another, the question is not about ‘one’ system tranforming, but the 
recognition of multiple systems existing and changing on multiple scales.  
2.6.2 Social Network Analysis 
The application of SNA to the governance system proved useful in several ways.  Perhaps the 
most significant outcome is a measured and quantifiable example of a governance system.  
Applied over time, SNA visually and statistically evaluated the changes in governance.  
Supplementing qualitative data with quantitative data brings strength and weight to the arguments 
of governance change, or simply to identify the type of governance system in place.  Visually, 
network diagrams made clear indications regarding actor’s interactions, identifying central versus 
periphery actors.  Network diagrams used in combination with network statistics were 
particularly valuable in identifying different types of engagement practices, as evidenced by the 
difference between phase Four and phase Five.    
Specific SNA findings relating to the governance network cover issues of network 
evolution, and the use of particular analyses for environmental governance.  Networks are 
dynamic structures that evolve over time in response to the context in which they are embedded 
(Daugbjerg and Marsh 1998; Hudson 2004).  Evolutions include changes in scope and size of 
network (Doz 1996) as a result of critical events that are external to the network (Knoben, et al. 
2006). The Lake Simcoe network experienced several expansions and contractions over time as a 
result of two primary factors; the economic context in which it was embedded, and the need for 
broader engagement on environmental issues.  Changes in the economic context forced both 
expansions and contractions of the network, while the need for broader engagement resulted in 
expansions twice during the evolution of the network.   Knoben (2006) commented that some 
evolutionary processes in networks can lead to path dependencies and result in network inertia.  
This was evident during the Fourth phase of the network, where the LRSCA had consistently 
been the most central actor in the network, but their capacity to further the network was limited.  
However, rather than remain in inertia, external forces created new opportunities for the network 
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to evolve, specifically campaigns and advocacy work of ENGOs forced the network into a formal 
hierarchical structure.   
Results of the SNA also led to a number of additional findings.  The combination of 
network diversity and the E-I index promoted more accurate depictions of cross-sectoral dialogue 
and engagement.  This perspective was deepened by the visual depictions of the network which 
highlighted the clusters of sectors, such as in the 2001-2007 phase.  Earlier phases show isolated 
engagement with different sectors, while later phases show greater frequency of direct interaction 
amongst a diversity of sectors.  Using weighted data that represented several meetings over time 
also permitted clearer evidence of which actors were more active as compared with others.  This 
is evident in the first three phases where networks sizes ranged from seven to 24, but high levels 
of interaction were only consistent between 4-5 actors.   
Other valuable insight included the comparisons of most centralized actors across phases.  
The network’s most centralized actors reached inertia when the fourth phase is considered against 
the fifth phase where a new centralized actor was identified.   Lastly, the negative correlation 
between network diversity and the E-I index was shown in the last phase to not always be 
accurate.  In this case, as network diversity remained high, the E-I index also increased.  
Therefore increased diversity does not always result in lower heterophily scores for a governance 
network.   
Two future areas for research remain.  First, deeper SNA analysis of governance networks 
through the use of additional statistics such as actor’s roles, actor clustering, and reciprocity could 
prove insightful.  Additionally, the contrast between multiple networks of the same system may 
reveal as much, or more data as a qualitative analysis would provide, i.e. one way directional ties 
of resources and communication, formal lines of authority versus informal lines of support.  The 
opportunity for SNA for governance studies is only beginning.  Also, a greater set of historical 
governance studies examining transition could reveal addition trends or sectoral differences.  
Overall, this research has demonstrated the unique contributions of a multi-method approach to 
governance studies.   
2.6.3 Lessons for Water Governance 
This case demonstrates a number of important findings regarding water governance systems more 
broadly.  First, the aspect of time cannot be undervalued, both from an analytical and planning 
perspective.  A historical lens permits a reflective understanding of context, influence, and 
transformation because the broadest perspective can be applied and linkages between elements 
can be drawn and analyzed in the most holistic way.  From a planning perspective, time permits 
various elements of a system to emerge, connect, conflict and transform.  At the end of the 
research period, a wide range of actors, knowledge and resources are present in a collective way 
that had not previously been achieved.  Governance actors from multiple levels of government, 
non-government organizations, stakeholders and scientists were all deeply engaged in the 
governance process.  Long-term and comprehensive knowledge regarding the natural and social 
system had been collected, documented and understood (in light of the inherent complexity of the 
system).  Resources, financial, technical and regulatory have been aligned in a new way.  As a 
disclaimer, this is not to say that governance in the watershed is now completely effective.   
Rather the intent is to bring attention to the fact that three important components: actors, 
knowledge and resources, are well developed at the same time, in a way that the governance 
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system has not previously experienced.  It was a 30+ year process to get to this stage, and one that 
is still continuing to develop and transform.  Meaningful progress takes time. 
Second, this case highlights the capacity of a system to respond to change and to what are 
identified here as ‘ceilings’ – instances where the governance system reached a point at which it 
was not feasible continue on the same path.  Figure 9 highlights a simplified account of 
governance transformations in Lake Simcoe, including stimuli, responses and ceilings.  The 
critical insight is how the system responded to these ceilings.  Rather than reach a point of inertia 
when a ceiling was hit, a response was identified, and the trajectory of the system was re-
negotiated.  One key example is the limitations of siloed efforts of individual governance 
(government ministries and the CA) actors early on that resulted in the creation of the 
collaborative LSEMS program to respond to phosphorus loading problems in the lake.  A second 
example was the withdrawal of government agencies as a main funder of LSEMS work.  This led 
to an important introduction of municipal government partners, not only as funders, but as 
governance partners and implementers.  A later and critical example occurred when voluntary 
phosphorus reduction strategies that could be initiated by the CA became exhausted and no 
further improvement could be achieved through these mechanisms.  This ceiling, combined with 
the stimulus created by the physical degradation, ignited efforts by non-governmental 
organizations in the watershed who were able to interject and again change the trajectory of the 
system.  This is not to say that these transformations in the system were simple, or without 
tension and conflict.  At each ceiling, a governance actor considered available resources and 
relationships, and found ways to re-combine them to create new opportunities.  It was this 
attention to system dynamics and opportunities that was utilized, and, importantly, it was not 
always the same governance actor who recognized and took advantage of opportunities.   
 
 
  
Figure 9 Simplified Account of Governance Transformations in Lake Simcoe 
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Future design of water governance system needs to allow for time.  Time is needed for the 
development of individual elements, and time is needed to allow new elements to emerge that 
may play valuable roles in the system.  This inherently goes against much current effort, where 
water crises demand actionable effort now.  Numerous cases from around the globe highlight the 
shortcomings of this approach; efforts to do everything all at once often are not feasible, and are 
likely to fail. What this case highlights is that efforts can be directed at individual elements at 
strategic moments in time.  In this case, a (simplified) sequence of effort was initially driven by 
scientific knowledge generation, followed by a focus on collaborative actor relationships and then 
by the addition of several types resources.  The skill and capacity for governance actors to ‘read’ 
and ‘see’ a system, and therefore to understand how, when and where to act, is an important 
opportunity for water governance to become more strategic and effective.  This case indicates a 
number of areas for further research.  Most broadly, do the transformation patterns identified here 
hold true for other locations? This includes the transitions between governance frameworks, and 
the role of government. Do they hold true for other kinds of governance systems (i.e. health)?  
Perhaps most interestingly, are there stages of maturity for governance systems?   Further 
research on governance systems and how they transform over time should seek to elaborate on 
these questions.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Transcending the Watershed Boundary 
3.1 Introduction  
Watershed boundaries are widely accepted by many water practitioners and researchers as the de 
facto ideal boundary for both water management and governance activities (e.g.,  European 
Commission 2001; Global Water Partnership 2003). In the context of governance, defined here as 
the structures and processes by which people in societies make decisions and share power (Young 
1992), watershed boundaries are typically considered an effective way to integrate the social, 
political and environmental systems they encompass (Mitchell 1990). However, the utility and 
authenticity of the watershed boundary for water governance should not be assumed. Instead, 
both scholars and practitioners ought to carefully consider the circumstances under which 
watershed boundaries provide an appropriate frame for governance (Cohen and Davidson 2011).  
The purpose of this paper is to identify how water governance can transcend the watershed 
boundary.  The paper begins by briefly summarizes the literature supporting the ‘watershed is 
best’ argument before returning to the watershed boundary challenges identified by Cohen and 
Davidson (Cohen and Davidson 2011).  This framework is then applied to an empirical water 
governance case where profound boundary-related challenges exist.  The results are presented in 
two sections.  First, the case is examined in light of the identified water boundary challenges to 
discuss how these are prevalent in the watershed.  Second, the results highlight instances where 
alternative non-boundary dependent tools for water governance are applied or created.   The 
discussion argues that the watershed boundary has utility when applied in a limited and focused 
manner, and then draws attention to opportunities for water governance that can transcend the 
watershed boundary.  
 
3.2 Water Governance: In or Over the Boundary? 
 
3.2.1 Governance through Watershed Boundaries 
The notion that the watershed provides an ideal boundary has been common for some time. The 
use of watershed boundaries was noted in the third century China (Molle 2009). Drainage areas 
were mapped in Spain and France in the mid-1800s (Blomquist and Schlager 2005; Molle 2009). 
Several rationales for the appropriateness of watershed boundaries have been advanced. First is 
the apparent naturalness of the boundary (Commission of the European Communities 2007; 
Parkes, et al. 2010; Saravanan, et al. 2009; Warner, et al. 2008; White 1957). Watersheds are 
defined by hydrological processes. Thus, they are “distinct, easily mapped and stable” (Barrow 
1998) and “define basic, ecologically and geomorphologically relevant management units” 
(Montgomery, et al. 1995). These properties, it has been suggested, make them a tangible and 
manageable unit for water governance (Kenny 1999).  
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With the acceptance of the boundary as natural, it is often asserted that watersheds are the 
most appropriate scale for defining the jurisdiction of water-related organizations. From this 
perspective, considerations such as social, political, economic and environmental functions 
relevant to water governance should be organized and integrated at this scale (Huitema, et al. 
2009; Leach 2006; Schmidt and Morrison 2012). This perspective is evident in the European 
Union, where watersheds (or catchments) are a defining feature of governance under the Water 
Directorate Framework (Commission of the European Communities 2007). The appeal of the 
watershed boundary as an organizing principle is the assumption that organizing activities around 
this spatial unit will permit systematic integration of issues, participation of relevant stakeholders, 
and more effective resource management (Montgomery, et al. 1995; Schmidt and Morrison 2012; 
Woolley and McGinnis 1999). Veal (2010) outlines several additional purported strengths of the 
use of the watershed boundary. These include the capacity for the state of the ecosystem to be 
reflected in the state of the water flowing through the system; the ability for water systems to 
demonstrate the cumulative effect of environmental stresses; the role that watersheds can play as 
bridging tools for agencies; and finally, the fact that human communities can relate to their 
landscapes, making it an appropriate boundary for engagement.  
3.2.2 Watershed Boundary Challenges 
A growing body of literature is arguing that watershed boundaries are useful in limited 
applications and that the utility of the watershed boundaries relates primarily to whether it is 
being used for water management or governance purposes (Cohen and Davidson 2011). It is 
therefore important to make the distinction clear between governance and management. 
Management is defined as “the operational, on-the-ground activity to regulate a resource and 
conditions of its use” (Nowlan and Bakker 2007, 5); designing allocation plans, flooding, and 
day-to-day water quality testing are examples of water management activities. Governance can be 
defined as “the structures and processes by which people in societies make decisions and share 
power” (Young 1992, 160). This paper is concerned with the use of boundaries for water 
governance, and consequently the use of watershed boundaries for water governance. Most 
recently Cohen and Davidson (2011)  have synthesized five distinct challenges that exist 
including boundary selection, accountability, public participation, problemsheds and policysheds.  
Boundary Selection 
The challenges associated with selecting which watershed boundary for water governance 
are diverse and extensive. Johns and Rasmussen (2008, 61) note that the “multi-jurisdictional 
scale and fugitive or transitory nature of water and its many interrelated uses make it hard to fit 
neatly within well defined categories” for governance. For instance, the catchment area of a 
tributary river may be nested within a larger watershed or basin. The nested nature of 
hydrological boundaries thus makes the selection of the boundary contestable (Fitzsimmons 
1996). Additionally, watershed boundaries are rarely absolute in terms of time or space 
(Saravanan, et al. 2009; Warner, et al. 2008). Many water systems have been altered by human 
beings over time and therefore the naturalness of a watershed is often unclear (Fitzsimmons 1996; 
Warner, et al. 2008). Consequently, authors such as Blomquist and Schlager (2005) and Warner 
et al., (2008) note that the selection of watershed boundaries is essentially a political choice, with 
Fitzsimmons (1998, 218) going so far as to suggest that the “system boundaries and internal 
elements may be chosen at will.” To illustrate, in California the ‘watershed’ boundary used by an 
organization involved in the management of the Santa Ynes River was redrawn several times over 
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the lifespan of the organization to reflect changing priorities and interests (Woolley and 
McGinnis 1999).  
Accountability and Participation 
Watershed boundaries used for political organizations are also problematic. Often 
watershed organizations are not granted independent power or authority for their watershed 
(Huitema, et al. 2009). Thus, they do little more than advise (Barrow 1998). Without 
legislatively-defined authority and responsibility and/or financial support from governments, the 
accountability of watershed organizations can be reduced, and their legitimacy diminished. Tied 
to concerns of accountability are issues of public participation. Activities of a watershed 
organization often assume that citizens recognize and engage at the watershed scale. However, 
this is not necessarily the case (Ferreyra, et al. 2008; Reeve and Brunckhorst 2007; Saravanan, et 
al. 2009). Therefore, citizens may not hold their watershed organization accountable in cases 
where they are not involved (Reeve and Brunckhorst 2007; Wengert 1985,  303).  
Problemsheds and Policysheds 
The issues of problemsheds and policysheds both relate to the spatial misfits among the 
various social and ecological systems that exist in the area of any watershed. Problemsheds are 
generated when separate environmental problems operate within the same ecological boundaries. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case in most circumstances (Cohen and Davidson 2011). While 
some environmental problems experienced within a watershed are generated or created within its 
boundaries, this is by no means guaranteed (Griffith, et al. 1999). Common examples of problems 
that manifest within a watershed but are generated wholly or partly outside that watershed include 
climate change and atmospheric deposition (Fitzsimmons 1996). Policysheds are similar in 
concept to problemsheds. Policysheds represent a geography where multiple policies apply and 
have overlapping, but not identical geographical jursidictions (Molle 2007; Tiesman and 
Edelenbos 2011; Warner, et al. 2008). In the context of a watershed this could mean that a 
landuse policy applies in the northern portion of the watershed, but not in the southern. This 
variation in policy application across the watershed presents significant challenges for 
implementing cohesive and integrate planning and management within a watershed (Cohen and 
Davidson 2011; Galaz, et al. 2008).  
3.3 The Lake Simcoe Watershed 
The kinds of boundary issues discussed in this paper are starkly revealed in the Lake Simcoe 
watershed of southern Ontario, Canada (Figure 10). Lake Simcoe is located one hour’s drive 
north of Toronto, Canada’s largest metropolitan area. The Lake Simcoe watershed has a total land 
and water surface area of 3,303 sq. km., with the lake itself accounting for 722 sq. km. Land use 
planning in the watershed involves 23 different municipal governments, each with its own 
municipal land use plans, as well as five provincial pieces of legislation that direct land use 
planning for the watershed. Conservation authorities (CAs) are an important part of the 
environmental landscape in Ontario. CAs are watershed management bodies created under 
provincial legislation at the request of local municipalities. They have specific responsibilities for 
land and water management under their enabling legislation. Thus, the Lake Simcoe Region 
Conservation Authority (LSRCA) is an important actor in this watershed. In addition to the 
provincial government, municipalities and the local LSRCA, there also are several departments of 
the Canadian federal government with jurisdictional authority in the watershed. An important 
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example is the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, which has responsibilities relating to the 
management and protection of fish and fish habitat. 
In 2009, the provincial government passed the Lake Simcoe Protection Act (LSPA) (R.S.O. 
2008, c. 23). The LSPA is the first in Canada to provide coordinated protection and planning for 
an individual watershed. The Act is being implemented through the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan 
(LSPP) (Government of Ontario 2009). Boundary problems exist in almost every setting where 
water governance occurs. For the purposes of this paper, water governance in the Lake Simcoe 
watershed provides an excellent case for examining the boundary related issues highlighted in 
this paper. First, the LSPA institutionalizes a watershed boundary, which creates several of the 
boundary selection issues outlined above. Second, even though a watershed organization exists 
(the Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority), governance in this watershed occurs through 
the efforts of a number of organizations that do not have mandates or jurisdictions that are 
defined by the watershed. This introduces challenges related to accountability, engagement and 
empowerment. Third, the presence of multiple governments in the watershed creates a complex, 
multilevel, cross-scale setting that has the potential to introduce issues of policysheds and 
problemsheds. For these three reasons, the Lake Simcoe watershed case is an excellent vehicle for 
exploring how governance for water can transcend the watershed boundary.  
3.4 Methods 
The research utilized a single case study approach, and examined a case where tools and process 
for water governance have recently been significantly overhauled as a result of new legislation. 
The Lake Simcoe case involves a highly complex set of jurisdictional interactions, significant 
environmental governance challenges, and a diverse and inter-connected set of actors. The 
introduction of the Lake Simcoe Protection Act (LSPA) and the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan 
(LSPP)  took place over a relatively short period of time (LSPA announced in 2007, LSPA 
legislation passed in 2008, and the LSPP finalized in 2009), with significant input from a wide 
range of actors who promoted a variety of emerging environmental concepts. As such, a single 
case method was ideally suited to examining why decisions were made and how they were 
implemented (Yin 2009).  
Data relating to governance processes, structures and outcomes were gathered through 
analysis of key documents. Key documents include the Lake Simcoe Protection Act (LSPA) 
(R.S.O. 2008, c.23), the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan (LSPP) (Government of Ontario 2009) and 
Regulation 219 (R.S.O. 219/09), and meeting minutes from LSEMS, and the multiple committees 
and meetings leading to the creation of the Act and Plan. This information was supplemented by a 
select number of key informants. Interviews were conducted for a larger study of which this 
research was one component. Interview data regarding the application of watershed boundaries 
was conducted with staff from the provincial government the conservation authority, and 
included six people.  Questions asked how the watershed boundary had been developed and 
applied over time in the Lake Simcoe watershed.     
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Figure 10 Lake Simcoe 
 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Boundary Challenges 
The notion that the watershed provides an ideal boundary has been common for some time. With 
the acceptance of the boundary as natural, it is often asserted that watersheds are the most 
appropriate scale for defining the jurisdiction of water-related organizations. However, a growing 
body of literature is arguing that watershed boundaries are useful in many applications and that 
the utility of the watershed boundaries relates primarily to whether it is being used for water 
management or governance purposes (Cohen and Davidson 2011). Concerning governance 
Cohen and Davidson (2011) synthesized five distinct challenges that exist when applying the 
watershed boundary to governance processes including boundary choice, accountability, public 
participation, problemsheds and policysheds.  In this section, results highlight the prevalence of 
these boundary challenges in the Lake Simcoe watershed.   
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3.5.1.1 Boundary Selection 
The selection of boundaries for environmental management is often a political exercise 
(Blomquist and Schlager 2005). In the case of Lake Simcoe, the selection of a boundary is 
certainly a political exercise, as the legally-defined boundary does not match the hydrological 
boundary of the watershed. From a hydrological perspective, the Lake Simcoe watershed is a part 
of a nested set of basins and watersheds. It is a secondary watershed of the Great Lakes Drainage 
Basin (Palmer, et al. 2011). At the same time, there are 18 sub-watersheds within the Lake 
Simcoe watershed (Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority  2009). Hence, choosing to 
focus on one level within this hierarchy (the watershed that drains into Lake Simcoe) is the first 
of many political and practical decisions in this case.  
The boundary utilized for watershed management and governance in Lake Simcoe has 
historically been defined by the jurisdictional authority of the LSRCA. A senior staff member at 
the LSRCA described how the LSRCA authority boundary has changed multiple times over the 
course of its history. Initially the boundary for the LSRCA was limited to the southern portion of 
Lake Simcoe, since this was the greatest area of concern. The staff member commented, “There 
are maps in this office where there is a line going right across the middle of the lake.” Next, the 
boundary was expanded as the LSRCA became responsible for more of the lake, but inclusion of 
more municipal members required negotiation between the municipality and the LSRCA, and 
some municipalities have chosen not to be a partner. Currently the LSRCA has jurisdiction over 
most of the hydrological watershed. A glaring exception is Lake Couchiching to the north of Lake 
Simcoe. Lake Couchiching is within the municipality of Orillia which has not joined the LSRCA, 
and thus was not included in the LSPA exercise (Figure 11). 
The LSPA (Section 2) states that the boundary of the LSPA is “(a) Lake Simcoe and the 
part of Ontario, the water of which drains into Lake Simcoe, or (b) if the boundaries of the area 
are described by clause (a) are described more specifically in the regulations, the area within 
those boundaries” (R.S.O. 2008, c.23). The boundary is currently defined by a regulation and 
largely follows the jurisdictional boundary of the LSRCA. Figure 11 identifies the hydrological 
boundary of the Lake Simcoe watershed created by the OMNR and the legislative boundary for 
the LSPA and LSPP. Interviews with Ontario government staff suggest that several factors were 
considered in establishing the boundary for the Act and Plan, including how the scale of boundary 
would impact the scope of actors to engage, the area contributing to the environmental problems, 
and the manageability of the resulting policy.  
Also considered was whether the Act and Plan would be limited to just the Lake, or if it 
should be the watershed. Limiting the scope of the Act and Plan to the Lake would limit the 
number of government agencies involved and would include those historically participating 
including the MOE, MNR and the LSRCA who have responsibility for shorelines and water 
resources. Whereas increasing the scale of the Act and Plan to include the watershed (and 
therefore the surrounding land resources) would then involve other government agencies such as 
MMAH whom is responsible for land use planning. A senior MNR staff commented, 
One thing we had to do early in the game was decide, are we going to focus on what 
we call the blue polygon, what we call the lake, or include the land base surrounding 
it. If we have focused on the polygon, it would have been really only an MOE only 
legislation because it would have been water quality and would have dealt with any of 
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the sewage treatment plants that flow into the lake that sort of thing. But we 
recognized that the watershed is a significant input 
Figure 11 Lake Simcoe Watershed and Jurisdictional Boundaries 
 
 
Monitoring by the LSRCA and the MNR indicated that the entire Lake Simcoe watershed 
should be included in the legislative boundary because of the geographic scope of phosphorus 
loadings. An Ontario government staff member clarified that the Lake Simcoe watershed 
boundary was ultimately selected based on what would be a manageable geographical/political 
area. “[The boundary is] generally based on a watershed boundary, but ultimately it is just a 
defined boundary sometimes out of convenience more than anything else. The true Lake Simcoe 
watershed… technically it could include Lake Couchiching, it is really just defining where you 
want to manage your resources.” 
The selected legislative boundary is also malleable because it can be altered through 
regulatory changes if it is determined through research and scientific evidence that there is an 
area outside of the existing boundary that “directly affects, or would directly affect the ecological 
health of the Lake Simcoe watershed” (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 13(3)(b)). If scientific monitoring 
and assessment conducted under the LSPA identify significant impacts originating from outside 
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the existing watershed boundary, then that boundary can be altered to include additional 
geographic areas. Interviews with two Ontario government staff suggest that it is likely that the 
boundary will change again as information improves. Hence, the “natural” hydrological boundary 
is not the de facto boundary in this legislation. Instead, several additional criteria, including 
political considerations, defined the legislative boundary.  
3.5.1.2 Accountability 
Leading up to the LSPA, there were two mechanisms in place regarding accountability for actions 
and decision making by government agencies in the watershed. The Lake Simcoe Environmental 
Management Strategy (LSEMS) was a partnership between several government agencies and the 
LSRCA through which the agencies collaborated on efforts to improve the state of the watershed. 
The LSRCA is responsible for watershed planning and permitting regarding waterfront 
developments and is a public agency. However, neither the LSRCA, nor the LSEMS program had 
jurisdictional authority to create and implement new regulations to protect or enhance the 
watershed. Additionally, prior to the LSPA being introduced, the LSEMS program had 
undertaken a governance review process which included community members and multi-sector 
stakeholders. However, with the introduction of the LSPA, the governance recommendations 
made by the multi-stakeholder LSEMS governance review were never implemented by the 
provincial government. Thus, while a watershed organization did exist (LSRCA), it lacked 
authority to implement new legislative controls. When a new governance structure was created by 
the LSEMS program through a multi-stakeholder effort, it was bypassed as a result of the 
introduction of the LSPA.  
The LSPP sought to address some issues of accountability. The first component that the 
Plan used to address accountability was clarification of the relationships among separate pieces of 
legislation that affect the watershed. The LSPP include two types of policies that have legal 
effects regarding policy decisions under other pieces of provincial legislation such as the Ontario 
Water Resources Act (R.S.O., 1990, c. O.40). In this context, decision made under the Ontario 
Water Resources Act must conform to or consider the policies of the LSPP (Government of 
Ontario 2009, 8). Therefore, the Plan lays out the legislative decision making hierarchy for the 
numerous provincial pieces of legislation that have overlapping jurisdiction in the watershed. In 
doing so, the Plan seeks to identify which legislation holds highest authority, and therefore can be 
used to identify those actors and processes for decision making and implementation 
responsibilities.  
The second component of the LSPP relating to accountability is the specific identification 
of public agencies that have responsibility for each policy, or in some cases, a group of 
responsible agencies. In the case of a group of agencies, one will be identified as the lead agency 
for specific policy concerns. When a public agency has been identified as responsible for a 
particular type of policy, it is required “to comply with any obligations imposed on it by the 
monitoring policy” (Government of Ontario 2009, 9). This action in effect, gives legal 
ramifications to any inaction on the policy item by the government agency. Lastly, the LSPP 
identifies how agencies can be held accountable to the public, and makes specific reference to 
courts, tribunals and progress reports as required by the LSPP (Government of Ontario 2009, 9). 
These components clarify who is responsible for what actions, to what other policy or legislation 
the Plan must adhere, and how issues of accountability can be addressed through specific 
governance mechanisms. 
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A third accountability component of the LSPP is the inclusion of progress and goal 
achievement indicators and reporting. Each chapter of the LSPP focuses on one of the major 
threats to the watershed. Progress metrics are included in each chapter (except those relating to 
recreational use and climate change), as are targets and indicators (Government of Ontario 2009). 
The inclusion of progress metrics is especially useful for governance actors to monitor and assess 
the implementation and achievement of the LSPP’s goals. In laying out specifically the goals to 
be achieved, and requiring reporting on these items, the public has access to the recorded progress 
of the Plan and can consequently hold the provincial government more accountable for their 
successes, but also failures to reach the goals of the Plan.  
Other accountability measures for the public are provided by the legislated annual action 
reports, five year progress reports and the 10 year full review produced by the provincial 
government, each of which are published on the Environmental Bill of Rights Registry – a public 
disclosure mechanism used in Ontario (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 12(3)). Additionally, any proposed 
amendments to the LSPP must also be posted to the Environmental Bill of Rights Registry 
(R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 13(3)(c)). Thus, a number of measures have been incorporated into the 
LSPA to ensure accountability for actions by government actors required by the LSPP.  
In addition to the requirement placed on the government by the LSPP, it is important to 
consider the creation and implementation of the LSPA and Plan as an act of accountability on the 
part of government. Importantly, six interviewees noted that the LSPA and LSPP exist 
specifically because of the actions of non-governmental groups in the watershed. The data from 
these six interviews suggested that the provincial government was motivated to introduce the 
LSPA because of the efforts of the watershed groups who became a visible and vocal force and 
demanded stronger protection for the lake. To illustrate, an Ontario government staff member 
noted  
You had an enormous environmental NGO collaboration out there that caught the ear 
of government and they had both the federal ear and the provincial ear and they 
wanted a number of things from the province. They wanted legislation, they wanted 
something with teeth. They wanted a Lake Simcoe Protection Act. They wanted the 
government of Ontario to step up to the plate and what they meant by that was that 
they wanted more involvement by the province.  
As a result of the public pressure, and action by ENGOs the provincial government was 
responsive to their calls and introduced the LSPA. That in itself demonstrates a degree of 
accountability on the part of government. In the following section on participation and 
empowerment, the findings demonstrate how direct involvement of non-government actors in the 
LSPA and LSPP processes also contribute to holding the provincial government accountable to 
its stated goals and actions in Lake Simcoe. 
3.5.1.3 Participation and Empowerment 
Engaging communities across a geographical area as large as the Lake Simcoe watershed (Figure 
10) can be difficult and costly. Considerable diversity exists in the types of people in the 
watershed, including urban, rural, and agricultural, First Nations and recreational/seasonal 
residents. Historically, engagement of members of the public has also been limited to the 
jurisdictional area of the LSRCA, the boundaries of which, as noted earlier, do not accord with 
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the hydrological boundary of the watershed. Primarily these challenges regarding participation 
and empowerment relate to the devolution of power and authority.  
The results from this research demonstrate that issues of power and authority devolution are 
more complex in the context of multi-level governance mechanisms. From one perspective both 
power and authority have remained with the provincial government with the implementation of 
the LSPA because no formal decision making power was devolved to a watershed-based non-
governmental group or agency. Two interviewees suggested that there was never any intention by 
the government to share authority with stakeholders. For example, one provincial government 
staff person noted “this was still a provincial exercise; having an LSPA and having a LSPP was 
promulgated by the province. Even though [during development of the LSPA and LSPP] we did 
go to great effort to consult [the public], it wasn't a shared product, it was a provincial product.” 
This argument was reinforced by a second provincial government staff member who stated “at the 
end of the day the government still holds the final level of authority.” However, a contrasting 
perspective argued that some power and authority was granted to stakeholders. A third provincial 
government staff person, observed, 
Why I said this is a hybrid [governance model] is they [the provincial government] 
have also enshrined these committees to ensure that people have a formal seat at the 
table, so it's very transparent. In terms of what people’s views are and what advice 
they give government. Governments can take the advice, sometimes they will leave it, 
but with these formal committees its difficult if you choose not to. 
In this comment the third government official is referring to two committees that were 
established under the LSPA: the Lake Simcoe Science Committee and the Lake Simcoe 
Coordinating Committee. The two committees provide opportunity for non-government actors to 
directly engage and access provincial government actors. Both committees are enshrined in the 
LSPA as permanent committees that engage directly with government policy makers and are 
comprised of community and multi-sector actors (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 18, 19). The Science 
Committee is charged with providing advice to the Minister of Environment regarding the 
ecological health of the Lake Simcoe watershed for a wide range of issues, including the 
identification of threats, research needs, types of monitoring programs, and advising on the extent 
to which proposed amendments adhere to the precautionary principle (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 18). 
The Coordinating Committee is charged with overseeing the implementation of the LSPP, 
providing advice regarding implementation, and making recommendations on amendments to the 
government (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 19). Together, the members of the two committees are granted 
direct access to decision makers, and have a formal mandate to provide advice to the provincial 
government on the implementation process of the LSPP.  
Both of the Science and Coordinating committees are extensions of previous committees 
that were developed during the creation of the LSPP. Prior to the Act, the Lake Simcoe Science 
Advisory Committee (LSSAC) held much of the same responsibility for informing and advising 
the Minister during the creation of the LSPP (Government of Ontario 2008). The efforts of the 
committee culminated in the report, Lake Simcoe and its Watershed: Report to the Minister of 
Environment (LSSCA 2008), which informed the key issues and structure of the LSPP. The Lake 
Simcoe Stakeholder Advisory Committee also was comprised of a diverse group of stakeholders 
and was charged with providing feedback on the development of the LSPP from the social 
perspective. Each committee was engaged in an intense six month period of consultation during 
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the development of the LSPP, during which government staff prepared drafts of each section of 
the LSPP along with corresponding research and presentations. These would be presented to the 
Science Committee for consideration. The input from the Science Committee was then used to 
update the LSPP. The Stakeholder Committee had an opportunity to review and comment on the 
draft LSPP. The process of the review meetings provides an important view into the collaborative 
relationship amongst the actors involved. While the government directed the topics of 
conversation, and provided the physical and political space for dialogue, interview responses 
indicated that the input received from the committees was considered valuable by government 
officials, and essential to the success of the process. A senior staff member from the MOE 
commented, “I'll be the first to say, we wouldn't have half the stuff if it wasn't for them [ENGO’s 
on the Stakeholder Committee].” 
In sum, the issue of whether or not power and authority have been shared with non-
government actor prompts deeper consideration of the meaning of power and authority. From a 
multilevel governance perspective, both the provincial government and the non-government 
actors have specific authority and power. A key concern is how inter-organizational dynamics 
play into these processes. While the provincial government holds ultimate authority for rule-
making and is responsible for implementation of legislation, non-government actors on both 
committees have demonstrated that they hold the power and authority to influence and sway the 
direction of the policy process. In particular, they secured for themselves a permanent, 
legislatively-enshrined level of participation that requires them to give advice, but importantly, 
also gives them the power to request changes to the LSPP.  
3.5.1.4 Policysheds 
In the Lake Simcoe watershed, land use planning involves 23 different municipal land use plans, 
five provincial statutes that direct land use planning, and a separate watershed planning process 
directed by the LSRCA (Figure 12). Thus the policyshed is a patchwork of overlapping and 
competing management programs, legislations and land-use planning systems - most of which do 
not align neatly with the watershed boundary. A senior staff from the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing commented, 
There’s a lot of provincial legislation and plans that impact this geography, the 
Planning Act, which is guided by the provincial policy statement that is province 
wide, and obviously applies to the watershed, the Growth Plan so the greater golden 
horseshoe, you have the Greenbelt Plan, you have the Oak Ridges Moraine 
Conservation Plan, and now you have the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan, and soon 
under the Clean Water Act, you'll have Source Protection Plans that will be created. 
Technically they are another mandated provincial plan. So in making decisions, you 
can see the layers of complexity that are in place now in comparison to even eight 
years ago. 
Regarding the policy landscape, the aim of the LSPP was twofold. First, the LSPP functions as an 
integration mechanism for areas where the LSPP overlaps with other land use policies. Second, 
the LSPP aims to create a cohesive policy landscape throughout the watershed by introducing 
complementary policies for areas not currently covered by existing land use planning policies. 
The LSPP uses three key mechanisms to implement these aims.  
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First, in the areas outside of other provincial land use plans, the mechanism for integration 
is a requirement for municipal Official Plan to conform with the LSPP. In other words, where no 
other provincial land use plans have jurisdiction, the municipality must alter its Official Plan 
regulations to be in accordance with those set out in the LSPP (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 6(3)). 
Therefore existing land use policies, and the LSPP are integrated through an already established 
decision making process that clarifies which policies have greater authority. In an effort to ensure 
there are few loopholes, the LSPA explicitly states that if there is conflict between any of the 
policies that have application within the watershed, the one that provides the greatest protection 
to the ecological health of the watershed prevails (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 6(4)). 
Second, in order to avoid duplication and to achieve a level of integration, the LSPP does 
not apply to areas already covered by Provincial land use plans within the Lake Simcoe 
watershed. Falling within parts of the watershed boundary are five other provincial land and 
water management policies. With the exception of one focused on source water protection (a 
provincial program organized on a watershed basis under the Clean Water Act (S.O. 2006, c. 22), 
each of the plans relates primarily to natural heritage feature protection through land use planning 
policies. Thus Chapter 6 of the LSPP, which relates to natural heritage features, notes where other 
plans have jurisdiction; the policies noted in this section therefore only apply to areas outside of 
the boundaries of these plans (Government of Ontario 2009, 52); R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 6(5)).  
Figure 12 Provincial Level Policyshed in Lake Simcoe 
 
Finally, Subsection 6 of the LSPP also extends the integration mechanism to all decisions 
by public bodies. Therefore, any comment, submission, advice or decision by a public body shall 
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also conform to the LSPP (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 6(7)). Thus the LSPP specifically identifies its 
relationship to other planning policies within the watershed, and explicitly states how, and by 
what means they should interact through established decision making processes. Together, these 
three mechanisms have the potential to aid implementation agencies (i.e., government, LSRCA) 
by clarifying the interactions and relationships between multiple policies and the hierarchical 
nature of which one takes precedence. Cumulatively, the mechanisms seek to create a more 
holistic and integrated planning environment for the watershed. 
3.5.1.5 Problemsheds 
The concept of “problemsheds” refers to the area affected by an environmental problem. For 
example, in Lake Simcoe one problemshed is defined by the landscape on which an invasive 
species has established itself. Another example is the area where atmospheric phosphorus is 
deposited. Similar to policysheds, there often is incongruence between watershed boundaries and 
the spatial scope of other environmental challenges and their problemsheds. The LSPP includes a 
number of governance mechanisms designed to address the issue of problemsheds. 
 First, the LSPA gives permission to the government agencies listed in the LSPP to conduct 
research and monitoring activities outside of the watershed boundary in order to determine 
whether or not activities affect the ecological health of the watershed (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 3(3)). 
These areas can be understood as ‘grey zones’ under the Plan. An example of a grey zone is the 
concern around atmospheric deposition of phosphorus coming from sources “beyond the 
watershed, but close enough that they are contributing to the atmospheric load” (Government of 
Ontario 2009). This was mentioned by an MOE scientist who commented, “one thing I think will 
come up fairly early on in the research is identifying areas that are beyond the watershed 
boundary but close enough that they are contributing to the atmospheric load and that we should 
expand our stewardship into those areas.” This is estimated to be 19 tonnes of the 72 tonnes of 
phosphorus that enter the lake annually. As previously noted, the LSPA permits amendments to 
the boundary of the Plan if an area has been demonstrated to generate a negative environmental 
impact on the watershed. Therefore, the objective of this clause in the LSPA is to allow new areas 
to be brought under the jurisdiction of the LSPA and LSPP.  
Other examples of addressing issues related to problemsheds in the LSPP include policies 
dealing with water quantity, climate change and invasive species. Section 5.2 of the LSPP calls 
for water budgets to be developed for sub-watersheds that exist as part of the larger hydro-
geological area (Government of Ontario 2009, 39). In Section 7.11, the LSPP attempts to deal 
with the immense problemshed of climate change. It states that valuable effort can be made 
within the watershed, to adapt to and build resiliency to the impacts that will result from negative 
activities outside the watershed (Government of Ontario 2009, 65). Finally, section 7.3 calls for a 
regulatory proposal to require anglers who use live bait to use only bait caught within the 
watershed, with the goal of preventing the spread of invasive species (Government of Ontario 
2009, 60). This clause in the statute recognizes the external nature of invasive species but draws 
on the concept of localism to prevent further invasion by requiring bait to be locally sourced. 
These policies are valuable in that they do not ignore the externalities of problemsheds impacting 
the watershed, but instead identify and attempt to address them within and sometimes beyond 
watershed.  
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3.5.1.6 Summary 
Table 4 summarizes these water governance challenges discussed above, notes how they manifest 
in the context of the Lake Simcoe case, and identifies mechanisms or approaches of the LSPA 
and LSPP that relate to these challenges. To clarify, the noted mechanisms and approaches do not 
suggest that the boundary challenge has been solved, but rather simply identify what has been 
used in the Lake Simcoe case.  
Table 4 Watershed Boundary Challenges and Lake Simcoe 
Problem noted in 
Literature 
Presence of Problem in Lake 
Simcoe 
Approaches Utilized in Lake 
Simcoe 
Boundary Selection 
Nested set of watershed 
boundaries 
“Naturalness” of 
boundary in question as a 
result of human impact  
Politically influenced 
 
Lake Simcoe watershed nested 
within the Great Lakes Basin, 
and contains 18 sub-watersheds 
(basin report) 
Watershed heavily impacted by 
residential development and 
Holland Marsh  
Watershed boundary selection 
historically linked to the 
membership of municipal 
governments in the LSRCA 
(wood) which created 
jurisdictional area  
Manageable area  
Source of environmental 
problems 
Engagement of government 
agencies 
Potential to be altered based on 
new knowledge  
Accountability 
Limitations in authority 
of watershed organization  
Poor accountability 
mechanisms because of 
lack of authority and 
reporting structure 
LSEMS has no teeth to 
implement regulations, no 
authority  
Had proposed new governance, 
but was dissolved by LSPA  
Clear distinctions between types 
of policies in LSPP 
Identifies specific responsible 
authorities 
Include targets and indicators 
which provide metrics to 
measure progress 
Legislated review periods  
LSPA and LSPP a response to 
action of citizens and NGO’s  
Participation and 
Empowerment 
Watershed boundary is 
not a meaningful 
boundary for public, so 
participation and 
therefore accountability is 
weak 
Watershed is extremely large 
and a diverse population.  
Primary division is between 
urban, recreational and 
agricultural and First Nation 
residents.  
Costly to engage whole 
watershed 
Historically engagement also 
limited by LSRCA jurisdictional 
authority  
Ultimate authority remained 
with the provincial government 
for decision making 
Intensive use of stakeholder and 
science committees to influence 
development of LSPP 
Stewardship Network 
Permanent multi-sector and 
science committees with direct 
access to policy process. 
Coordinating committee with 
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power to request amendments, 
and directly oversee 
implementation process  
Policysheds 
Incongruence between 
policy jurisdiction and 
environmental challenges 
Multiple provincial, municipal 
and watershed scale policy 
programs which resulted in 
fragmented and overlapping 
policy landscape 
 
Reduction of duplication 
between LSPP and previously 
established provincial land use 
plans 
Integration of LSPP policies 
with municipal jurisdictions 
through Official LSPP 
conformity 
All comments, submissions, 
advice or decisions by public 
bodies must conform to LSPP 
Problemsheds 
Incongruence between 
boundaries of multiple 
environmental problems  
Several environmental 
challenges are derived from 
outside of the watershed, ie 
invasive species and atmospheric 
deposition of phosphorus 
Allow for research and 
monitoring outside of legislated 
boundary to understand extent 
of externalities 
Permits for amendments to 
boundary to include area of 
externalities if necessary to 
regulate negative activities  
Recognition of externalities 
impact on watershed, and 
introduces policies to mitigate 
problems where feasible 
3.5.2 Water Governance: Tools that Transcend the Boundary 
In addition to the components presented above, the LSPA also incorporates a number of 
innovative governance mechanisms regarding how the LSPA is structured and implemented. The 
LSPP is structured around four different types of policies. Strategic Actions play an important 
role in the adaptive nature of the LSPP by introducing issues or problems acknowledged to play a 
role in either the restoration, or degradation of the watershed (i.e., shoreline protection or 
recreation), but which require further research, consultation or monitoring in order to formulate 
how they should be addressed. Thus, Strategic Actions identify the type of work to be done, 
which may later be used to bring amendments to the LSPP as a result of their analysis. This type 
of action is related to the LSPA being considered an “enabling” piece of legislation, in that it 
provides authority for the LSPA to develop regulations around an issue, without stating the 
details of the regulation (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 26, 27). This also permits the agencies named in 
the LSPP an opportunity to further determine whether a) a regulation is necessary, and b) what 
the appropriate approach and details of the regulation would be. An example is the case of on-site 
sewage treatment (septic systems) noted in Section 4.13 of the LSPP which calls for the proposal 
of a regulation of these systems when in 100 m of a shoreline (Government of Ontario 2009, 30). 
Therefore, the combination of the strategic actions, and the enabling capacity of the LSPA permit 
the governance system to adhere to the pre-cautionary principle.  
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Also, the LSPP has the potential to be amended at any time, as noted in Section 8.13 
(Government of Ontario 2009, 84). This is unique to the LSPP, in comparison with other 
provincial level plans, which can only be amended during their 10 year review. As noted by one 
government staff member, the LSPP was less than one year old before there were consultations 
being held for amendments to the Phosphorus Strategy, Shoreline Protection Strategy. 
Additionally, the LSPP can be amended as a result of research, monitoring and reporting reviews 
(annual and 5 year review). Thus, the LSPP has the potential to be very responsive to new 
knowledge and understanding, and incorporate this quickly into the management of the LSPP, 
permitting the plan to be very adaptive in nature. 
Lastly, the implementation of this LSPP occurs through policy integration which takes place 
at several levels of government. Specifically, both levels of municipal Official Plans must 
conform to the LSPP. The actions and management plans of the Lake Simcoe Conservation 
Authority, which provide a watershed scale jurisdiction, are also guided by the LSPP in addition 
to other provincial level agencies and legislation that must be integrated with the LSPP. Second, 
multilevel learning and collaboration has occurred primarily through the Committees for the Plan, 
and will continue to take place in the permanent committees. In addition to these committees, 
there were also a number of other consultation and training events that permitted cross level 
learning. These include training for municipal planners and the public on the implementation of 
the LSPP, the extensive consultations held prior to the introduction of the LSPA, and 
consultations currently taking place for amendments to the LSPP. Combined, these approaches 
provide a precautionary, adaptive and multi-level governance process. 
3.6 Bounded and Unbounded Water Governance  
The purpose of this paper is to explore how governance for water can transcend the watershed 
boundary. The case of Lake Simcoe provided valuable insights as to whether this is feasible or 
appropriate. The case demonstrated that boundaries are necessary for select purposes such as 
delimiting the scope of an organization’s mandate, or the coverage of a statute. However, it also 
highlights that water governance can transcend the use of a watershed boundary for many 
activities (Table 5). 
Table 5 Strategies for Water Governance 
Thematic Area Strategy 
Legislative Design - Harmonization of new and existing policies 
- Utilize existing mechanisms to implement harmonization 
Organizational Arrangements - Clear identification of which governing agencies are 
responsible for individual responsibilities 
- Implementation, monitoring and authorities exist at multiple 
levels 
- Utilize existing organizational authority  
Role of Science - Underpins entire development process 
- Directs adaptations of legislation and regulations 
- Led by non-government scientists  
 62 
- Adaptive approach built on precautionary principle 
Multi- actor governance  - Role for non-government actors in policy development, 
review and implementation 
- shared institutions created by engagement in policy creation 
and implementation rather than through a new organization 
Jurisdictional Boundary - Amendable based on emerging science 
- Defined by capacity to manage (within political, economic 
and social contexts) 
 
In the case of Lake Simcoe, a boundary was necessary to identify the scope of the 
legislation, and therefore the geographical area over which the legislation grants authority in 
decision making. The boundary chosen was largely based on hydrological parameters (i.e., the 
Lake Simcoe watershed). In that sense, the use of a boundary in Lake Simcoe responds to the call 
from authors who argue that governance should be organized and integrated at this scale 
(Huitema, et al. 2009; Leach 2006; Schmidt and Morrison 2012). However, the boundary is only 
loosely based on the natural hydrological boundary. This is in accordance with the view that 
suggests that all boundary choices are inherently political (Blomquist and Schlager 2005; 
Fitzsimmons 1996; Warner, et al. 2008). The data from this study show that the hydrological 
boundary was only a starting point; it was adjusted based on a number of other social and 
political considerations. Thus, while a boundary was utilized to define the scope of the Lake 
Simcoe Protection Act, it was not selected based on the inherent ‘naturalness’ of the watershed. 
Additionally, the legislative boundary does not limit the research and monitoring activities of the 
legislation. While most of these activities will take place within the legislative (watershed) 
boundary, research and monitoring will also take place outside the boundary if an issue of 
concern is identified that could be impacting the watershed. Therefore, the case of Lake Simcoe 
reinforces that strict adherence to watershed boundaries is not necessary (or desirable). A review 
of non-boundary dependent tools in the case highlight a focus on process, rather than boundaries 
for water governance. The use of a boundary in the Lake Simcoe empirical case is somewhat 
limited. While it identifies the jurisdictional areas of the legislation, it is also a flexible and 
permeable boundary where activities can take place outside of the boundary. This approach 
permits greater attention to coordination across levels and scales. In this case the LSPP is a 
mechanism used to harmonize the policies within the watershed, and is intended to create clearly 
defined areas of policy authority between the policies that apply to the watershed. This occurs 
through two mechanisms. First, the highest level of authority is identified in cases where there is 
overlap among mandates. Second, the LSPP ensures cross scale coordination through the 
municipal Official Plan process through which all policies of the LSPA and other provincial 
policies are implemented. In doing so, competition between policies is reduced and linkages 
across scales are improved.  
Working across multiple levels and scales is an important way to address the question of the 
mismatch between watershed boundaries and relevant policysheds and problemsheds. Doing so 
recognizes that not all action must take place at one scale (i.e., the watershed). The 
implementation of the LSPP takes place at a variety of scales and levels to address both issues of 
policysheds and problemsheds. For example, municipal Official Plans are used by municipal 
government for land use decisions, sub-watershed plans are utilized for water management 
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activities, and the shoreline is one of the many areas of focus for improving natural aquatic 
habitat. Importantly, the LSPP does not use the watershed boundary to attempt to encircle all of 
the environmental challenges facing the watershed. Rather it permits strategic policy options for 
dealing with the problems arising outside of the watershed, but which have impact within the 
watershed.  
Also significant, a new watershed organization was not created to implement the LSPA. 
Instead, coordination across multiple levels and scales of organizations and government agencies 
was identified through the LSPP development process as a potentially more effective approach. 
Consequently, the LSPP is implemented by relevant actors at the municipal, provincial and 
federal government levels, and by members of local community and environmental groups. This 
approach stands in contrast to calls for the creation of new agencies at the watershed scale that are 
expected to provide this integrative function (e.g.,  European Union Water Directors 2003; Global 
Water Partnership, Technical Advisory Committee 2000). 
 Another important characteristic of the LSPP is its recognition of the ‘unknown scale’ 
through explicit inclusion of a kind of ‘grey zone’ around the LSPA legislative boundary. These 
grey areas are an opportunity to include in the legislated area of the LSPA, areas where 
externalities are generated, if determined through research and monitoring activities. Therefore, 
the LSPA gives government the authority to take actions to improve the ecological health of the 
watershed even though the problem that threatens the watershed is generated outside of its 
boundaries. The LSPP also has the capacity to introduce regulations or environmental 
management plans for grey zones introduced into the legislated area. Therefore, the LSPP 
recognizes that new scales may also be identified, and permits their inclusion into the 
management of the watershed. Whether or not this approach will be effective could not be 
determined through this research. Nonetheless, it stands as a potential example of the kind of 
adaptive approach to governance that increasingly is being called for. For instance, Folke (2005) 
suggests that flexible and adaptive institutions are necessary, and that decision makers should be 
able to respond to new knowledge, technical capacity, and resources. In the Lake Simcoe case, 
flexible and adaptive institutions and behaviours underlay the design of the LSPA and the 
LLSPP. Critically, the jurisdictional boundary can be amended by government based on new 
scientific information relating to the problemshed gathered through monitoring activities, or 
outcomes from Strategic Action policies. The Strategic Action policies leave a place holder in the 
LSPP for future areas of study where issues have been identified as a potential concern, but which 
require further research, consultation or monitoring in order to formulate how they should be 
addressed. Thus, Strategic Actions identify the type of work to be done, which may later be used 
to bring amendments to the LSPP as a result of their analysis. The LSPA is also an “enabling” 
piece of legislation, in that it provides authority for the LSPA to develop regulations around an 
issue, without stating the details of the regulation (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23, s. 26, 27). This also permits 
the agencies named in the LSPP an opportunity to further determine whether a regulation is 
necessary, and what the appropriate approach and details of the regulation would be. These 
measures can lead to amendments to the LSPA, but importantly, the amendments can take place 
at any time. This distinguishes the LSPA from other statutes that can only be reviewed at fixed 
intervals, if at all.  
Constructing shared institutions requires a focus on the quality of interactions and joint 
development of policies and programs through learning by doing. This insight is useful for 
considering the approach in Lake Simcoe regarding policysheds and participation and 
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empowerment. Policysheds can only be effectively created through a joint appreciation and 
commitment to integration and coordination across scales, while empowerment in participation 
comes from the quality interactions and joint development of policies and programs. The two 
committees created by the LSPA (the Science and Coordinating Committees) have permanent 
access to government, and have the power to call for amendments to the LSPA. This provides a 
meaningful empowerment opportunity for those involved. The fact that the government engaged 
members of the public deeply in developing the LSPP also is important. The two predecessor 
committees that provided a mechanism for this interaction were involved in an intense 
negotiation process to determine key elements of the LSPP and to provide input to its overall 
direction. Finally, coordination efforts necessitated by the Official Plan conformity process 
required open communication among various levels of government and between agencies to 
achieve a level of integration between the various provincial and municipal policies. This too 
demonstrates the multilevel governance approach of the LSPA and LSPP. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
Water governance scholars and practitioners have long grappled with questions surrounding how 
best to engage actors, formulate policies and plans, and implement the results with success 
(Bakker and Cooke 2011; Morrison, et al. 2004; Smith and Porter 2010). Watershed boundaries 
have been identified as a way to ease the challenges of obtaining participation, integrating 
resource problems and providing a coherent policy framework (Grigg 2008; Mitchell 2005; 
Savenije and van der Zaag 2008; Varis and Rahaman 2005). Yet critical analyses of the role of 
the watershed boundary for governance are pointing to a host of challenges (Blomquist and 
Schlager 2005; Fitzsimmons 1996; Warner, et al. 2008; Woolley and McGinnis 1999). These 
relate to boundary selection, participation and empowerment, accountability, policysheds and 
problemsheds. Critiques of the use of the watershed to define the scope for governance suggest 
that doing so does not ensure integration of processes, issues, problems or policies. More 
fundamentally, there is little evidence that adopting a watershed boundary necessarily leads to 
harmonized policies, reduced power struggles, or more effective collaboration. Whether applied 
by legislation or policy, watershed boundaries simply create another jurisdictional boundary for 
governance. As Tiesman and Edelenbos (2011, 102) have noted, “no redefinition of boundaries 
will make boundaries disappear.” What then is the role of the watershed boundary in governance 
for water? 
Results from this research show that a watershed boundary can be used to define a 
legislated area, and to delimit management areas as has been suggested by watershed governance 
scholars. However, the case of Lake Simcoe has highlighted a number of caveats for identifying 
and applying a watershed boundary for water governance. In the case of Lake Simcoe, the 
watershed boundary was not a strictly hydrological boundary, but was modified based on both 
political and management needs. Yet, the case has also indicated that issues of accountability, 
participation and empowerment can be navigated through non-bounded mechanisms, and 
highlighted some specific opportunities for improved governance process.  
Perhaps most importantly, this research indicated that non-boundary governance 
mechanisms were being used extensively by the provincial government to navigate a complex 
water system. The LSPA and LSPP include mechanisms for learning followed by adaptation, the 
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creation of shared institutions, and multiple mechanisms to integrate issues and solutions across 
scales and levels. This is an important advancement in water governance as it demonstrates a 
focus on process. Specifically, the case illustrates the principles of adaptation, learning by doing 
and accepting that not all is understood about our physical and social environment. It also 
highlights the fact that these systems are in constant flux, and our capacity to govern them is 
dependent upon our ability to become dynamic, responsive and adaptable governance actors. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Environmental Non-governmental Organizations in Water Govern-
ance: Mechanisms, Relationships and Roles 
4.1 Introduction  
The changing role of the state in the last quarter century has been an important contemporary 
concern for policy makers, scholars and the public (Gouldson 2009; Hysing 2009; 2011, 102). 
There is increasing recognition among governance scholars that non-government actors are 
exerting influence over governance systems and contributing in novel ways to governance 
process (Newell, et al. 2012). The role of non-government actors such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) is particularly pertinent. NGOs can be understood as “non-government or 
non-profit organizations that have traditionally been composed of volunteers and concerned with 
distinct policy objectives” (Lane and Morrison 2006, 233). NGO actors have long played an 
important role in the governance process through advocacy, protests, awareness campaigns and 
citizen movements (Pross 1986). Classical governance arrangements, whereby the state exerts 
hierarchical control and dominance over the governing of society (Treib, et al. 2007), have 
proved unsuitable and unresponsive to current social, cultural and environmental complexities 
(Lemos and Agrawal 2006). As a result, NGO actors have become more involved in governance 
beyond the role of advocacy and stakeholders. NGO actors are generating opportunities for, and 
sometimes directing, governance processes (Auer 2000a; Bugdahn 2008; Dombrowski 2010). In 
this way they are exerting greater agency and authority (Benecke 2011). 
Lane and Morrison (2006) have observed, environmental policy is routinely being 
developed through joint action between governments and NGOs. To illustrate, Kapaciauskaite 
(2011) found that non-government actors were involved in initiating international conventions, 
drafting agreements, and providing scientific and technical expertise; they have also played roles 
in implementation and monitoring of decisions and actions. Other scholars suggest that an even 
more important change is taking place: non-government actors are not simply being invited to 
participate in governance activities by government (Edelenbos, et al. 2010; Gouldson 2009; 
Gunningham 2009b). Instead, they are actively pursuing their own governance agendas (Crow 
2008; Gouldson 2009) and thus are becoming important actors in shaping environmental 
solutions (e.g. Auer 2000a; Wapner 1995). While Legler (2012) states that unless non-
government actors are able to obtain authority, their efforts to govern are meaningless, other 
authors suggest that non-government actors are creating their own distinct roles in governance 
processes that go well beyond simply being subjects for consultation. As a result, they are further 
altering the governance frameworks in which they operate.  
4.2 An Emerging Conceptualization of NGOs 
Some authors contend that contributions by non-government actors are creating a more resilient 
and democratic environments by revitalizing the governance process (Kapaciauskaite 2011; Kim 
2009). In many cases, non-government actors are not bound by the legal or policy frameworks 
that constrain government actors, and therefore they have the flexibility to introduce new and 
novel mechanisms for governance. They can more readily adapt their approaches, the scope of 
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their activities, and the communities they engage based on the energy, creativity and 
responsiveness of the process (Auer 2000a; Dombrowski 2010). In this sense they are ‘light on 
their feet’ as compared to governments. By drawing on this capacity, non-government actors also 
have the potential to increase the level of participation in governance by citizens, which can foster 
greater democratic engagement (Crow 2008; Wright 2000). These examples suggest that the 
actions of NGOs can be complementary to those of government actors because NGOs can offer 
new opportunities, ideas, resources and solutions to complex challenges.Knowledge on NGOs is 
vast and includes a number of sub-focus areas including ENGOs, interest groups and the not-for 
profit sector.  While acknowledging that there are nuances between these individual actor types, 
for ease of discussion, these sub-groups are collectively identified as NGOs given that each form 
refers to, at the broadest level, a non-government actor.   This approach is also useful, given that 
this research offers an emerging conceptualization of NGOs, one that requires further refinement 
and empirical evaluation.  Additionally, where preliminary research indicated additional elements 
of character (i.e. networks and policy entrepreneurs) discussions from these literatures were 
included in the framework in order to permit the broadest assessment of these actors and their 
potential.    
With increasing acknowledgement of the changing role of NGO actors and their potential to 
shift the dynamics among actors, an investigation of these actors is warranted. This research uses 
an empirical water governance case to investigate the changing role of environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs). The paper draws on multiple literatures, including NGO, 
policy entrepreneurs, networks and governance develop an emerging conceptualization of the 
mechanisms, structures and roles of ENGOs. Accordingly, three research questions guide this 
investigation. First, what mechanisms are ENGO actors utilizing to contribute to water 
governance in new and novel ways? Second, if ENGO actors are engaged differently, how has 
this affected the governance structures in which they operate? Finally, what roles can ENGO 
actors play in water governance processes?  An empirical case study set within a water 
governance context is used to evaluation the conceptual framework.  Data drawn from interviews, 
formal documentation and a survey are used to respond to these research questions. Lessons for 
water governance are identified in the conclusion regarding the changing dynamic of water 
governance and the engagement of ENGOs. 
4.2.1 NGO Mechanisms  
Political Pressure 
Doyle and McEachern (2008) note that during the 1970s and 1980s, there was an explosion in 
NGO numbers in North America. This explosion was largely due to the emerging array of 
environmental problems, and the international meetings held to respond to them. An early 
example is the Stockholm Conference in 1972 on the Human Environment (Conca 1995; Peet 
1994). NGOs engaged in these international meetings were heavily focused on lobbying and 
applying political pressure on governments and international bodies to either stop or regulate 
economic activities that negatively affected the environment (Doyle and McEachern 2008). 
Specific activities included political confrontation and protest (Bryant 2009); demonstrations and 
informational campaigns (Conca 1995); mass mobilization strategies to engage the public 
(Wright 2000); direct action activities, and creating media events to gain attention (Kellow 2000). 
In essence, their approach was confrontational and combative, with the goal of gaining influence 
and power over policy processes (Bryant 2009; Conca 1995; Doyle and McEachern 2008). 
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Policy Change  
Many NGOs today continue to use the combative strategies noted above. However, the NGO 
literature suggests that the approaches utilized by some contemporary NGOs have shifted and are 
proving less combative and more cooperative and innovative. For example, Vaughan and 
Arnseault (2008) suggest that NGOs in the health sector are seeking to create policy change by 
redefining problems, reframing issues, and securing desired legislative changes. Dombrowski 
(2010) argues that ENGOs are making an effort to have a diverse range of non-government actors 
participate directly in decision making. In this way, NGO’s are reformulating policy issues and 
opportunities through supporting more inclusive processes. In doing so, NGOs can alter the 
landscape of perspectives represented and valued in the governance process (Peet 1994).  
 
Knowledge Brokers 
NGOs can play a key role in linking different kinds of knowledge (i.e., scientific, cultural) across 
scales (i.e., local, regional, provincial). For example, NGOs can act as information translators 
between the languages and world views of different actor groups, such as technical experts and 
citizens; similarly, they can bridge the political and environmental perspectives (Auer 2000a). 
Dombrowski (2010) suggests that NGOs can act as conduits of information across scale, 
‘upstreaming’ the concerns of local communities, and ‘downstreaming’ the debates and 
agreements of regional, national or international institutions. Thus, NGOs can serve an important 
function by bridging between actors, and thus breaking down barriers across scales and between 
different types of knowledge.  
Policy Entrepreneurs 
NGO’s are also acting as policy entrepreneurs (Vaughan and Arsneault 2008; Young 2009) in 
order to influence and participate in governance. Policy entrepreneurs are defined as “individuals 
[who] see problems from new perspectives and develop innovative new approaches to solve 
them; they are able to effectively mobilize and lead others in support of their proposed solution” 
(Vaughan and Arsneault 2008, 413) They seek to create dramatic change within their areas of 
interest (Mintrom and Norman 2009). In the context of water policy, Huitema and Meijerink 
(2009) suggest that policy entrepreneurs use a number of different strategies to navigate the 
governance system. These include developing and promoting new ideas, building coalitions, 
recognizing and exploiting opportunities, recognizing and exploiting multiple venues or platforms 
of participation, and orchestrating and managing networks (Huitema and Meijerink 2009a, 380). 
Other studies of NGO strategy also emphasize the importance of coalition and networking 
building in accounting for the success of NGOs (Crow 2008; Richardson 2000; Wright 2000).  
4.2.2 Governance Structures: NGO’s and a Network Approach 
Insights drawn from the network governance literature provide additional understanding 
regarding the approaches of NGOs. In the context of governance, networks are comprised of 
distributed sets of people (Volkoff, et al. 1999) who have come together for problem-solving 
purposes (Reihlen 1996). They are united by acknowledgement of their mutual dependency (Isett 
and Provan 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000) and by their shared interest and approach to 
problem solving (Hay 1998; Hudson 2004). Actors in the network collaborate to achieve 
innovative solutions through knowledge sharing, collective learning and negotiation (Adam and 
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Kriesi 2007; Borzel 1998; Cash, et al. 2006; Reihlen 1996; Volkoff, et al. 1999). The contexts in 
which a network operates are typically characterized by meta or indivisible problems too intricate 
to be effectively managed by one organization alone (Gray 1985; Trist 1983).  
Through the process of identifying the problem, network actors come to understand that 
they offer asymmetrical resources, and that through collaboration they can provide more effective 
solutions to their common problems (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Hudson 2004). Trist (1983) and 
Jarillo (1988) suggest that network formation is enabled by the presence of individual actors who 
have the ability to create ties with other actors – a joining made easier as a result of similar 
concerns and outlooks. These types of actors are sensitive to situations that require mobilization, 
and are able to engage other actors to address those issues. In contexts as diverse as international 
negotiations (Oberthur, et al. 2003), health care (Provan and Milward 2001) and environmental 
governance (Dombrowski 2010), NGOs increasingly are supplying this entrepreneurial energy 
and playing these bridging functions. Insights from the network literature suggest that actors 
operating in this capacity are strategic and directed in their actions, with each carrying a particular 
purpose and objective. Network actors are hyper aware of their contexts, and the opportunities 
and constraints they face. As a result, they can have skills and knowledge that prove to be 
extremely valuable for successful environmental governance.  
4.2.3 Shifting Roles in Governance and the Positive Sum Game 
Governance can be understood as “the structures and processes by which people in societies make 
decisions and share power” (Young 1992, 160). Early discussions by Rhodes (1996) centred 
around the government-to-governance debate which questioned whether governance was shifting 
from conventional top-down government control towards alternative models for governing such 
as collaboration, partnerships and networks (Folke, et al. 2005). Authors such as Gunningham 
(2009b) argue that what has changed is the processes governments are using. In particular, there 
has been a shift from governments relying on formal consultation processes, to governments 
making use of participatory dialogue, deliberation, and consensus building strategies. These 
processes often are framed as a way to increase flexibility, inclusiveness and transparency (Duit 
and Galaz 2008). However, others suggest less positive reasons for this shift. Agrawal (2005), for 
example, argues that increased use of multi-stakeholder bodies that have responsibilities for 
environmental governance, but whose power to effect change is limited, are being created by state 
actors to enhance their legitimacy without actually reducing their power.  
Researchers who reject the government-to-governance perspective argue that governments 
are pursuing their traditional legislative roles, while at the same time adopting new practices and 
approaches for decision making that involve a wider range of actors. This view suggests that 
governance is not a zero sum game whereby power is either held by governments or by 
autonomous, non-government actors. Instead, Kim (2009, 874) argues, new ways of governing 
permit a “mutual empowerment of state and society”. Johns and Rasmussen (2008) state that in 
the context of water policy in Canada, “there has been a steady increase in involvement of non-
state actors…such partnerships are an attempt to involve citizen and groups at the national, 
provincial and local levels in the planning and implementation of improved water and watershed 
management.” These result in positive sum outcomes for both state and society, where 
opportunities are created for both government and non-government actors to be engaged and 
active. Through governance processes, actors contribute to, and in some cases benefit from, the 
synergy of their interactions with other actors. This notion of a positive sum game is supported by 
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Lane and Morrison (2006), who note that the emergence and strength of NGOs in governance 
provides a complementary, rather than a competitive, function.  
 
4.3 Empirical Context 
The research utilized a single case study focused on Lake Simcoe. This important water body is 
located in southern Ontario, one hour’s drive north of Toronto, Canada’s largest metropolitan 
area. Environmental governance in the Lake Simcoe watershed provides an excellent case study 
for building understanding of the changing roles of NGOs. First, the governance system in Lake 
Simcoe is complex due to its geography, economic value, environmental stressors and public 
engagement activities. The Lake Simcoe watershed (Figure 13) crosses 23 municipal boundaries 
and has a total land and water surface area of 3,303 sq. km., of which the lake itself occupies 
approximately 22% or 722 sq. km. The watershed contains significant natural, urban and 
agricultural systems and is a source of drinking water for five municipalities (LSRCA 2009; 
OMOE 2009). Lake Simcoe is southern Ontario’s largest inland lake, excluding the Great Lakes 
(Government of Ontario 2009). The watershed provides significant economic value to the region 
and the province, bringing in an estimated $200 million annually through recreational activities 
(Government of Ontario 2009). Water quality problems in Lake Simcoe have been documented 
since the 1970s. These problems include an overloading of phosphorus, invasive species, climate 
change, land use change, and water-related recreational water activities, such as boating and 
fishing (LSSAC 2008). 
Second, several distinct governance systems have existed in the watershed since the late 
1970s. Prior to 1990, an informal communications network circulated information about research 
in Lake Simcoe between government agencies and the Lake Simcoe Conservation Authority. By 
the late 1980s, the members of this network sought opportunities to formalize their activities. In 
1990 a government-driven collaborative program, the Lake Simcoe Environmental Management 
Strategy (LSEMS), was established to coordinate efforts to improve the health of the watershed. 
The LSEMS program completed three phases (1990-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2007) of monitoring 
and management, and achieved phosphorus reductions in each stage (LSEMSSC 2007). 
Nonetheless, during each phase environmental challenges in the basin continued to grow and 
become more complex. As a result, in the early 2000’s the capacity of the LSEMS to effectively 
address increasingly complex environmental challenge in the watershed declined. In 2007, the 
Ontario provincial government announced its intention to introduce the Lake Simcoe Protection 
Act (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23) (LSPA), which came into effect on June 2, 2009. The LSPA and 
associated regulations are currently being implemented.  
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Figure 13 Lake Simcoe Watershed 
 
Third, NGOs have become actively engaged in governance in the watershed. During the 
second and last phases of LSEMS, water quality problems were becoming evident along 
shorelines and near shore areas. Consequently, a number of NGOs became established and were 
very active. In 2003, an umbrella organization named Rescue Lake Simcoe Coalition (RLSC) was 
formed to bring together small community groups to advocate for improvement in the governance 
of the watershed. A second organization, Ladies of the Lake (LofL), was also created in 2005 
with the goal of developing public engagement strategies to raise awareness and to engage the 
public. The RLSC later joined forces with Environmental Defense (ED) (a national 
environmental advocacy organization) and Ontario Nature (ON) (a provincial scientific and 
environmental advocacy organization) to form Campaign Lake Simcoe (CLS). As will be 
demonstrated below, these organizations were instrumental in the process that led to the creation 
of the Lake Simcoe Protection Act (R.S.O. 2008, c. 23). Thus, the case is an outstanding example 
of a large scale governance system that experienced significant social, economic, and 
environmental stress, and where NGOs played critical roles in shaping the changes that occurred.  
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4.4 Methods  
To gain insight into the actions and motivations of NGO actors, a deep analysis of their work 
within an empirical case is necessary (Young 2009). This approach permits grounding and helps 
to define their use of mechanisms, structure and roles within a governance system. It is critical to 
examine the efforts of NGOs both as independent actors, organizations, and networks, as these 
are the multiple scales in which they operate. Further, their actions must be examined in the 
social, cultural and economic contexts in which they took place. This research used a single in-
depth case study method, and examined activities over a 10 year period. This time scale 
encapsulated the breadth and depth of work by various NGOs, and permitted the networked and 
entrepreneurial nature of their work to be highlighted.  
4.4.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
The Lake Simcoe case involves a highly complex set of governance actor interactions and 
activities that culminated in a significant environmental and policy outcome, the LSPA, all within 
a relatively short period of time (2003 to 2008). Inherent in the research process was the need to 
balance formal documentation of activities with personal insights and knowledge regarding the 
governance processes as they played out amongst actors and organizations. Additionally, 
balancing qualitative data with quantitative, structural data was important to satisfactorily depict 
and assess network relationships. Therefore, the research drew upon three data sources: 
documentation of actions (formal reports, legislation and policy documents, websites of the 
organizations, media releases); key informant interviews; and a survey of key actors that provided 
the data in support of a social network analysis (SNA).  
Documents established a baseline of activities from multiple organizations and informed 
subsequent steps in the research process. Documents were gathered from the internet, from 
libraries and public offices, and from the personal libraries and collections of interviewees who 
shared published and unpublished materials. Purposive sampling (Bradshaw and Stratford 2005) 
was used to identify potential interviewees from an initial list of names derived from the 
document collection. Potential participants were required to be directly engaged in the 
governance activities during the study time period. Interview requests were sent to 59 people, 
with 34 accepting. Semi-structured interviews focused on 1) the characteristics of the NGO actors 
in the watershed and 2) the strategies and impacts of NGO governance activities over time since 
their rise in early 2000. Interviews were conducted with 17 people representing provincial 
government agencies, four people employed by the Lake Simcoe Conservation Authority, one 
land developer, five municipal government staff people, and seven representatives of NGO’s. 
Interviews typically lasted about an hour, with a few running closer to 45 minutes, or as long as 
90 minutes. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and then coded and analyzed using Nvivo 8 
software. Interview data were verified with those interviewed (Carlson 2010).  
The approach to data coding and analysis was grounded in the principles presented by 
Liamputtang and Ezzy (2005) and supported by Hennink, et al (2011, 206) and Yin (2011, 95) 
who stated that “theory building occurs in an ongoing dialogue between pre-existing theory and 
new insights generated as a consequence of empirical observation” (Liamputtong and Ezzy 2005, 
266). The coding casebook was built using both an inductive and deductive approach. In the first 
round of coding, new nodes were developed as free nodes, and the code book was built 
successively as additional interviews were completed. Once the entire set of interviews was 
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coded, a second round of coding was conducted to ensure that all nodes were consistently applied 
across the data. Then, data for each node was reviewed and considered in light of the other nodes 
that were developed (Berg 2009). After this review, the nodes were converted to tree nodes and 
restructured into a relational hierarchy, in the process of categorizing to derive meaningful 
categories (Hennink, et al. 2011). Next, each tree node was reviewed and analyzed for insight and 
understanding regarding the node theme, through the process of conceptualizing, in order to find 
relationships and meaning between and among categories and codes (Berg 2009; Hennink, et al. 
2011). Additionally, data analysis was conducted on nodes by way of text and compound queries 
to identify concepts, and to explore patterns, themes and meanings in the data. In order to draw 
out contrasting or supporting positions amongst actors, separate analyses were conducted and 
contrasted based on the characteristics of the respondent. During the entire data collection and 
analysis, constant ‘memoing’ of emergent ideas and code development was employed. Therefore, 
quality of coding was established through: verbatim transcription, codebook, memoing and 
coding saturation (Hennink, et al. 2011).  
An online survey was circulated to all actors who had previously been interviewed, as well 
as to those who had been identified as a key actor by at least two other actors who had been 
interviewed and for whom contact information was available. The survey had two objectives: 1) 
to ask respondents about the processes of governance in the watershed, and 2) to characterize 
interactions among key actors involved in governance for water in the Lake Simcoe watershed. 
The survey was circulated to 78 people, and completed by 43, for a response rate of 52%. Of 
those who responded, 21 had also been interviewed. The respondents were asked to rate the 
presence of the principles of governance (open and transparent, inclusive, communicative, 
integrative, equitable and ethical, accountable, efficient, sustainable) both before they became 
engaged, and after they were engaged in Lake Simcoe governance. 
The survey asked respondents to identify organizations with whom they had collaborated on 
a Lake Simcoe project within the period 2006 to 2010. This period was selected as it encapsulated 
an extremely high period of activity amongst NGO actors in the watershed as identified by formal 
reports and the websites of the organizations. The data were imported into a SNA software tool, 
UCINET, where they were analyzed. Another software tool, NetDraw, was used to create visual 
depictions of the data. In SNA, density and degree centrality are key variables that can be used to 
study the structure and of the network (Borgatti, et al. 2013). Density refers to the number of ties 
that exist in a network – the more ties, the more closely linked each actor is with other actors in 
the network (Bodin, et al. 2006). A perfect density, where all actors are connected to all other 
actors is represented by 1.0. Centrality relates to an actor’s position in a network relative to the 
position of other actors (Bodin, et al. 2006). Degree centrality is measured by the number of 
direct ties one actor has to another (Bodin 2006) with 1.0 reflecting a tie to all other actors in the 
network.  
4.5 Results  
Three research questions guided this investigation as derived from the literature. First, what 
mechanisms are NGO actors utilizing to contribute to governance in new and novel ways? 
Second, if NGO actors are engaged differently, how has this affected the governance structures in 
which they operate? Finally, what roles can NGO actors play in governance processes? Before 
examining these questions, it is first necessary to provide a brief review of the core NGO actors in 
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Lake Simcoe that were highly active in the governance process in the Lake Simcoe watershed 
leading up to, and during the creation and implementation of the Lake Simcoe Act. Table 6 
outlines the basic construction of two organizations, and one collaborative campaign that became 
active in the early 2000’s; for simplicity, Campaign Lake Simcoe (CLS) is described as an 
organization in this paper.  
Table 6 Key NGO's in Lake Simcoe 
Name of 
NGO 
Actor  
Established by 
Whom and 
When 
Motivation for 
Creation 
Focus of 
Actions 
Types of 
Members 
Style of 
management  
Rescue 
Lake 
Simcoe 
Coalition 
(RLSC) 
Cottagers  
Est. 2003 
Concerned 
about the 
physical 
evidence of 
changes in the 
Lake and the 
perceived lack 
of engagement 
and action by 
the 
Conservation 
Authority to 
improve Lake 
conditions and 
community 
awareness 
Community 
engagement 
and 
awareness 
Resident 
associations, 
naturalist 
groups, 
cottagers 
Charitable 
organization 
Board of 
Directors  
Campaign 
Lake 
Simcoe 
(CLS) 
A tri-NGO 
campaign 
comprised of 
Environmental 
Defense, 
RLSC, Ontario 
Nature 
Est. 2005 
A political 
advocacy 
campaign to 
call for greater 
protections for 
the Lake 
Simcoe 
Watershed 
Political 
advocacy, 
grassroots 
engagement 
NGO’s and 
the public  
Coordinator 
was also a 
cottager 
Charitable 
organizations 
Collaborative 
partnership, 
led by 
Environmental 
Defense  
Ladies of 
the Lake 
(LofL) 
- Two Lake 
Simcoe 
Cottagers  
Est. 2005 
Concerned 
about the 
physical 
evidence of 
changes in the 
Lake, and lack 
of creative 
solutions and 
engagement  
Community 
engagement 
and 
awareness 
Volunteers Charitable 
organization 
Board of 
Directors 
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Data from the survey provide additional insight into the characteristics of individual NGO 
actors. NGO actors active in the governance system had a direct connection to the Lake as 
demonstrated by the fact that 71% of NGO actors who responded live in the watershed, while 
28% had a recreational property in Lake Simcoe watershed. Therefore a large number of the 
actors working on Lake Simcoe issues were directly affected by the state of the watershed. The 
survey found that 14% of NGO actors said that working on Lake Simcoe issues took up the 
majority of their week, while 56% spend between 1-10 hours per week, and 29% spend 11-20 
hours/week. As a measure of their commitment, 43% said that their engagement in Lake Simcoe 
issues was voluntary. Of the NGO actors engaged on Lake Simcoe issues, 86% had a university 
or graduate university degree. Most were older – 71% between the ages of 50-74, and most (71%) 
were female. Each of the three organizations described in Table 6 was spurred to action by 
similar motivations – concern for the condition of the lake.  
4.5.1 Mechanisms of NGO actors 
Results are described in relation to the five key mechanisms noted in the literature that NGOs 
may utilize in order to engage in governance processes. This includes applying political pressure 
(Bryant 2009), seeking policy change (Peet 1994), acting as knowledge brokers (Auer 2000b)and 
entrepreneurs (Huitema and Meijerink 2009b), and operating as and through a network 
(Dombrowski 2010). Data for this section were drawn from the websites of the organizations, 
media releases, reports, government policy documents and interviews with key actors. While 
numerous activities were undertaken over the 10 year time period of analysis, selected examples 
of each mechanism are described below. A detailed table of a wider range of selected activities is 
provided in Appendix B. 
4.5.1.1 Political Pressure 
Political pressure was applied through multiple methods. NGOs in Lake Simcoe engaged in 
effective lobbying and media campaigns. For example, the goal of the CLS was to achieve 
legislative protection for Lake Simcoe, and lobbying was a direct and strategic activity 
undertaken by CLS in the early days of the campaign. Initial steps included finding and meeting 
with a supportive Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP). A collaborative partnership was 
formed with an MPP from the opposing party. The combined efforts of CLS and the MPP led to 
the introduction of Bill 106– An Act to establish a natural heritage system and watershed 
protection area for Lake Simcoe and the Nottawasaga River into the Legislative Assembly of 
Ontario. Unable to find strong support amongst his political party, the MPP modified the Bill into 
a Resolution that was then voted on and passed in the legislature. In Ontario, when a Resolution 
is passed in the legislature, the members of provincial parliament are indicating to the ruling party 
that they would like to see action on an issue. The passing of the Resolution brought political 
attention to the issues in Lake Simcoe, which later became a focal point for the forthcoming 
provincial election.  
Comments from a regional government planner highlighted the effectiveness of the political 
efforts of the NGOs.  
These folks,  and you see it in most very effective stakeholder groups, they are well 
connected, they are well funded, they have an understanding of the dynamics of the 
sort of the context in which they are dealing. They are not afraid to call on that. These 
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folks, in some respects, had direct or at least semi direct linkages to their political 
masters of the province, which is an interesting dynamic. 
Similar commentary was offered by a government policy maker: “they were meeting with 
ministers, they were lobbying their MPP's, they were pushing the Conservation Authority and 
they were riding through the province to change things.” CLS was deeply engaged in lobbying 
and making its presence known to other governance actors in the watershed.  
Evidence collected through the interviews and document analysis shows that the NGOs 
were also particularly media savvy. Two actors, one from CLS and one from LofL, were 
particularly instrumental in this regard. A regional government planner commented, “It's been 
very interesting the amount of media coverage and the amount of attention this brought to Lake 
Simcoe, courtesy of some of these other actors, the not for profits groups, and the groups that 
kind of rallied around Lake Simcoe as an issue or concern. They drew attention to it.” This was 
critically important for garnering attention from the provincial government. Both CLS and LofL 
ensured their events had media attention from the news outlets, they regularly published media 
releases announcing their activities, and they had a strong web presence. The media efforts of the 
NGOs were necessary to ensure that Lake Simcoe issues could hold the attention of policy 
makers, and to bring them into the election campaigns during the provincial election that took 
place in 2007.  
2.1.1.1 Policy Change 
In the Lake Simcoe case, these NGO actors focused much of their effort on changing the policies 
affecting Lake Simcoe. They started by re-framing the problem as a governance issue rather than 
as just an environmental management issue. They did that by first demanding a seat at the table 
during the last phase of the Lake Simcoe Environmental Management Strategy (LSEMS), and 
then during the creation of the LSPA and LSPP; through these efforts, they fought for permanent 
opportunities to participate in the decision making process. Following these efforts, they worked 
towards a specific goal of legislation, and made that goal very clear to the government. The whole 
process of action is captured in the following quotation from a provincial government official:  
They [NGOs] are more vocalized, more organized, strategic. I think it's unique in that 
we've seen many places in the province where groups are well organized and able to 
mobilize quickly and are effective. It is not unique in that citizens were mobilized, but 
it is unique in the outcome, that there is watershed protection… but also to have these 
committees, the ongoing mechanisms to have a seat at the table, the government 
formally requiring in the legislation to listen to their advice, not to take it, but they can 
give the government that advice. I can't think of anywhere, where the outcome is 
ongoing legislation, to be engaged. It's a little different. Usually, it's we're opposed to 
something, and the government intervenes to side with them and prevent it, or the 
opposite.  
These actions demonstrate the capacity of the NGOs to influence and steer the process in ways 
they saw necessary.  
Both CLS and LofL drafted strategic plans to lay the groundwork for policy change and to 
effectively carry out their plans by using a variety of techniques to advocate and generate support 
both from the public and from the government. The NGOs did so by crafting the LSPA as a 
solution not only for the environmental challenges, but also for the governance challenges. The 
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Act was posited by CLS and LofL as the best option for all parties involved in the watershed. 
Rather than blame the complex challenges of Lake Simcoe as a “what the government is doing 
wrong” problem, the NGOs called for more people to be engaged in the problem solving, and for 
a highly effective approach to protect the lake, rather than framing it as a fight against a 
government. This notion is captured in the following quotation by a provincial government staff 
person:  
I find that this job, I appreciate it, in the sense that I've worked on other things where 
people have been highly involved but it's been more of a NIMBYism type. And I find 
that working here, I really appreciate it, because I find that it is really a community 
driven process, they really lobbied for it, and they lobbied for protection, but have also 
been very reasonable about, obviously they've got concerns that we're not always 
going to be able to address and all that, but overall, I find the working relationship to 
be much more civil, and they worked really hard, and the history is so important 
within the watershed and we definitely couldn't continue to do it without them. 
Documents and interviews also indicated that individual NGOs were participating directly 
in the governance process through the various committees associated with the Lake Simcoe 
Protection Act (LSPA) and Lake Simcoe Protection Plan (LSPP). As advocated by the NGOs, the 
government created the Stakeholder Advisory Committee after the passing of the LSPA. This 
committee was charged with providing input to the development of the Lake Simcoe Protection 
Plan (LSPP), the document which provides a framework for action under the Act. The LSPA also 
required that a permanent stakeholder committee be established to oversee the implementation of 
the LSPP. Consequently, the government also created the Lake Simcoe Coordinating Committee 
to serve this function. NGO actors were appointed to both of these committees.  
In addition to serving these formal governance roles, NGOs were making official 
submissions during the legislation development process. In particular, CLS would submit a 
number of rebuttal reports to each piece of legislation, policy and regulation document produced 
by the government. The participation of the coordinator at ED is particularly noteworthy. In this 
instance, the coordinator represented someone who was embedded in the policy development 
process from both the grassroots perspective of the RLSC, but also from the broader policy 
development perspective at ED. Thus the Campaign benefitted from someone who could 
contribute from a number of perspectives, but also dedicate a full time effort towards the work. 
This idea is captured in a quotation from a LofL member.  
Because in order to be a watchdog you have to know what it is you’re guarding. You 
almost have to know more about the topic then the other people who are 
implementing the work. I mean, someone like [the ED coordinator] is a fabulous 
watchdog because they have the wherewithall to be a very thorough watchdog. They 
worked with Environmental Defense and that is what they do. But not many people 
can be like that. I can't even do that. Because I can't go to government with documents 
and go line by line and ask why didn't you do this and why didn't you do that. 
4.5.1.2 Knowledge Brokers 
Dismay with previous governance process in Lake Simcoe was a motivating factor for both CLS 
and LofL. In particular, interviews with actors from both of these organizations identified that a 
lack of knowledge transfer between the LSEMS project and the public was a critical motivator for 
engagement. The founder of LofL commented,  
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when we started to talk to people and in particular, politicians, about what was going 
on here before our very eyes, the lake was getting sicker and sicker, and what was 
anybody doing about it and the answer from all of the politicians was, we haven't 
heard anybody complain about this, there is nothing wrong with the lake and I don't 
think that anybody is interested. We said, we think you are wrong and set out to do 
something to show those people that people did care about the lake and it was 
important that government take an initiative. 
While CLS primarily focused on lobbying and policy change efforts, the LofL spent considerable 
effort generating new knowledge through shared learning experiences with a broad spectrum of 
citizens. One of their largest projects was called the Naked Truth. The project involved 
simultaneous expeditions for 300 citizens that took participants under the water (diving), on the 
water (canoes), along the water (shoreline hike) and above the water (planes) providing them an 
opportunity to capture what they saw happening on the lake. Participants documented their 
experiences and through rounds of facilitated dialogue, these experiences would be built into a 
Citizen’s Action Plan (Ladies of the Lake and Windfall Ecology Centre 2006). The Citizen’s 
Action Plan was then proffered as a potential solution for the challenges in Lake Simcoe. This 
was followed by a report on the state of youth environmental education, titled Whales in Lake 
Simcoe (Ladies of the Lake 2007). Here LofL are generating their own policy solutions, and 
building community support for its implementation. 
CLS’s regular contributions to the policy development process also contributed to the 
transfer of knowledge between grassroots organizations and the government. Documents 
produced and circulated to government often represented the combined efforts and perspectives 
(in most cases) of more than 20 groups in the watershed (e.g.Campaign Lake Simcoe 2007a; 
Campaign Lake Simcoe 2009). Other examples of knowledge brokering opportunities also 
include the combined efforts of CLS and LofL (as well as other NGOs) to host the Lake Simcoe 
Summit, 2007 and the website www.our30million.LSRCA which has now transferred to 
www.ourlakesimcoe.LSRCA. The website was a clearing house for information on how the 
federal government’s $30 million, five year, Lake Simcoe Clean Up Fund was being distributed 
and implemented. Funding was intended for environmental improvement projects in the Lake 
Simcoe watershed.  
 
4.5.1.3 Entrepreneurs 
NGOs in the watershed exhibited an entrepreneurial spirit when they engaged in particular 
activities, including identifying and strategically exploiting opportunities, creating innovative 
solutions, and engaging a multipronged approach to problem solving. While this discussion 
focuses largely on the role of the NGO as an organization or campaign, it is important to note the 
individual leadership in both contexts.  Leaders within both of these contexts (LofL and CLS) 
have close personal connection to the watershed with family residences on the Lake.  Both 
worked to fill a gap where they saw an opportunity for leadership by creating or taking on 
leadership roles in organizations that were focused on the Lake.  Both also were engaged not only 
in their own organizational work, but sat on the governance committees for the LSPA.  
CLS navigated the political context of an upcoming election to campaign for change 
through two complementary activities. First, they built awareness of the environmental challenges 
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in Lake Simcoe at the community level resulting in public pressure for the government to address 
the challenges. Second, CLS navigated the political context by building a strategic partnership 
with an MPP from the opposing government party which created additional political pressure 
between the government parties and created a win-win situation for Lake Simcoe regardless of 
who won the election. The previously discussed Naked Truth project illustrates the 
entrepreneurial orientation of LofL. A later project entitled Rewilding Keswick Creek, also 
highlights their inventive nature. LofL build a cross sectoral partnership with the Conservation 
Authority and another NGO, Windfall Ecology Centre. The project focused on revitalizing one of 
the most urbanized and degraded sub-watershed, where socio-economic conditions were also 
poor. High school students, through a variety of activities, competed to reinvent a space with the 
winning design being implemented.  
While CLS and LofL each took a very different approach to generating attention and 
directing the policy, both maintained a continuous stream of activities that also varied, and 
provided a multi-pronged approach to engaging with the governance process. While they shared 
an objective – bring attention to the need for a comprehensive policy for Lake Simcoe – they 
created opportunities through very different means. LofL focused on grassroots efforts and sought 
to engage the general public in the problem. They host an annual water festival – SPLASH in 
Lake Simcoe and fundraised $250,000 by creating a ‘calender girls’ style calendar with women 
from the watershed. This fundraising effort supported the creation of a Citizens Action Plan, and 
a summer environmental film school for youth in the watershed. At the time this paper was 
written (2013), LofL was in the process of creating an Ontario Water Centre. RLSC and CLS 
lobbied, created media campaigns, partnered with smaller NGOs, and played a watchdog role. 
Additionally, actors from both organizations would engage in the governance activities led by 
government such as the LSEMS process, and the committees for the LSPA and LSPP. Thus, 
individually, and combined, they carried out diverse, but complementary activities that sought to 
achieve a shared goal.  
4.5.2 Structure of the Governance System  
Both CLS and LofL operated through networks and diverse connections. RLSC was comprised of 
a network with several smaller naturalist, environmentalist and ratepayers associations across the 
watershed. With the creation of CLS, a larger network was formed between RLSC, ED and ON. 
LofL also built a network with the Windfall Ecology Centre (NGO), and the Conservation 
Authority for several projects. Networked efforts also include the coming together of the CLS and 
LoL for several public events, and the provision of support for each others’ work.  
Each one of the individual organizations within this network offered their own area of 
expertise and focus, as well as a set of resources. Their coming together into a larger network for 
a coordinated response to the challenges in Lake Simcoe signals their mutual dependency, as well 
as shared interest in problem solving. Several of the contextual factors also align with the 
precursor factors noted by the literature including the presence of a meta-problem, uncertainty, a 
set of complex tasks. The collaboration within each of the level two networks (CLS and Lol) 
involved several opportunities for knowledge sharing, collective learning and negotiation, as each 
crafted their own set of activities. For CLS this would have included efforts to develop their 
reports that were endorsed or collaboratively developed with their member organizations, which 
was similar for the LofL network where each of their programs and projects were developed in 
collaboration with their network counterparts. At the heart of this meta-network is the non-
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competitive and supportive environment that was created by appreciation of each other’s 
asymmetrical resources, and was the true key to success in the policy process. RLSC brought the 
grassroots, ON the science and technical expertise, ED the advocacy and strategic planning, WEC 
the innovation and LofL engaged the grassroots, but often also presented the public face of the 
network.  
An important characteristic of governance efforts of NGOs in the Lake Simcoe watershed 
was their ability to work with government actors through a variety of mechanisms. In the 
previous section it was noted that both CLS and the LofL engaged in the formal consultation 
efforts organized by government agencies. Actors from each of these NGOs participated as full 
members in several separate processes, including the search for a new governance model for 
LSEMS, and the Stakeholder, and Coordinating Committees created by the LSPA. In this section 
Social Network Analysis is used to identify the structure of the governance network in which the 
NGO’s operated in order to reveal how NGO actors are engaged in the governance structure in 
Lake Simcoe. 
Figure 14 was produced based on responses of survey participants, who were asked to list the 
agencies with which they had collaborated. Collaboration in this survey was defined in terms of 
formal partnerships within a project or program in which each actor holds a key role, and 
decisions are made through a process of negotiation and agreement. The figure presents a visual 
depiction of the network connections amongst governance actors in the Lake Simcoe watershed. 
The density of the network is quite low – 0.070 which relates to the high number of pendant 
organizations (actors who only have one tie) shown in the network. This low density suggests 
there is not a high level of connection among all the network actors. However, when accounting 
for the pendants (pendants are nodes with only 1 tie) the density changes dramatically to 0.773, 
offering a very high level of connectivity amongst actors. This suggests that the core actors in the 
network collaborate on a regular basis and have a high level of interaction amongst the network.  
In Figure 14 the LofL are the most centrally located of the NGOs in this network (as 
measured by degree of centrality – 0.036), while RLSC is 0.023, Ministry of Environment is 0.07, 
and the Conservation Authority is 0.10. Of note, both of these NGO actors have direct ties to the 
provincial government agencies and the Conservation Authority. This indicates, that while the 
provincial agencies have formally taken the lead in the governance process a wide variety of 
governance actors maintain a close collaborative relationship with the Conservation Authority. 
This is likely due to the fact that the Conservation Authority led the LSEMS process.  
The structure of this governance network also indicates that the key NGOs (RLSC and 
LofL) were collaborating formally with a diverse range of organizations outside of government 
agencies and other NGO’s. Overall this highlights the deeply connected network in which both 
the government, Conservation Authority and the key NGO’s are embedded 
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Figure 14 Network of Organizations that Formally Collaborate in Lake Simcoe - 2010 
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Figures 15 and 16 display the ego network (the actors with whom the NGO’s are directly 
connected with) for RLSC (CLS) and LofL, based on the question “With whom do you formally 
collaborate?” In the following two figures, the red lines denote a reciprocal relationship whereby 
both organizations noted that they collaborated with each other. The blue lines denote a one way 
tie, where only one of the organizations noted collaboration with the other. Additionally, both 
Figures 15 and 16 display how the actors connected to the NGO are also connected amongst 
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themselves. Figure 15 shows in closer detail the set of actors that RLSC are directly tied with in 
formal collaborative projects. RLSC has 10 direct connections, and a total of 37 ties. RLSC/CLS 
show direct and reciprocal ties to three government agencies and the LSRCA, as well as with 
other NGO actors, including LofL. It is significant that several of RLSC’s closest ties are with 
government.  
 
Figure 15 RLSC Ego Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 16, the ego network of the Ladies of the Lake is displayed. Their network is somewhat 
larger than RLSC with 16 organizations and a total of 74 ties. LofL and RLSC are directly tied to 
government agencies, but are also collaborating with a diverse range of other organizations. 
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network, it is still secondary in terms of network size as compared with government organizations 
and the Conservation Authority.  
Figure 16 Ladies of the Lake Ego Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By comparison, the Ontario Ministry of Environment (the ministry responsible for the Lake 
Simcoe Act) has 30 organizations in its ego network and 159 ties (not shown). The Conservation 
Authority has 46 organizations in its ego network and 177 ties (not shown). Importantly, figure 
14 indicates a network that is highly connected, where a number of reciprocal ties exist, including 
between government and ENGO’s . 
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In this governance network there is a high level of network connection represented by 
formal collaborations between NGO’s and governments. There is also a residual set of 
connections with the Conservation Authority, which previously led the governance process 
through LSEMS. Importantly the structure of the governance network and the ego networks 
suggests that beneficial and relevant working relationships have been developed and implemented 
between governance actors.  
4.5.3 Governance Roles  
Drawing from the survey of NGO’ actors, this section discusses their motivation for action in 
Lake Simcoe, and how they conceptualize different roles for different types of actors within a 
governance process. When asked to comment on factors that influenced their decision to 
participate in governance activities in the watershed, 71% said that the future of the watershed 
was in jeopardy. Three factors tied for secondary importance, with 57% commenting that 
challenges to the watershed were too complex to be handled by one organization; solutions could 
only be created through the engagement of a diverse range of people and organizations; and 
opportunities existed to develop a shared, united vision for the watershed.  
Stated motivations appear to reflect the weaknesses the NGO actors perceived in the 
governance system prior to their becoming engaged. Survey respondents were asked to comment 
on key principles of contemporary governance, and how present they were in Lake Simcoe 
governance before they became engaged in LS governance and after the LSPA was passed. The 
survey asked if the governance process was open and transparent, inclusive, communicative, 
integrative, equitable and ethical, accountable, efficient and sustainable. NGO actors commenting 
on the state of these principles prior to them becoming engaged in LS governance rated all of the 
factors as poor. Transparency and inclusiveness having a 100% response rating of poor, and 
communicative being 85% poor. These responses are clear indicators of motivations for 
becoming involved. Assessment of these principles after the passing of the LSPA show an 
increase in all areas, suggesting that NGO actors had felt significant progress was made.  
Actors were also asked how engaged various governance actors were in Lake Simcoe 
governance activities. Here there is some improvement in the assessment of how effectively the 
general public engaged with Lake Simcoe governance (before 100% said poor, after – 42% said 
good), but there is a larger increase in the perception of how effectively government was engaged 
at all levels. Municipal government improved from 42% saying poor, to 71% saying fair. Federal 
government improved from 71% saying poor to 71% saying good. Provincial government 
improved from 42% poor to 71% good. The Conservation Authority remained the same at 57% 
fair. Responses to these two questions indicate an improved governance context whereby 
principles of process, and action on the part of government have taken place. Importantly, this is 
alongside the rise of NGO action, thus depicting a mutually supportive environment for 
governance.  
NGO actors also commented on what they felt the primary role should be for a various 
range of governance actors; 42% maintained that government’s primary role is that of regulator, 
while 84% said the role of NGOs should be one of either watchdog, participant or steward. This 
delineates a clear path for who should be conducting which types of activities, but within a shared 
environment of governance. Results from the survey data indicate that NGOs identified a gap in 
the process of governing, whereby the diversity of actors engaged was insufficient, principles of 
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engagement had been disregarded, and a significant challenge needed to be addressed. Opinions 
regarding these components of governance changed dramatically over the short period of time 
during which NGO actors became engaged and worked towards a LSPA in concert with 
government actors. Importantly, 47% of all respondents stated that the provincial government 
should remain as regulator and ultimate authority, while 81% of all respondents stated NGO’s 
should remain external as either watch-dog, participant or collaborator, but complementary to 
governments in their roles.  
4.6 Discussion 
The objective of this research was to explore how the role of ENGO actors has changed in real 
world environmental governance processes. The research was based on a detailed, long term 
single case study analysis focusing on a 10 year period of activity. The analysis examined the 
actions, characteristics and roles of ENGO actors, and captured the structural component of the 
governance system. The results from the research offer several insights into the way NGO’s are 
working within governance systems. Table 7 outlines the key findings in relation to proposed 
conceptual framework for  this research.  
Table 7 Key Findings on ENGOs 
Mechanisms Used by 
NGO’s 
- networks that utilized diverse skills, knowledge and capacities 
- avoided duplication and competition  
- held shared vision and goal for the watershed 
- diversity of tactics made for stronger effort collectively 
- actions directed at several levels of government 
- entrepreneurial action exhibited by development of own plans and 
programs for Lake Simcoe 
- keen attention to and utilization of political opportunity  
Changes in Structure - NGOs directly tied to government agencies – enables stronger 
transfer of knowledge, and mutual benefit opportunities  
- reciprocal relationship between government and NGOs 
acknowledged by both parties 
Roles of NGO actors - NGO confirmed their role as watchdogs, and the role for 
government was as regulator 
- confirmed role in governance process as collaborator 
 
In building understanding around the types of activities that NGOs are engaged in and their 
approaches, the results identified that NGOs in Lake Simcoe are utilizing a networked approach. 
NGOs are also serving in instrumental roles in accessing and engaging multiple levels of 
governance actors and a wide range of techniques to both steer governance and improve process. 
Perhaps the single most important finding was the diversity in the types of NGO organizations 
active within the watershed, and the ways in which they collectively utilized a multi-level 
approach to achieving their objectives. Each NGO highlighted in this research played a particular 
role in the governance network in Lake Simcoe. Simultaneously, the NGOs did not duplicate, 
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overlap or compete with each another. Rather, the NGOs offered mutually beneficial support for 
their shared goal: greater protection for Lake Simcoe. The NGOs came together for particular 
purposes, activities or events (e.g., Lake Simcoe Summit, LSEMS governance review), but 
operated with the understanding that other NGOs were carrying out certain activities such as 
political advocacy or grassroots water awareness campaigns. They therefore recognized the value 
of, and operated with an understanding of, their asymmetrical resources and the value of bridging 
ties with other actors (Hudson 2004; Jarillo 1988). Through this complementary set of actions by 
the NGOs, multiple initiatives were used to raise awareness, change behaviour, and pursue 
legislative goals. The diversity of tactics used by the groups highlights not only their significant 
capacities to effect change, but also their ability to readily adapt their approaches (Auer 2000a; 
Dombrowski 2010).  
The structure of the network also sheds light into how knowledge was transferred among 
actors, and the resiliency that a broad water governance network can offer. The network analysis 
identified close ties between government and NGO organizations. In having direct and ready 
access between these organizations, the transfer of knowledge and mutual knowledge creation 
opportunities is increased. Additionally, the diversity of network members, and their direct 
linkages create a stronger ‘net’ through which collaborations, but also challenges can be captured, 
before creating irreversible damage to both the governance and ecological systems.  
The various activities of the NGOs were also designed to resonate with different levels of 
governance – the watershed, the region and the province, as well as at multiple social levels of 
organization – personal, community, society. Thus there were multiple avenues for entry and for 
impact. Perhaps most importantly, they were not only operating at these various levels, but also 
they were the bridge between them by transmitting knowledge and expertise both up and down 
and between organizations. This supports the findings by Kapaciauskaite (2011) and Kim (2009) 
who found that non-government actors are creating a more resilient and democratic environments 
by revitalizing the governance process.  
The tactics of the NGOs also proved entrepreneurial. The literature identifies a number of 
entrepreneurial activities and includes new and innovative approaches (Vaughan and Arsneault 
2008), variety of tactics (Huitema and Meijerink 2009a), exploiting multiple venues, and 
importance of coalitions (Crow 2008). Through the combined efforts of the NGO’s, their efforts 
offered a multi-faceted approach to governance. In the case of LofL, rather than waiting for the 
provincial government to change policy on Lake Simcoe policy, this NGO sought its own 
community development plan. Even while the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan was being 
implemented by government, LofL created their own partnerships and programs to complement 
the efforts being undertaken by the Province (e.g., Rewilding, WASTE films, Ontario Water 
Centre). Combined, the NGOs utilized a variety of tactics and strategies at multiple levels and 
scales as described above and they valued and drew strength from building coalitions. This was 
especially the case for CLS and the RLSC, which worked directly with numerous smaller NGOs 
to build support and knowledge capacity for their research and reports.  
The governance efforts of CLS exhibited a distinct effort to navigate and manipulate the 
institutional system. CLS comprised a set of highly engaged actors who sought to understand the 
institutional context, its opportunities and constraints, and then work through the formal 
institutional government system to bring about the change they deemed necessary in order to 
achieve a Lake Simcoe Protection Act. CLS was able to pursue a changed system of decision 
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making by adopting a very strategic approach, engaging deeply with both the community and 
political authorities, supporting government action where warranted, making clear the rules of 
negotiation through media and messaging, and being legitimized by their broad support from the 
public. CLS did so through distinct actions such as recognizing an upcoming provincial election 
as an opportunity, collaborating with an opposition MPP to draft the initial Lake Simcoe 
Protection Act Bill, demonstrating an extremely high level of responsiveness to each policy 
initiative of the province, and calling for citizens to hold the government to account. This is 
significant as it demonstrates a capacity to work within institutional constraints, but at the same 
time to achieve independent goals. CLS in particular, was able to steer the governance system in 
the direction it created and to pursue its own governance agenda (Gouldson 2009).  
 The Social Network Analysis component uncovered an important trait in the governance 
structure in this case study. By identifying actors with whom they formally collaborated, the 
networks for RLSC and the LofL show a clear, direct and reciprocal relationship with several 
government agencies as well as elected officials. These reciprocal relationships indicate a 
valuable development in the structure of the governance system, whereby both governments and 
NGO’s identify each other as collaborators, and have moved beyond strict definitions of 
“government” and “stakeholder’`. The findings demonstrated a high level of density between 
actors in the governance network once isolates and pendants were removed. Such a high level of 
interaction, not only among key NGO actors, but also with a broad range of governance actors 
between and amongst themselves, indicates a shift in the governance dynamics of actors. Where 
previously there was a combative approach (Bryant 2009), both government and NGOs in this 
case are choosing a process which provides mutual empowerment (Kim 2009). This case is an 
example of a high level of collaboration across sectors, which created a dense institutional 
network of governance actors working to achieve a positive sum game of governance through 
recognizing and utilizing complementary skills and resources (Lane and Morrison 2006).  
The largest gap in the literature was a lack of knowledge around the motivations of NGO 
actors. Results from this case on why NGO actors are engaging in governance and what they 
hope to achieve provided valuable insight. Significant drivers for NGO’s were not only the 
physical degradation of the watershed, but also the processes of governance and the principles 
that informed decision making processes. Additionally, these actors saw the need for a multi-
sector/organization/scale approach to the problem, as it was far too complex a problem to be 
handled by any one actor. Underpinning these concepts was acceptance of the need for positive 
interaction and collaboration, as opposed to negative combative practices. Related to this finding 
is how NGOs responded when asked about roles. When asked about the role of government, 
several confirmed that government should continue as a regulator and maintain the status quo as 
the primary governing authority. While NGOs want, and will create roles for themselves and 
space for other non-government governance actors, this is not a loss of opportunity for 
government. Instead, a governance space where multiple actors interact and collaborate is 
created, but does not decrease the capacity of previous actors. Given that NGOs continue to lend 
support for the role of government implies NGOs do not want to drive governance. NGOs 
recognize the specific resources, skills and capacity that government offers. However, they feel 
that they can offer complementary resources, skills and capacity to the greater benefit of 
governance as a whole.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
This research suggests that there is a changing dynamic between government and non-
government actors, and that governance processes are also evolving. From a broad literature 
review of governance, NGOs, networks and entrepreneurs, a more comprehensive understanding 
emerged regarding the mechanisms, structures and roles of non-government actors. The empirical 
case study in Lake Simcoe identified actions by NGO actors, revealing that actions of the NGOs 
were inclusive of traditional roles. However, the findings also indicated that using a network and 
entrepreneurial lens broadened the scope and understanding of additional activities and NGO’s 
engagement with government actors. The research demonstrated that with the exception of 
lobbying, few of the traditional approaches of NGO’s, such as the combative and confrontational 
activities of protests, demonstrations, and negative information campaigns, were present in the 
case study. In place of these activities was a multi-pronged, networked and cooperative approach 
to exert power, direction and influence over the governance process. In the case of Lake Simcoe, 
multiple NGOs identified a clear and direct objective: the creation and implementation of a Lake 
Simcoe Act. Over the course of several years, multiple activities were implemented in a strategic 
fashion to achieve this goal. Thus, understanding the approaches and capacities of NGO actors in 
water governance is critically important to a wide range of actors, including governments, policy 
makers and practitioners who interact with NGOs on a consistent basis. NGOs in the Lake 
Simcoe case have demonstrated an increased capacity to contribute, steer and create governance 
opportunities. As a driving force of governance, their efforts cannot be dismissed.  
The work of the NGO’s in Lake Simcoe highlight a multi-pronged approach, whereby they 
worked within, alongside, and external to government. The NGOs in this case maintained their 
individual identity and organizational vision, but collaborated when there was opportunity to 
create a synergistic effect, whereby asymmetrical resources, knowledge and connections could be 
utilized to support the goal. Additionally, once these NGOs gained access to the decision making 
table, they participated in government-drive governance activities in roles that extended well 
beyond simply offering advice and commentary. In parallel, they conducted their own initiatives, 
or collaborated directly with government, in an effort to bring innovation into government 
process. This suggests that there are opportunities for synergy between NGOs and government, 
whereby a faster moving institution, can ebb a slower moving institution.  
This case study underscores recent arguments that suggest there is still a critical role for 
government, and that government is not in retreat. The objective of the NGOs in Lake Simcoe 
was to obtain legislative support for the watershed. Such an objective suggests that NGOs expect 
and indeed, rely on government, to maintain hierarchical control, and that formal legislated 
mechanisms of accountability are still relevant and in demand. Yet, NGO actors have also 
become more involved in governance, beyond the role of stakeholders participating in 
consultations. Hence, this case highlights how recent actions by NGO are generating 
opportunities for, and also guiding, the governance process. The implication of these findings 
regarding the role of NGO’s, as well as how NGO perceive the roles for other governance actors, 
are significant. The dynamic between governance actors clearly can be altered. The findings 
points towards a more fluid and malleable governing environment in the sense that action, 
knowledge, networks, and resources outside of government can exert influence and direction over 
government policy and the process of governing (Auer 2000a; Wapner 1995). Governance in this 
case study does not indicate a one-way directional decision-making process. Rather, it is a dance 
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of actors moving in, out, and within a shared space. Given this changing context, the governance 
process lends itself to less predictability, but perhaps instead greater resiliency. The governance 
process has engaged a diverse range of interests, voices, and ideas. It has involved negotiations 
between collaborators responsible for a societal, environmental and economic good and has 
achieved the creation of shared objectives and strategies for implementation. It is possible that 
this form of governance may offer a more suitable and attentive response to current social, 
cultural and environmental complexities. 
Ultimately, this research suggests that considerable scope exists for actors in environmental 
governance to govern in new ways using their existing resources. It is not what the NGOs in the 
case have achieved, but how they achieved it that provides lessons for governance. These lessons 
are not limited to other NGO actors, but hold meaning for government actors as well. In this 
instance, government actors were open to working with the evident capacity of non-government 
actors, without ceding authority. This case demonstrated the power of a positive sum game, as 
opposed to the negative sum game that traditional hierarchical and market governance processes 
have lent themselves. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
In this thesis, the research was organized into three chapters and was presented in manuscript 
form. Though intended to be standalone publications, the individual papers are related to one 
another and to the overall research objectives. In this chapter, the full span of research from the 
thesis is synthesized and assessed. The chapter begins with a review of the purpose and 
objectives, and then provides a brief synopsis of the major findings from each chapter. Later a 
discussion on the significant academic contributions is presented. This is followed by 
opportunities for practice and future areas of research for water governance.  
5.2 Purpose and Objectives  
The purpose of this doctoral research is to characterize and explain changes in a water 
governance system. The research explored a water governance case over a 30-year period to 
evaluate how and why the water governance system changed. Within the broader purpose stated 
above, there are four specific study objectives:  
• To evaluate changes in governance architecture over time; 
• To identify and assess governance tools; 
• To examine the changing role of NGOs in governance  
• To offer insight and theoretical contributions on how more effective governance processes 
can be created. 
 
5.3 Major Findings 
Research findings were presented in three separate chapters. Chapter Two provided an analysis of 
the changing governance architecture in the Lake Simcoe watershed over a 30-year period. 
Chapter Three provided an investigation on the use of the watershed boundary for water 
governance. Chapter Four examined the roles of non-governmental actors in water governance. In 
the following section, a summary of the major findings from each of these chapters is provided. 
In the last section the discussion returns to the governance framework. 
5.3.1 Governance Over Time 
Howlett, et al. (2009) called for multi-dimensional analyses of governance change. This research 
provided a multi-year, multi-scale, triangulated analysis of a governance system over a 30 year 
period. It evaluated the governance system from statistical, social and formal documentation 
perspective in order to assess the direction of change in governance. In so doing, it contributes to 
debates in the governance literature regarding the role of the state.  
Recent scholarship in the governance field rejects the notion that governments in the West 
are in decline (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Hysing 2009). This research offers empirical evidence 
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that demonstrates that the reality, at least in the context of environmental governance, is more 
nuanced. As evident in phases Two and Three, there was indeed a retreat of the government from 
participation in environmental governance in the Lake Simcoe region. The evidence indicates that 
this was a direct result of economic circumstances in the province, rather than a strategic decision 
on the part of the provincial government to move away from involvement in governance in the 
region. This finding is further supported by the fact that there was a re-emergence of the 
provincial government as a dominant actor in phases Four and Five despite the fact that 
governance during these periods still occurred through a network form. Importantly, the “retreat” 
of the government that did take place during phases Two and Three did not involve a reduction in 
the legal and constitutional responsibility or authority of governments. Instead, it was a shift from 
activities such as conducting expert science, monitoring and planning, to a more limited focus on 
regulatory control. During these phases, the government retained authority and control. 
Ultimately the role of government in the governance system at the end of this research period 
(2010) was very strong and hierarchical, as demonstrated by the introduction of legislation, 
regulatory controls and a top-down implementation process.  
Despite the clear return to a hierarchical style of governing, the research also demonstrated 
that the roles governments play can change, but not in simplistic “advance” and “retreat” forms. 
As others have noted, governments can shift from strictly using command and control approach 
to relying on alternative governing mechanisms such as interactive governance, collaboration, 
deliberative policy making, inclusive management or partnerships (Howlett, et al. 2009; Hysing 
2009; Tenbensel, et al. 2011; Termeer 2009). This phenomenon is apparent in Lake Simcoe. 
Attention to the public and scientific community’s engagement in the Act and Plan provides a 
pertinent example. The development of the Act proceeded through traditional, although more 
expansive, consultative processes, i.e., public comment periods that permitted written 
submissions as well as community workshops. However, the creation of two public committees 
(Science and Stakeholder) that directly and frequently advised the government on the formulation 
of the Plan, and which were widely considered by government staff interviewed for this study to 
have provided significant contributions to the development of the Plan.  
Additionally, two new permanent committees (Science and Coordinating Committees) were 
established by the Act, to oversee the implementation process, and to advise and make 
recommendations on the adaptation of the Plan. As a steering mechanism, these committees 
represent a strategic effort on the part of government to more effectively engage and broker 
professional relationships with non-government actors. This reinforces the argument that 
governance does not have to be a zero-sum game, in other words, there is room for multiple 
actors who are engaging in different types of activities (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Blakeley 
2010). In this case, governance of the watershed changed as a result of several social, economic 
and environmental factors. In phases Two and Three government participation declined. In phases 
Four and Five, the government slowly increased its level of participation; Phase Five concluded 
with the provincial government introducing strongly directive legislation.  
In this respect, the governance system in this watershed began with a network, which 
evolved through several phases, before concluding with a formal hierarchical system. This 
reinforces the fact that governance transitions can be non-linear and do not accord with the 
hierarchical to market to network narrative. Also, as is apparent in this case, the choice is not 
between governing through hierarchies or governing through networks. Instead, both forms can 
exist simultaneously.  
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This research concludes that the role of government is indeed changing and becoming more 
inclusive of alternative mechanisms of governing, and that governance does not transition in a 
clearly delineated linear fashion. The non-linear transition of governance highlighted two 
important findings. First, that governance changes as a result of the economic, social and 
environmental context in which it is embedded. Second, because governance systems are 
embedded within one another, the question is not about ‘one’ system shifting, but the recognition 
of multiple systems existing, interacting and changing on multiple scales.  
5.3.2 Boundaries for Governance 
How can governance for water transcend the watershed boundary? The case of Lake Simcoe 
provided valuable insights to respond this question. The case demonstrated that boundaries are 
necessary for purposes such as delimiting the scope of an organization’s mandate, or the coverage 
of a statute. However, it also highlights that water governance can transcend the use of a 
watershed boundary for many activities.  
Water governance scholars and practitioners have long grappled with questions surrounding 
how best to engage actors, formulate policies and plans, and to implement the results with success 
(Bakker and Cooke 2011; Morrison, et al. 2004; Smith and Porter 2010). Watershed boundaries 
have been identified as a way to ease the challenges of obtaining participation, integrating 
resource problems and providing a coherent policy framework (Grigg 2008; Mitchell 2005; 
Savenije and van der Zaag 2008; Varis and Rahaman 2005). Yet critical analyses of role of the 
watershed boundary for governance are pointing to a host of challenges (Blomquist and Schlager 
2005; Fitzsimmons 1996; Warner, et al. 2008; Woolley and McGinnis 1999). These relate to 
boundary selection, participation and empowerment, accountability, policysheds and 
problemsheds. Critiques of the use of the watershed to define the scope for governance suggest 
that doing so does not ensure integration of processes, issues, problems or policies. More 
fundamentally, there is little evidence that adopting a watershed boundary necessarily leads to 
harmonized policies, reduced power struggles, or more effective collaboration. Whether applied 
by legislation or policy, watershed boundaries simply create another jurisdictional boundary for 
governance. As Tiesman and Edelenbos (2011, 102) have noted, “no redefinition of boundaries 
will make boundaries disappear.” What then is the role of the watershed boundary in governance 
for water? 
Results from this research show that a watershed boundary can be used to define a 
legislated area, and to delimit management areas as has been suggested by watershed governance 
scholars. However, the case of Lake Simcoe has highlighted a number of caveats for identifying 
and applying a watershed boundary for water governance. In the case of Lake Simcoe, the 
watershed boundary was not a strictly hydrological boundary, but was modified based on both 
political and management needs. It has also indicated that issues of accountability, participation 
and empowerment can be navigated through non-bounded mechanisms, and highlighted some 
specific opportunities for improved governance process. For example, research and monitoring 
take place based on the scale of impact, cross scale coordination occurs through mandated 
harmonization of policies, multiple scales and levels are utilized for implementation, there is no 
watershed scale organization, there is a commitment to learning and flexibility regarding how 
policies are identified and applied, policy adaptation can occur with ease through an updated 
legislative amendments process, and there is empowerment for many through the creation of 
shared institutions. 
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Perhaps most importantly, this research indicated that non-boundary  governance 
mechanisms were being used extensively by the provincial government to navigate a complex 
water system. The LSPA and LSPP include mechanisms for learning followed by adaptation, the 
creation of shared institutions, and multiple mechanisms to integrate issues and solutions across 
scales and levels. This is an important advancement in water governance as it demonstrates a 
focus on process. Specifically, the case illustrates the principles of adaptation, learning by doing 
and accepting that not all is understood about our physical and social environment. It also 
highlights the fact that these systems are in constant flux, and our capacity to govern them is 
dependent upon our ability to become dynamic, responsive and adaptable governance actors. 
5.3.3 Non-government Actors in Governance  
This research suggests that there is a changing dynamic between government and non-
government actors, and that governance processes are also evolving. Some scholars suggest non-
state actors are not simply being invited to participate in governance activities by government 
(Edelenbos, et al. 2010; Gouldson 2009; Gunningham 2009b). Instead, they are actively pursuing 
their own governance agendas (Crow 2008; Gouldson 2009) and thus are becoming important 
actors in shaping environmental solutions (Auer 2000; Wapner 1995). From a broad literature 
review of governance, NGOs, networks and entrepreneurs, a more comprehensive understanding 
emerged regarding the capacity and approaches of non-government actors. The empirical case 
study in Lake Simcoe identified actions by NGO actors, revealing that actions of the NGOs were 
inclusive of traditional roles and actions of NGO action. However, the findings also indicated that 
using a network and entrepreneurial lens broadened the scope and understanding of additional 
activities and NGOs engagement with government actors. The research demonstrated that with 
the exception of lobbying, few of the traditional approaches of NGO’s, such as the combative and 
confrontational activities of protests, demonstrations, and negative information campaigns (e.g. 
Pross 1986), were present in the case study. In place of these activities was a multi-pronged, 
networked and cooperative approach to exert power, direction and influence over the governance 
process (Benecke 2011). In the case of Lake Simcoe, multiple NGOs identified a clear and direct 
objective: the creation and implementation of a Lake Simcoe Act. Over the course of several 
years, multiple activities were implemented in a strategic fashion to achieve this goal. Thus, 
understanding the approaches and capacities of NGO actors in water governance is critically 
important to a wide range of actors, including governments, policy makers and practitioners who 
interact with NGOs on a consistent basis. NGOs in the Lake Simcoe case have demonstrated an 
increased capacity to contribute, steer and create governance opportunities. As a driving force of 
governance, their efforts cannot be dismissed.  
The work of the NGO’s in Lake Simcoe highlight a multi-pronged approach, whereby they 
worked within, alongside, and external to government. The NGOs in this case maintained their 
individual identity and organizational vision, but collaborated when there was opportunity to 
create a synergistic effect, whereby asymmetrical resources, knowledge and connections could be 
utilized to support the goal. Additionally, once these NGOs gained access to the decision making 
table, they participated in government-drive governance activities in roles that extended well 
beyond simply offering advice and commentary. In parallel, they conducted their own initiatives, 
or collaborated directly with government, in an effort to bring innovation into government 
process. This suggests that there are opportunities for synergy between NGOs and government, 
whereby a faster moving institution, can ebb on a slower moving institution.  
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This case study underscores recent arguments that suggest there is still a critical role for 
government, and that government is not in retreat. The objective of the NGOs in Lake Simcoe 
was to obtain legislative support for the watershed. Such an objective suggests that NGOs expect 
and indeed, rely on government, to maintain hierarchical control, and that formal legislated 
mechanisms of accountability are still relevant and in demand. Yet, NGO actors have also 
become more involved in governance, beyond the role of stakeholders participating in 
consultations. Hence, this case highlights how recent actions by NGO are generating 
opportunities for, and also guiding, the governance process. The implication of these findings 
regarding the role of NGO’s, as well as how NGO perceive the roles for other governance actors, 
are significant. The dynamic between governance actors clearly can be been altered. The findings 
points towards a more fluid and malleable governing environment in the sense that action, 
knowledge, networks, and resources outside of government can exert influence and direction over 
government policy and the process of governing (Auer 2000a; Wapner 1995). Governance in this 
case study does not indicate a one-way directional decision-making process. Rather it is a dance 
of actors moving in, out, and within a shared space. Given this changing context, the governance 
process lends itself to less predictability, but perhaps instead greater resiliency. The governance 
process has engaged a diverse range of interests, voices, and ideas. It has involved negotiations 
between collaborators responsible for a societal, environmental and economic good and has 
achieved the creation of shared objectives and strategies for implementation. It is possible that 
this form of governance may offer a more suitable and attentive to response to current social, 
cultural and environmental complexities. 
Ultimately, this research suggests that considerable scope exists for actors in environmental 
governance to govern in new ways using their existing resources. It is not what the NGOs in the 
case have achieved, but how they achieved it that provides lessons for governance. These lessons 
are not limited to other NGO actors, but hold meaning for government actors as well. In this 
instance, government actors were open to working with the evident capacity of non-government 
actors, without ceding authority. This case demonstrated the power of a positive sum game, as 
opposed to the negative sum game that traditional hierarchical and market governance processes 
have lent themselves. 
 
5.4 The Changing Governance Context 
Ultimately, the objective of this thesis is to identify how governance changes over time. The 
research used a holistic perspective as a basis from which to explore this question. Taking a 
holistic perspective allows space for the depth and complexity that is inherent in governance 
structures and processes and dynamics. It is necessary for investigations of governance to 
examine the full range of elements, in order to decipher, describe and gain knowledge of the true 
construction and interactions of governance. While the three core chapters of this thesis have 
provided a detailed examination of the architecture, tools, and actor roles that have taken place in 
the watershed, there is now opportunity to shift the scale of assessment and collectively examine 
the architecture of governance. From a whole system perspective, there are three key 
contributions that have been made. 
Governance processes have the potential to be flexible, adaptive and responsive 
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There are two important takeaways to this point. First, a governance system requires time to 
develop knowledge, resources, and capacity (Chapter Three). Second, this governance system did 
not become inert; it continued to evolve over time and in response to major system drivers. This 
is most clearly demonstrated in Chapter Two.  
Biermann, et al. (2009) comment that governance is an “incremental processes of 
institutionalization.” In this case it is important to acknowledge the necessary need for the 
‘institution’ or the ‘system’ to develop. This case took place over a 30 year period, and 
acknowledging the time taken to develop the institutional memory, the scientific resources, and 
human capacity cannot be under-valued. During this period relationships between organizations 
as well as individuals were developed. Scientific data collection, and a strong network of 
researchers enabled significant knowledge capacity around the system, its challenges and 
opportunities (Chapter Three). Additionally capacity both, human and technological had time to 
develop and synchronize (also evidenced in Chapter Four). Each of these components represents 
pieces of the puzzle that need to be present in order for the puzzle to be completed.  
The shifts in the system took place over a 30 year period and illustrate a moving institution 
that is responsive to changes in social, economic and environmental contexts. Burns and Stöhr 
(2011) offer a useful framework through which to examine the shifts in governance in the Lake 
Simcoe watershed. They identify four drivers for shifts in governance including 1) dominant 
power and a shift in the agent’s cognitive-normative framework, 2) power shifts, 3) a new 
governance order is established through multi-agent negotiation, 4) governance shift through 
diffusion and emulation (organic transformation) (Burns and Stöhr 2011). In this case all but one 
of these drivers (organic transformation) was responsible for shifts at various periods. In the 
beginning a shift in the cognitive normative framework of the key governance actors led to the 
creation of the LSEMS process as a result of improved understanding that the system was 
experiencing distress. In the next phase, the Conservation Authority became the newly dominate 
actor in leading the process. Following from this a new governance order was established through 
multi-agent negotiation and culminated in the Lake Simcoe Protection Act. Newell (2012) notes 
that many institutions are charged with responding to environmental challenges that did not exist 
when they were initially created. Significantly, rather than remain firmly planted with the same 
governance architecture that the system began with the Lake Simcoe system continued to evolve 
over time, in a way that was keenly responsiveness to these shifts. This led to a governance 
system under constant construction due to the push and push between governance elements.  
Reduced presence of government did not hold back processes of governance 
The level of government engagement in governance in Lake Simcoe varied across phases. As 
described in Chapter Two, while they maintained their legislated authority throughout the case, 
and actually increased it in the last phase, between phases 2-4, the government was less engaged. 
In this case the presence of government began with giving support to the bureaucratic staff 
initiative, and then it moved towards a classic retreat due to the economic context of the province 
and re-emerged with the political opportunity to introduce the Lake Simcoe Act. What is 
significant to note, is that while the government’s level of engagement was reduced, governance 
processes continued, and even became amplified during this time. The space created by the 
reduced capacity of the provincial government ministries permitted the emergence of the 
conservation authority as a strong leader, who then engaged other governance actors. This is not 
to say that the widening of governance actors could not have happened with the government 
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leading the process, but simply that it did occur with a different governance actor at the helm. 
Additionally, it was the strong engagement of NGO actors in the final phases who really pushed 
the governance processes forward and held significant energy for the efforts during this time. 
Pierre and Peters (2000) comment that states are increasingly dependent on other social actors. 
However this does not appear to hold true in this case. It was not a dependency on other actors by 
government, so much as an organic re-organization of key actors facilitating and enabling 
governance outside of the actions of government, but notably within the confines of government 
legislation, and at the request for more government engagement (Chapter Four). A point by 
Legler (2012) raises another important aspect for discussion; he states that unless non-
government actors are able to obtain authority, their efforts to govern are meaningless. In this 
case, while it was never an outright goal of the LSRCA to obtain more power, its actions to 
improve conditions in Lake Simcoe were certainly constrained by a lack of authority. While the 
ENGO’s demonstrated quite clearly that they too were not interested in obtaining more authority, 
they were nonetheless able to wield great influence and power over a process to achieve greater 
authority, but for government, not themselves (Chapter Four). This leads to an important final 
point, that government in this case is embedded within governance. Government is not separate 
from governance, but operates within a context of governance in which other actors have the 
potential to be equally active, and where there are synergistic opportunities to collaborate to 
govern. 
Non-government actors have agency  
“Agency relates to the ways in which actors exercise influence, proscribe behavior, substantively 
participate in rule making, set their own rules and as such contribute to the purposeful steering of 
society” (Newell, et al. 2012). Benecke (2011) states that NGOs have greater agency and 
authority, and this holds true for both the LSRCA and the ENGO’s in the Lake Simcoe watershed 
who demonstrated greater agency. This was explored deeply in Chapter Four regarding ENGO’s 
but also relates to the actions of the LSRCA. These two actors were able to expressively steer the 
governance systems in particular directions (Newell, et al. 2012). Especially in the case of the 
ENGO’s they sought to create and implement experimental approaches, and innovative solutions 
(Newell, et al. 2012). Bulkley and Moser (2007) suggest that the key legitimizing factor for non-
government actors is their ability to mobilize the masses, and engage them in the issues at hand. 
While in this case, select projects by ENGO’s sought to engage a broader community, it was not 
their sole focus, nor is it where they derived their legitimacy. Their legitimacy was built on their 
ability to orchestrate a strategic plan in order to obtain a particular result, and the methods they 
utilized including, strategic assessment of the policy landscape, networking to collaborate efforts, 
share resources and build presence, optimization of opportunities and political maneuvering.  
5.5 Recommendations for Practice 
Given the heavily empirical nature of this research, there are several recommendations for 
practice that have emerged. There are five valuable implications for practice that can be drawn 
from this research. 
Attention to individual knowledge and capacity through a distributed governance approach 
To begin, towards the later stages of this research period, individual efforts and skills of various 
governance actors were identified and more appropriately utilized. This is made clear during the 
development of the Plan, where academic researchers were given a mandate to provide scientific 
 97 
knowledge and background not only on the health of the lake, but also on potential future 
remedial actions in the Science Committee. The provincial government was attentive to the 
expressed interests of its constituents (the call for an Act) and passed legislation. Yet, rather than 
offer a heavily prescriptive piece of legislation, the government strategically left the details of 
how the Act would be enabled relatively open. This was significant in two ways. It permitted the 
details of the Plan (content, implementation and review process) to be determined by the 
bureaucratic government ministries in collaboration with non-government actors and the science 
community as opposed to focusing on these types of details in the legislative process. It also 
enabled a strong facilitation role for Ministry of Environment. Other key roles were established 
for the municipal governments and the conservation authority that spoke to their specialized 
knowledge and authoritative capacity in a distributed governance approach. Therefore it is 
suggested that a scan of individual actors could be used to identify their knowledge and capacity 
and then, where they could then be incorporated into processes accordingly and permit a wide 
engagement of actors. 
Attention to time and the building of scientific knowledge 
Scientific knowledge was the core component of efforts for most of the early phases of 
governance in the watershed. With a collective partnership amongst three provincial ministries 
and the conservation authority, comprehensive and well developed data were available for the 
watershed to understand trends, stresses and effectiveness of remedial action. The collaboration 
of efforts constructed a sizeable knowledge base from which future efforts could grow. The size, 
location and presence of research facilities also further snowballed research efforts in the 
watershed. Interestingly, some early work of the Ladies of the Lake focused on clarifying 
scientific knowledge for the general public (Citizens Action Plan), but again, it was able to 
undertake this task due to the fact that a vast collection of data existed. The value of accessible, 
long term data on the status of the watershed cannot be undervalued as it is the foundation, or 
more importantly the starting point for governance processes and decision making.  
Attention to facilitated processes 
The substantial financial and time investment made in the collaborative processes implemented to 
create the Plan should also not be overlooked. On the part of the Ministry of Environment, they 
had a clear understanding that the non-government actors demanded a fair, open, honest and 
legitimate process for dialogue and debate, and to do otherwise would jeopardize the potential to 
achieve constructive results. Often attention to facilitated dialogue is treated as a simple task that 
involves hiring an external consultant. Yet in this case, significantly more effort was expended to 
ensure that non-government actors were comfortable and encouraged by the process and would 
thereby invest and commit to the process. This began with the Science and Stakeholder 
committees being formally appointed through provincial government offices. It carried through to 
the day to day action during the year of deliberation on the Plan including very clear responses on 
the part of government to how they considered and weighed comments provided by non-
government actors. It also included more practical strategies such as video conferencing for those 
who could not attending meetings in person and the posting of meeting notes immediately 
following meetings. Also significant was the cyclical nature of commenting on components of the 
Plan – where draft items would move between the Science committee, provincial ministry(ies) the 
Stakeholder committee and back again. These measures created clear lines of accountability for 
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how things were being developed, responded to and advanced between various actors. Specific 
efforts on processes should be receive deep attention. 
Attention to opportunity 
This recommendation requires a keen attention to context and strategy, yet in several instances 
was well utilized by various governance actors. This is in specific reference to the capacity to see 
how ‘space’ is being opened, and the opportunity that may create to advance a particular agenda. 
This is not limited to policy opportunities, but rather tactical movement to move issues or needs 
through a system. In this case the system is the social-political-economic-environmental system 
of the Lake Simcoe watershed. This is a highly diversified, complex and inter-related system. 
Examples within this case include the opportunity to draw in political support for Lake Simcoe 
efforts in the early stages from the provincial government via the Memorandum of Understanding 
and financial backing from provincial cabinet. The skill to identify and monopolize this 
opportunity in order to further research efforts in the watershed was valuable. A later, example is 
the Conservation Authority taking a scan of the economic climate and seeing the financial 
withdrawal of the provincial government – this provided a necessary opportunity to draw in the 
municipalities as a financial partner, but also as implementer. Later still the Campaign Lake 
Simcoe drew on the political opportunity of an upcoming election to push their agenda to achieve 
legislation in the watershed. Each of these present strategic maneuver’s within the system, and 
were used to achieve a particular goal. This is related to one of the earlier recommendations 
whereby actors should be utilized for their particular skill and expertise, here too, opportunity 
must be sought and monopolized in a strategic manner.  
Creative Destruction  
At its most basic, creative destruction refers to the breaking apart of current systems, in order to 
enable a reconstruction through new stimuli and innovation. This process, although highly 
uncomfortable, unclear and at times alarming, can lead to inventive opportunities and a new path 
forward. Nearing the final phase of governance in the watershed, with the Conservation Authority 
leading efforts, who undertook a process to develop a new governance model for the watershed, 
and included in their efforts several non-government actors. While authentic and well intentioned, 
this process was ultimately unsuccessful, because alongside of these efforts the non-government 
actors were generating their own opportunities and building the solutions they felt necessary for 
the watershed. As described in this thesis, several new elements were ultimately developed. 
However, the process just before the emergence of the Act is important. During this period, there 
was significant contestation and conflict between the historical governance system in place, and 
the one being sought by non-government actors. This is not to say there was public inter-personal 
conflict, but that there was a push and pull between what had been, and what could be – which 
option would prevail? For all actors involved, this is a highly involved period, but where like two 
race cars, one may pull ahead, only to be superseded by the other moments later. Because it 
involves much investment of effort and resources, the stakes are high, but ultimately one must fall 
away. In this case, it was the Conservation Authority’s role as governance leader that needed to 
fall away to make room for a new architecture to emerge. The highly challenging aspect of this 
recommendation is to know when to push and when to pull on the system and in what direction. 
This again leads to the acuity of governance actors ability to read and see the system and 
opportunity. But also to get comfortable with ‘being uncomfortable’ in order to see new processes 
emerge.  
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5.6 Ideas for Future Research and Study Limitations 
There were two primary study limitations for this research. The first pertains to the data used for 
the social network analysis in Chapter Two. Data for the historical networks were based on 
meeting attendance, and could not be collected from the individuals first hand. Given that this 
was the type of data used, assumptions were made that meeting attendance equaled collaboration. 
While this assumption is supported by other formal documentation noting joint commitment to a 
project, several nuances of interpersonal interactions are lost, for example, variations in effort by 
each agency. Social network analysis data is most accurate when captured in real time. However, 
opportunity to capture governance data in real time may be infrequent, as a result of associated 
costs (long-term research projects) and access (depending on the political sensitivity of the 
governance system). Therefore the validity and potential for this kind of research is dependent on 
the availability of well managed formal documentation. The second study limitation relates to the 
lack of capacity to assess the success of the proposed multilevel and adaptive governance 
approaches identified in Chapter Three. These tools and processes are only valuable in light of 
their successful implementation. The time period of this research did not permit for an evaluation 
of these components. An evaluation of these tools would also lend itself to a future area of 
research.  
Given that this research uses a single case study methodology, the single largest future 
research opportunity is to apply conceptual developments from this research to multiple case 
studies to uncover whether the results from this research are evidence of wider trends or an 
example of an outlier case. Specifically, in regards to Chapter Two, whether governance systems 
exhibit similar patterns over time, or if multiple patterns exist would build the governance 
literature and provide greater insight into the actual complexities and interconnections between 
multiple governance systems in one geographic location, and for system change over time. 
Results of Chapter Three identified multiple tools and processes for water governance that were 
not reliant on a watershed boundary. Building a collection of tools and processes which are 
characterized by multilevel and adaptive characteristics would aid practitioners and broaden the 
scope of what is possible for water governance. Research from Chapter Three presents data which 
is perhaps the most context-specific, therefore determining if such skill and agency by other 
NGO’s can be applied will be important.  
Two other important areas for research emerge from this work. The distributed governance 
model presented in Chapter Three is a direct contrast to many of the international watershed 
governance models that primarily focus on the creation of a watershed organization. Thus 
whether this model also has the potential to be implemented at other scales would serve as a 
valuable development for the water governance model. Lastly, the relatively new application of 
Social Network Analysis to governance systems creates important opportunities to challenge and 
further develop governance theory. Greater application of this methodology to multiple cases, and 
a deeper application of the analytical tools that provide insight to power, communication and 
resource transfer would bring greater empirical weight to the literature.  
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Appendix B - Selected Activities of NGO Actors 
Date Organization Type of Activity 
2003 RLSC Formed  
2005 RLSC Conducted the Wave Program  
– promoting water safe lawn practices 
 CLS Formed 
 LofL  Formed 
- created first calendar for fundraising ‘calender girls’ style around 
the Lake 
- Raised $250,000 
 CLS Lobby event next to parliament  
2006 CLS Lobby provincial MPP 
 LofL, 
Windfall 
Ecology 
Public Events and Report – The Naked Truth  
- engaged 300 members of the public in field trips around the Lake 
to document problems and opportunities. As a collective, combined 
into a report, and set of recommendations to the provincial 
government  
 RLSC, LofL Wave Program continues 
 CLS Lobby event next to parliament 
 CLS Works with MPP to introduce a private members bill  
 
 Provincial 
Government 
Introduction of private members bill – Lake Simcoe Protection Act. 
- Bill does not pass, but the legislature agrees to turn it into a 
Resolution, requiring the Provincial Government to Act  
2007 LofL Report - Whales in Lake Simcoe?  
- report on youth environment education in Lake Simcoe 
 LSRCA Working group formed to review new governance models  
- included NGO actors  
 CLS   Campaign expands to include ON and RLSC 
 CLS, LofL Lake Simcoe Summit 
 
 Provincial 
Government 
Announces intent to create the Lake Simcoe Protection Act 
- announced at the Lake Simcoe Summit  
 CLS 
 
Media release - Applauding announcement of the LSPA 
 CLS Campaign gets a full time coordinator 
 CLS  Begins monthly newsletter campaign 
 Provincial 
Government 
Provincial election 
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 LSRCA 
working 
group 
Report - Towards a new governance model for LS  
- includes NGO actors  
 CLS  Report - Top 6 Priorities for LSA 
 Federal 
Government 
Federal government creates the Lake Simcoe Clean Up Fund 
- Creates a citizens committee to advise on the distribution of 
funds. NGO actors on committee 
 
 Provincial 
Government 
Introduces interim phosphorus regulation 
 CLS Media Release – Supports Interim Regulation 
2008 Provincial 
Government 
Releases Lake Simcoe Strategy 
 Federal 
Government 
Announces additional funds for the Lake Simcoe Clean Up Fund 
 CLS Media Release – Welcomes Lake Simcoe Strategy 
 Provincial 
Government 
Conducts public consultation on Lake Simcoe Strategy 
- NGO actors engaged  
 CLS Media Release – Announce Problems with Lake Simcoe Strategy 
 CLS Report - What it Takes to Save Lake Simcoe 
- report endorsed by 41 NGO groups in the watershed  
 Provincial 
Government 
Introduces Bill 99 – The Lake Simcoe Protection Act  
 CLS Media Release – Applaud introduction of Act 
 LofL Second Calendar – Media Launch Event 
 CLS Canoe lake tour to take about issues 
 CLS Presentation to Standing Committee on LSPA 
 Provincial 
Government 
Passes Lake Simcoe Act 
 CLS Media Release – Celebrating Passing of Act 
 Provincial 
Government 
Lake Simcoe Stakeholder Committee established 
 - NGO actors engaged on committee  
- As requested by NGO actors. Provide direct input to creation of 
Lake Simcoe Protection Plan 
 LofL, RLSC, 
Windfall 
Ecology 
Ourlakesimcoe.com launched 
- Website created by NGO’s to track disbursement of Federal Lake 
Simcoe Fund  
2009 Provincial 
Government 
Releases Lake Simcoe Protection Plan (implementation strategy for 
Act) (LSPP) 
 CLS Media Release – Problems with LSPP 
 CLS Report - Cheers and Jeers for Draft LSPP 
 CLS Media Release – Plan Still has Issues 
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 CLS Report - Plan for Success: a citizen response to the LSPP  
 LofL, 
Windfall, 
LSRCA 
WasteFilms – Youth Films Project  
- 64 youth made films about the environment in the Lake Simcoe 
watershed  
2010 Provincial 
government 
Public Information session on LSPP 
- NGOs engaged 
 CLS Media Release on Draft Strategies – what is missing 
 Provincial 
Government 
Workshops for Citizens, Planners, Municipalities on implementing 
LSPP 
- workshops for Citizens called for by NGO actors  
- as called for by NGO actors  
 Provincial 
Government 
Lake Simcoe Coordinating Committee established 
- provides advice to the minister on the progress of the 
implementation of the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan. NGO actors 
included 
 LofL, 
Windfall, 
LSRCA 
Re-Wilding Keswick Creek project 
- Youth create revitalization plan for a sub-watershed  
 RLSC Updating Strategic Plan 
 LofL Launch concept of the Ontario Water Centre 
 CLS Continues newsletter on Lake Simcoe 
 
